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The Involution and Politicization of U.S. Elite Press: A Case Study of Framing Discrepancies on the News Coverage of Sino-US Trade War
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The Involution and Politicization of U.S. Elite Press: A Case Study of Framing Discrepancies on the News Coverage of Sino-US Trade War

Ding Yi

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Principal Supervisor:
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June 2021

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis represents my own work which has been done after registration for the degree of PhD at Hong Kong Baptist University, and has not been previously included in a thesis or dissertation submitted to this or any other institution for a degree, diploma or other qualifications.

I have read the University's current research ethics guidelines, and accept responsibility for the conduct of the procedures in accordance with the University's Research Ethics committee (REC). I have attempted to identify all the risks related to this research that may arise in conducting this research, obtained the relevant ethical and/or safety approval (where applicable), and acknowledged my obligations and the rights of the participants.

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Date: July 2021

Abstract

The elite U.S. Press such as the New York Times (NYT), the Washington Post (WP), and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), when framing the Sino-U.S. trade war, tended to frame the disputes and issues concomitant to the trade war in completely different ways because of the differences inherent to the entirely distinctive media systems, as described by Hallin and Mancini (2004), and a wide range individual and societal level factors. The consensual view of the news is that journalists have a fourth estate role as the news texts and images are not merely concerned with representing the factual reality, but also the products of media institutions. Therefore, it is imperative to understand the news production in order to gain a deeper insight into the social and cultural phenomena behind the news contexts.

This research primarily adopts a combination of methods, including framing analysis, diachronic framing analysis, and multivariate regression analysis, and Chi-squared tests, along with more qualitative methods, such as in-depth interviews and discourse analysis, to explore the various dimensions of framing discrepancies, identify the presence of the master and emplotting frames on the three U.S. elite newspapers, namely, New York Times (NYT), the Wall Street Journals (WSJ), and the Washington Post (WP), along with two Chinese newspapers, China Daily (CD) and the Global Times (GT), in their diachronic dynamics with major events occurring along the timeline of the trade war, and, more importantly, examine the causalities between the two dimension of the core construct, news sources, viz. the locality and political power reliance and the concerned frames. Moreover, it has been found that there are significant differences among the five newspapers in the salience of political frames, economic frames, conflict frames, human rights frames, consequence frames, and secondary technology frames, including technology theft, forced technology transfer, and types of technology disputes. It has also been discovered that there are significant differences between Chinese & U.S. newspapers in the salience of political power reliance, conflict, consequence, and technology frames. In addition, WSJ and WP also witnessed a trend of using alternative and oppositional frames in

U.S. news coverage. In conclusion, this study contributes by putting forth the involution and parochialism of U.S. elite newspapers for their tendencies towards less diversity of frames, disproportionate focus on national interest of U.S. being compromised, disproportionate low presence of national interest of China, heavy reliance on government & authoritative sources, and last but not least, the myopic and over-simplistic views held by journalists towards the trade war. Further analyses also revealed strong antagonistic politicization trends of U.S. newspapers in general, with WP taking the lead, while the two Chinese newspapers, particularly GT, show strong predilections towards outward propagandization. This dissertation intends to further inform the extant literature in framing studies and international communication studies.

Keywords: Media Frames, Framing Discrepancies, Impression Management, Involution, Antagonistic Politicization, Professional Autonomy, Deviation of Journalistic Professionalism, Locality of Sources, Political Power Reliance of Sources, Outward Propagandization

Acknowledgement

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Chapter 1. Introduction and Backgrounds

1.1 The Purpose and Scope of the Study

The elite U.S. print media such as the New York Times (NYT) and the Washington Post (WP), when framing the trade war, tended to frame in terms of the salience and visibility of certain issues in completely disparate ways, as a reflection of the distinctions intrinsic to the entirely different media systems of the two countries, along with other socio-economic factors and moderators, such as the degree of commercialization or the privatization of the institutions, as in the case of the media establishment in both the countries, party-state corporatism as in the case of Chinese media institutions, which will be elucidated later in this chapter. The consensual view of news is that journalists have a fourth estate role, as the news texts and images are not merely about characterizing the reality but also the products of media institutions. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to gain a more profound insight into the news production in order to further comprehend the social and cultural phenomena behind news contexts. There are certain ways in framing practices that demonstrate the discrepancies of the discursive practices as part of the framing practices by journalists when they write about the momentous events, such as the Sino-U.S. trade war, encompassing not only the national and public interests, but also the economic interest. The discrepancies in the discursive practices can be demonstrated in a number of ways. For instance, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters, in the discourse of the news used to frame the trade war in the U.S. media outlets, despite remarkable variation among the three U.S. newspapers in

question, the public interest, to a certain extent, was given greater salience compared to the two Chinese newspapers. An inverse trend was observed in the salience of the national interest, as evidenced in the chapter on the results and findings that the two Chinese newspapers had the proclivity toward conferring precedence to the visibility of the national interest, either compromised or advanced as a result of the trade war, at the expense of the salience of the public interest. Moreover, the conflicts and consequences were more foregrounded in certain newspapers, as reported in the framing analysis that the presence of the antagonist or the conflict frames in the coverage of the trade war might have been more prevalent owing to an expansive range of factors. A meticulous examination of an article with the coverage on the trade war through the discourse analysis reveals the power relations backgrounding the trade war, offering new insightful perspectives into the news making. The purpose of this study was to explore the multifaceted dimensions of the discrepancies through using a wide array of qualitative and quantitative methodologies such as framing analysis, content analysis, and interviews.

1.2 Sino-U.S. Trade War and Issues at Stake

1.2.1 Timeline

January 20, 2017 was the inauguration of the 45th US President Donald Trump, and on April 4, 2018, the US government announced its intention to levy 25% tax on Chinese exports (1,333 items) into the US (took effect on July 6, 2018). On May 6, 2018, polls showed the approval rating of Donald Trump that reached a record high of 44.6%, and on July 11, 2018, the US government announced its list on

200 billion worth of Chinese commodities exported into the US, where 25% of tariff was levied. Furthermore, on August 1, 2018, the Trump administration announced a spike of tariff from 10% to 25% that was levied on the 200 billion worth of commodities exported into the US, and on December 1, 2018, a temporary truce on the trade war was announced at the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires, thereby giving the trade war a temporary stay of 90 days, and pending further agreement can be made between two sides. The truce was interpreted as a turning point of the Sino–US trade war by Chinese media, while American authorities have interpreted the 90-day temporary stay as the ultimatum, which is considered by China as the equivalent of any routine practice by the US intended to press impose its own interests in the former country through extreme pressure. Moreover, the very same incident has been framed by Chinese media as a sheer diplomatic victory.

1.2.2 Backgrounds of the Sino–US Trade War

Trump has posted on his Twitter account, "When a country (USA) is losing many billions of dollars on trade with virtually every country it does business with, trade wars are good, and easy to win. For example, when we are down $100 billion with a certain country and they get cute, don't trade anymore — we win big. It's easy!" The Sino–US trade war will be contextualized in the shift in the US from strategic expansion to strategic shrinking as a result of its dwindling revenue relative to its investment as reflected in its trade deficit against other countries, particularly China. The nuances of trade war should also be understood in the contexts where America has shifted its focus from exporting commodities to exporting services,

which is not factored in to cancel out the trade deficit against other countries, including China and the EU. These types of service include, but are not confined to, the advertisement revenue from Google and Facebook, Amazon Cloud, and the cut taken by Apple Inc. from revenues received from the Apple Store, Netflix subscriptions, revenues from movies and TV shows, and revenues resulting from IPOs and other transactions in the US stock market. However, these services were not calculated toward the trade volume of commodities, while the service industry accounts for more than 70% of the US GDP.

Other than the lagging of commodities of the US in certain industries behind China, another factor that may contribute to the trade war staged against China is attributable to the low results of Trump in polls, which reached 37% on December 13, 2017, followed by the oust of Kushner, his son-in-law, from policymaking and the subsequent designation of hawkish Peter Navarro as the Director of the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy. There is sufficient evidence that the support rates of Donald Trump have increased following the appointment of Peter Navarro, who launched Section 301 Investigation and, most importantly, a succession of subsequent measures taken against China during the progression of the trade war.

There is also evidence validating that the trade war is consistent with nationalism resulting from the diminishing middle-class and the decline of manufacturing, compounded by debt-stricken but jobless college graduates and the decrease of life expectancies in addition to other social conflicts. The middle-class is the cornerstone and the stabilizer of the US economy. Middle-class people with stable

jobs and possessions are less likely to take extreme attitudes toward social issues.

There is evidence that the US is gradually shifting from an olive-shaped society with

a population dominated by middle class people to an hourglass society, where the

polarization of the rich and the poor is enlarging. With the decline of the middle class

in the US, there tend to be more social conflicts. Hence, unemployed workers put the

blame on illegal immigrants, while laid off white collars pin the problems with

companies that employ several Indians who are paid much less. In the meantime,

workers who have to pay for mortgages complain about the expensive medical

insurance and heavy taxes, and ethnic minorities protest against violence by law

enforcement.

The Sino–US trade war should also be explored under the backdrop of the

trade war US waged against Europe by increasing the tariff. The imports of steel and

aluminum from Europe were levied at 25% and 10% punitive tariffs, further

exacerbate economy of EU. In July 2018, European antitrust regulators hit Google

with a record 4.34 billion euro fine, ordering it to stop using its popular Android to

block rivals.

The trade war can also be contextualized in the backgrounds where Donald

Trump announced the US plans to exit from the Paris Agreement, which was

intended to stop global warming. Even with widespread negative criticism, Donald

Trump argued that the exit from the agreement is in accordance with his American

first policy and is presumably beneficial to American workers and businesses.

Historically, once developed countries have access to cutting-edge technologies, they

tend to press developing countries to come to terms with the Paris Agreement, which is the follow-up on the Kyoto Agreement, to put cap on carbon emissions. Developed countries, thus, raise the threshold for the industrialization of developing countries while making money by selling developing-country technologies for reducing carbon emissions. In the meantime, developed countries, including the US, can brand their images as being responsible for the environment. When China first entered into the agreement, there was great opposition grounded on the claim that the agreement was unfair in the first place, as developing countries have completed the industrial revolution, while the limits of carbon emissions will be imposed on China upon entering into the Paris Agreement. Since China entered into the Paris Agreement, it has come as a huge surprise for the US, and China has made great progress and prospered in many fields, particularly in the new energy sector, including photovoltaic solar energy, nuclear energy, and low carbon thermal power, all of which provide a solution to reductions in carbon emissions. While the manufacturing sector in the US is dipping, the manufacturing sector of China has experienced exponential growth over the past decades. In 2004, the industrial-added value of the US was almost twice as much as that of China, while in 2006, the industrial-added value of China exceeded that of the US. In addition, in 2017, while the industrial-added value of the US was 2,869.2 billion USD, the industrial-added value of China reached 4,147 billion USD, which was 44.5% higher than that of the US.

1.3 Multitude of Views toward Sino-US Trade War and Issues at Stake

1.3.1 Pro-China Views toward the Trade War and Issues at Stake from the Pro-China Perspectives

  The view of Chinese authorities toward the trade war is that, to a certain extent, the trade war results from the dominant position of US dollars. Ever since the World War II, with the transition from industrial capitalism toward a financialized bubble economy, the dominance of US dollars has afforded the convenience and upper hands for the US to take advantage of and cash in the benefits that otherwise would have left other countries by means of simply printing more of its currency.

  From the perspective of Chinese authorities, as illustrated and expounded by a wide array of government documents and government officials, the trade war is a direct result of the new embodiment of the cold war between China and the US. China has emerged as the second-largest economy of the world and a global power to be reckoned with. This has become possible because of rapid industrialization in the early 1960s and then the reforms and opening up in the past four decades. The country owes its success to the right policies performed by visionary leaders and the hard work of its people. Notwithstanding, there is another very important, and often ignored, factor: China was developed in a non-hostile environment, one where the US and other Western countries supported and helped it grow.

  From the 1970s until recently, the US and the West have been pro-China. Their energies were first focused on isolating and confronting the USSR, and then after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, they turned their attention to the energy-

rich Middle East. In the Middle East, Iraq, then the region's strongest military might, was systematically destroyed. Its leader Saddam Hussein was also portrayed as a demonic dictator, and the country was invaded after being falsely accused of storing weapons of mass destruction. The government of Libya was also destroyed, and its leader Muammar Gaddafi was killed. As for the war in Kuwait, leaked documents arguably showed that the US ambassador effectively gave the green light to Saddam to invade. America's role in all these wars cannot be denied.

From the pro-China perspective, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Washington's say in global affairs was established, marking the start of the unipolar era. Nonetheless, the Syrian war turned the tables on unipolarity. The Russian involvement in Syria was an act of countering the US and its NATO allies. While the US was engaged in Middle Eastern conflicts, China was out of sight and developing rapidly. It is only very recently that the US has begun to feel that China's rise poses a threat. Now, the Western world's focus has changed to monitoring China. With China on the radar, every move it makes is subject to scrutiny, and an undeclared cold war is being waged. The trade war is only one dimension of the hostilities. Additionally, the US is openly supporting India, for example, to counter China, and encouraging Vietnam to create problems for Beijing. An energy-rich region with huge reserves of gas and oil is now the subject of numerous territorial disputes and may become the epicenter of future wars. With its military supremacy in the area, the US has conducted naval maneuvers in the seas that have generated tension. In view of the threats, China may be forced to increase its defense budget despite its own wishes for a "peaceful rise" and preoccupation with the country's continued development.

Nonetheless, pro-China experts see the trade war as an opportunity for China who has to take what it takes to weather the storm. As an old civilization, China has gone through many ups and downs in its history and learned many bitter lessons; therefore, it is mature enough to face any situation and navigate through these difficult times. On many occasions, China successfully avoided bloodshed and resolved highly complex issues. The 2017 and even the recent compromises that Beijing has made in its trade talks with the US are all evidence of the calm and mature heads in the city. Peaceful relations must be built on understanding. China's Belt and Road Initiative was launched to foster connectivity, improve infrastructure, and boost regional development. The initiative should also enhance people-to-people contacts, which would eventually promote understanding among nations. After all, relationships based on mutual understanding are more durable.

13.2 Pro-US Views Toward the Trade War and Issues at Stake from the Pro-US Perspective

As far as the US's national interests are concerned, Trump, since his inauguration, has been advocating a fairer, more reciprocal trade relationship with China throughout his campaign and has quickly made it a priority issue after taking office. The experts who are more concerned about the US interest argue that his decision to impose 10% tariffs on the US $200 billion in imports from China reflects confidence in his strategy and position. On multiple occasions, the Trump administration believes that the US is in a no-lose situation with two potential outcomes from the trade war both positive. They are expecting through the trade war that either China will revise its industrial policy to allow US companies reciprocal

market access, or the tariffs will cause US companies to disengage from China and bring manufacturing back to the US or source imports from countries that do not pose a long-term threat to US security. Moreover, from what is insinuated from Pence's speech and multitude of official documents released from the Trump administration, Trump's top priority is to seek reciprocity in what he sees as an unfair relationship characterized by a massive trade imbalance and persistent efforts to steal American technology and limit American companies' market access. The Trump administration has been making efforts to engage China to open and reform its markets by transparently recording objectionable Chinese acts, policies, and practices in trade, currency manipulation, and imperial expansion as illustrated in its One Belt and One Road Strategy.

An array of government records shows the American's bid to reduce its trade deficit with China, protect American technology and intellectual property, and create a level playing field for American companies in Chinese markets. The US rejected China's offer during the trade war to reduce the trade deficit by increasing purchases of US agricultural products and imploring the US to lift long-standing bans on the export of hi-tech goods.

Regarding the rejection of China's offer during the trade war because the country does not address the underlying industrial policies that engender the trade imbalance, the US has declined the proposal, dug its heels in, and made more tariff threats. Washington's rejection should be attributed not to truculence but to confidence that they are in the upper hand. The US can benefit whether the trade war

is short. From the pro-US standpoint of view, this is not a containment strategy, as argued by the pro-China view, but a reflection that the US recognizes the need to escalate its game to maintain its economic vitality and, ultimately, its long-term economic sovereignty.

1.4 Paradigms and Theoretical Foundation and Underpinnings of the Research

1.4.1 Introduction

When the editorials in the elite U.S. newspapers such as NYT, WP, and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), delineated the trade war, they tended to frame the major events in different ways, which is a reflection of the different paradigm guiding practices of the elite media professionals. I attempted to contextualize the issues within 3 different theoretical approaches in sociology to deal with the theme in question.

1.4.2 Practice Theory as an Interpretive Theory

The first approach was used to explain the reasons that lead to the discrepancies is practice theory. Practice theory is conceptualization regarding how people create the social world that creates them (Bourdieu, 1979). As will be mentioned in the discourse of Foucauldian tradition (1979), which serves the function of social reality construction, the editorials written by these elite media professionals, as well as the way how they frame issues related to human rights, can definitely serve to create the social reality. The practice theory emerges from structuralism but advances further from the idea of the underlying structures. Early anthropologists, in

consonance with the first approach mentioned earlier that explores how these journalists' identities shape up with external influences, only looked at the one-way arrow in their analysis of the social phenomena, i.e., how the society creates enculturated individuals. In the meantime, the practice theory also looks at how people, through their enculturated everyday actions, create the society that creates them. Berger and Luckman (1966) further explicated the practice theory in "the social construction of reality." More specifically, their theory asserts that people comprehend the universe altogether through the social lenses they have been provided with, and people are born into the world which they take for granted. Thereafter, people create a reality in their daily life. In this regard, the society is considered as a human product and an objective reality, and man is contemplated as a social product. In accordance with this theoretical framework, researchers, before going to the field and observing the participants' interviews, should examine how the institutions, the newspapers, or the newsrooms establish the institutionally-set line that the journalists within have to follow and believe its cultural legitimations and should accept the predetermined culture that helps shaping who they are, once they step into the newsrooms. Therefore, the data acquired from the field trips by inevitably conducting interviews on these elite American journalists regarding how and to what extent do newsrooms and workplace culture, as some type of power, shape not just the way they practice as media professionals, but most importantly, the way they accept becoming enculturated individuals. Considering the practice theory concerns itself on a double-arrow process, this research may also be concerned with how the discourse produced in the editorials and written by the journalists constructs the social reality and constructs the ideology and identities of not only the media

professionals within the institutions that shape who they are and who they are evolving into, but also those of the general public. Indeed, the social construction of discourse is the main concern of Foucauldian tradition (1979), Bourdieu's practice theory primarily brings it down to the level of individual action, belief, behavior, and even bodies through his concept of habitus, i.e., human beings recreate in a taken-for-granted way the society that has created them. Analogous to the language itself, Foucauldian discourse (1979), and structuralism by Levi-Strauss (1967), habitus indicates that human beings recreate in a taken-for-granted way the society that has created them. Habitus, according to Bourdieu (1977), is able to bridge the gap between conceiving of individuals as autonomous free agents and of individuals as entirely determined by social structures. In this study, the journalists are a combination of both, recreating with a limited degree of autonomy, the society at large, the newsroom, and the newspaper that has created them, based on their culturally shaped imaginations. Therefore, for the study, it was imperative to interview the journalists working in the news institutions for the purpose of making further inquiries as to how the culturally-shaped society of the U.S. and the newsroom environment build the framing practices of these journalists in relation to those by Chinese journalists from the Global Times (GT) and China Daily. Furthermore, the acquired data can also reveal how these journalists can shape their habitus, the place where they work in a certain way, so that it exerts influence on all other individuals, in addition to the discourse they have produced to construct the social reality in general.

From the perspective of Bourdieu (1977), this process is a negotiation between united theories of structure and the conceptions regarding individual actions. The differences between the concept of habitus and the structuralism lies in the fact that the former provides the reasons behind how individuals recreate the society the same way the society has created them, whereas the latter only concerns how the society where people live shapes their actions, beliefs, and even bodies. In this ethnographic research, this study can also be placed in the perspective of Ortner (1974, 2006), who argued that the practice theory implies that certain people have more power than others in shaping the society. Thus, this study revolved around the domination of the journalists holding more power than others in their abilities to recreate the society that shaped not only them but also the society and the news agency which they constitute as individuals. In line with the practice theory, this study offers an insightful glimpse into how journalists are able to take initiatives to make changes to the power structure and culture of the American society and the newsrooms that, in turn, shape their own framing practices.

1.4.3 The Foucauldian Perspective

The second approach that was used in this study was the Foucauldian tradition (1979). The approaches labeled as the post-structuralism can also be included in the theoretical debate, such as the Foucauldian discourse analysis (1979), to explore how the social world expressed through language is affected by various sources of power. To further explore how different agents function to have influences on social construction, post-structuralism may place the issue under different perspectives. As

far as Foucault is concerned, the power is internalized and distributed in a multitude of places and is never destined to involve violence and punishment as characterized by Panopticon (Foucault, 1979). The practice theory that may not attach prominence to power has made the prevalence of power salient. Therefore, the current study was conducted to explore how power comes into play in newsroom of the news agencies. More specifically, the current study explored how individuals involved in the ritual were acted upon or acting, even though in most of the cases, the journalists and editors are not aware of the power that acts upon them or the way they are actually acted upon by actors in determining the shifts in social values and other symbolic resources. In other words, the ethnographic work, if influenced by the Foucauldian tradition (1979) regarding power and knowledge, could concern itself with how all these actors as well as others involved in wedding ceremony act upon each other, making concerted efforts to construct social reality.

1.4.4 From the Perspective of Impression Management and Self

The following literature review focuses on and relates to the impression management in the backdrop of several U.S. elite newspapers framing the issue of human rights in various contexts. Impression management is a construct first conceptualized by Goffman (1959) who also referred to the construct as self-presentation, until further elaborated in notably more enriched contexts. According to Goffman (1959), impression management refers to a conscious or subconscious process in which people attempt to influence the perceptions of the other people about a person, object, or event by controlling and regulating information in social interaction. In other

words, it particularly concerns itself with how individuals try to present themselves according to their goals and needs by controlling and guiding how others form an impression of them, doing or not doing while performing before others. It was first introduced in face-to-face communication, before being incorporated into wider academic contexts including computer-mediated communication and corporate communication.

Two major issues of impression management are yet to be resolved. First, the motives behind the journalists' self-presentation are to be examined. Kamau (2009) remarked that impression management is crucial when there is a social situation in place, whether real or imaginary. Moreover, the primary goals of impression management serve to determine the ways and strategies relating to self-presentation or management of the impression. Furthermore, as asserted by Kamau (2009), a few factors need to be factored in to identify the construct of impression management or self-presentation and determine the strategies and ways of the same. Among all the factors, the most prominent ones that relate to various dimensions are the awareness of being a potential subject of being monitored, the characteristics of a social situation, and most importantly, the goals of the individuals and self-efficacy. As far as the social interaction and cultural norms are concerned, from the structuralism perspective, the actions have to be appropriate, as the relation to the target audience influences how impression management or the efforts in self-management are realized. As far as the goals are concerned, they influence the strategies of impression management, leading to distinct ways of self-presentation. Last but not least, self-efficacy refers to how a person believes the intended impression upon others can be

successfully conveyed. The importance of impression management is evident in an

extensive range of empirical studies including the one conducted by Anderson et al.

(2011), demonstrating that as the unconscious brain process shapes human

perception, people are more sensitive and pay more attention to faces or images that

tend to have negative or neutral associations compared to the positive ones. It is also

worth noting that there are countless methods behind self-presentation, including self-

disclosure and alter-casting, both widely used on the corporate level. In this study, for

the middle-level theory-building purposes, the self-disclosure by journalists and their

interactions with other factors including the various dimension of identities and the

multilevel influences on the news production in both China and the U.S. were

employed (Xu & Jin, 2016; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014).

1.4.5 Impression Management in Communication and Media Studies

Under this context, where the news construction is the chief concern, some

other methods than the two aforementioned are to be taken into consideration.

Nevertheless, the very concept relevant to the current study is the dramaturgical

analogy, starting from symbolic interactionism to record people's daily life.

According to Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical sociology, human interactions are

reliant on time, place, and audience, and in other words, human beings present

themselves to others based on cultural norms, values, and beliefs. In this study, using

the same theatrical metaphor, the journalists associated with the U.S. elite newspapers

presented themselves to their audience, based on whether their presentation of self

being accepted and endorsed by their audience. The social actions described in

dramaturgical sociology have been used by others to prove self-image by many other

scholars including Habermas and Garfinkel. Furthermore, Goffman (1959) visualized

this action as the performance to provide the audience with impression consistent

with the desired goals of the actor. Therefore, there are certain things that need to be

resolved to explore the issues. First and foremost, the goals of the journalists to

impose a certain impression on their audience, particularly when they frame the

human rights issues of the others as opposed to self in a different manner. Second, the

situation is also extremely related according to Goffman (1959), and therefore the

social norms, and values, and beliefs shaping journalists' motivations, goals, as well

as performances, have to be factored in when examining their practices and

construction of certain news types in question.

Other paradigms applicable to this study are under the umbrella of face-to-

face communication. Jones (1992) first introduced impression management as an

interpersonal process to characterize interpersonal process in face-to-face

communication. Schlenker (1980) further developed impression management in the

tradition of symbolic social interactionism (Stryker & Vryan, 2003). In Schlenker's

(1980) impression management, the concept of self is of particular importance as the

images that people have on themselves get shaped by interactions, the way in which

they can control the impressions others have on them and handle the consequences of

the social outcomes, even though Schlenker (1980) primarily dealt with children's

early experience, drawing on symbolic social interactionism. In this study, social

interactionism was contemplated as a more generic paradigm, and impression

management was presumed as more specific on a continuum to capture the social

reality where the construction of the news on human rights issues by journalists shape and get shaped by audience and the responses they receive. Since the social interaction is role-governed, as everyone in the social interaction has to role to play to ensure that the interaction goes smoothly, as claimed by Jonathan and Brown (2013), journalists in this study were examined with regard to their roles in imposing impressions upon others and what they received in terms of others' responses, whether positive or negative. Another factor that was factored in is the identity, as proposed by Schlenker (1980). The paradigm uses various impression management strategies to impose social identity on others, who, in turn, establish their identity to influence the behaviors and the responses they receive from others. From the perspective of symbolic interactionism, the journalists are inevitably involved in the social interactions in which they use strategies such as framing or priming to manage the impression, and concurrently, they are influenced by their role and self-identity. As a result, the behaviors of these journalists, their treatment of others, and the outcome they receive are also shaped by their roles, self-identities, and most significantly, the social situation involving, as previously mentioned, the social and cultural norms and beliefs, as well as their self-efficacy, which is to what extent journalists have faith in their ability to impose the impression they are framing onto the audience.

1.5 Narrowing the Scope of Research

1.5.1 Establishing Research Gaps

There is sufficient comparative research dedicated to how certain media in the U.S. and the West frame the issues in different manners to provide empirical support for the normative theories of journalistic practices, and literature on framing theories, and journalistic professionalism. For instance, Torrence (2012) examined how any experienced journalist frames certain issues of national importance regarding legislative and social issues in different ways in NYT and the Dallas Morning News, the embodiment of the elite media in Northern and Southern U.S., respectively, with the results showing that the two typically framed the same subject in different forms, but used equal tones of coverage, when two responsibilities of media were examined, namely framing the individuals and information in the current contexts and refraining from using one single moment or political episode to define the individuals. A comparative study by Esser and Umbricht (2013) acquired an extensive data based on 6525 randomly sampled political news at regional and national levels in newspapers in six western countries, namely the. U.S., the U.K., Germany, Switzerland, France, and Italy, to explore to what extent the discursively-defined reporting styles corresponded to the conceptual typologies of the media systems and historical classifications of journalistic tradition, in pursuit to provide empirical evidence in support of the normative theories regarding the different media systems in various western countries where the paradigm for professionalism journalism varies for historical and systematic reasons. In this study, the unit of analysis, the opinion-orientation, objectivity, and negativity, were examined under a framework on the typology of three major pathways, the predominant Anglo-American pathway, also

referred to as liberal or social mobility model, or professional model, described as objective, detached, and neutral in the way news is recorded, a universal corporatist Continental European model, more typical in more polarized Mediterranean European system, emphasizing interpretation and commentary over factual reporting (Mancini, 2000, 2005, as cited in Esser & Umbricht, 2013), with mixed news and opinions or giving precedence to ideas over reporting, under the context of stronger literary tradition, weak financial status, limited readership, and elite orientation, and last but not least, the corporatism models, most typical in Germany and Sweden, where the political system of consensus democracy is in place, focusing on power sharing, characterized by a group of institutions that arrive at a consensus by making collective decisions through bargaining and negotiation, with strong associations among newspapers, less emphasis on literary traditions, and connections to politics realized less through instrumentalization than consensus. The last of the three serves as the intermediate between the first two models, for its lesser professional journalism, parallelism politics, and pluralism, but more literary-oriented than the Anglo model, but revealing more professional journalism and information orientation than the second model, i.e., the universal corporatism continental model. The multivariate and univariate analyses reveal that in countries where polarized Mediterranean model prevail, the degree of opinion orientation is the highest among the three, and the U.S. news shows the largest share of objective reporting, and the U.K. news demonstrated a relatively lesser share of objective reporting, still fitting into the Anglo model. Regarding the diversity, it was observed from the study that the U.S. newspapers linked to more of the ideal of internal pluralism, in which case, each media outlet expresses a diversity of opinions from within as opposed to external

pluralism. Moreover, there is more coverage of pros and cons in the U.S. print media (Esser & Umbricht, 2013). All these factors evidence the nuances in the liberal system, providing empirical data for the normative theories of typology of media system; however, this study failed to investigate the nuances in the U.S. media system, either at national level or regional level, where internal pluralism prevails (Mancini, 2000, 2005). Furthermore, there was no empirical data provided to substantiate the negativity of reporting or even the framing discrepancies between self and others on certain issues. It shall be remarked that the study by Esser and Umbricht (2013) provides support for the research conducted by Benson (2010) and Benson and Halin (2007) asserting that the negativity is higher in French media than the Anglo systems following more liberal traditions, but much less than countries such as Germany and Sweden, where more corporatist traditions are followed. In a similar vein, the research failed to reveal the negativity made salient in the empirical studies in a more nuanced way, when being shed in various lights. Jirik (2010) reported that the Chinese media are not merely a party mouthpiece when part line is increasingly difficult to identify for the editors. Instead, Jirik (2010) argued that as opposed to a mere advocate for the Chinese government, the news-making process of Chinese media in English language demonstrated a complicated balance of sources, intention, and other constraints at ideological and political levels, resulting in a paradoxical combination of "ideological and narrative orientation in the news" (p. 36). Furthermore, Wang (2006) compared photographic coverage of China and the U.S. in each other's newspapers, concluding that in the coverage of China by the U.S., there are three major frames, a rising China, a communist China, and China as a threat, and in contrast, the entertainment, businesses, and science and technology are

the prevailing themes, with the media frames focusing on the materialistic U.S. and the funny Americans in Chinese media. While the Americans are framed in a hegemonic frame by the Chinese media and the human right infringement in China is framed in certain ways as stated above, there are no detailed discussions on the media framing of monumental events in the U.S. as significant as the trade war, not to mention no rigorous investigations on the issue under a comparative microscope with China's media system. A similar analysis can be seen in the work by Van and De Vreese (2012) that focuses on the reporting style and role conception in four countries. However, a limitation of their study lies in the fact that it failed to and did not intend to address the issues of how the journalists who manage their impressions and are engaged in framing practices deal with events of national importance differently in terms of giving certain issues more salience at the expense of others, moderated by their identities and other multi-level or multi-dimensional influences such as the impacts from editorial, institutional, and societal level and so forth. The study also did not assess the framing practices by them from a diachronic lens, in their interactions with the public opinions and the progress of the vicissitudes of the trade war. Therefore, a comparative framing analysis and epistemological study on the discrepancies among different countries with distinctive media systems was not warranted in their study, calling for more insightful and relevant studies to be conducted in the future, even though the visual framing by the U.S. media on China is well documented in a generic sense, when two frames a communism China and China as a threat can be utilized as a part of the coding scheme as an exploration into the framing analysis. Indeed, there are some works having reported the racial profiling of the domestic issues of the Americans, but typically are concerned with a limited

purview, such as the study by Patronik (2011) on the desegregation of the three flagship Southern universities based on the content analysis on news coverage as well as that on racial framing in the 2008 presidential election (2009). There exists a wide range of studies in the literature providing further corroboration for the media's different framing practices, reporting the issues confined to the political realms as in the case studies and discourses analyses on the U.S. elite media's perceptions on Tiananmen, Berlin Wall, as well as how the Americans see through China Daily under a hegemonic frame. Indeed, the three newspapers in question provide insights into the American elite journalists' deviation of country specific professionalism as demonstrated in the framing discrepancies that can bog down to their judicial superiority, hegemony, and ideological differences at multiple levels. Nevertheless, the relevance and the generalizability of several studies (Lee, 1981; Lee, 2002; Lee & Li, 2013) may be limited as the scope of these studies were constrained to the political realms and the media framing of China in the U.S. elite media and vice versa, in contrast to a major event with the magnitude equivalent to the trade war in terms of not only economic interest, but also the national and public interests of both the countries.

1.5.2 Research Overview

This research can prospectively enrich the framing theory when it comes to the discrepancies in framing the trade war or other notable events of national importance, even though there is abundance of framing analysis on visual representations and comparative content analysis on framing across different nations.

There is also a presence of abundance of de-westernized research on the modified paradigm in the Chinese media in a generic sense. For instance, there exists research on how the Chinese Communist Party has shaped the Chinese media's communication capacity of going global to exert further global power (Sun, 2010; Jirik, 2016). Nevertheless, there is insufficient research with a primary focus on the framing practices of major events with a focus on self vs. others in both the U.S. and China. Considering the " established pluralism" of the American media (Lee, 2002, p.2) .The purpose of this research was also to tie in the journalists' cultural, national, and ethnic identity issues with their impression management and framing practices, for stepping out of box to study impression management in the field of journalistic professional where the liberal model prevails. This research further explored the nuances of prevailing the assumption regarding the news production of the Chinese media that is mere a mouthpiece of the establishment, since the discrepancies in the framing practices of the two Chinese media outlets in question may well demonstrate that the boundaries are constantly pushed with more plurality, as opposed to mere and over-simplistic metaphor "emperor's clothes" (Jirik, 2001, p.2).

Chapter 2 Framing Theory and Framing Analysis

2.1 Framing Theory

According to the definition by Entman (1993), frames are generally defined by the definition of causal interpretations of the problem, and causes of the problems, and the suggestions on how to address the problem. Goffman (1986), widely known as the founder of framing analysis theory, argued that framing is able to help people position, become aware, recognize, and label. Thus, framing leads people to perceive and reproduce the basic cognitive structure of reality. This view runs contrary to the view held by others such as Gitlin (1980), who contended that frames fail to result from the conscious construction of the reality and are adopted unknowingly in its application. However, the extant literature, as demonstrated by Entman and Rojecki (1993), stated that framing is human construction and is employed proactively for the purpose of defining the issue, interpreting the cause, making moral criticism, and, most importantly, proposing solutions. Following this viewpoint made by Entman and Rojecki (1993), the views approving the defining proactive role of framing started to play a central role, as can be echoed in a wide selection of the existing literature, such as those by Entman and Rojecki (1993), Goffman (1986), and most prominently, Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman Bliss and Ghanem (1991). A synthesis of a wide selection of definitions on framing by Pan and Kosicki (1993) led to the standpoint of view that framing is a mere kinesiological tool meant to decode, interpret, and index information. Framing could relate to the professional practices and codes and therefore could be researched as journalists' strategies on the

construction of news. Meanwhile, it could also be studied in light of its own characteristics. This study intends to inform the latter, namely, the strategy commutation entailed in the construction of news by US elite journalists. A far cry from content analysis and discourse analysis, as stated by Pan and Kosicki (1993), framing analysis presumes that news texts can be expounded in their meaning objectively, as opposed to serving mere psychological stimuli. Conversely, framing analysis presumes that news texts entail a combination of semiotic tools enabling interactions with readers for the purpose of the construction of meanings. According to de Vreese (2002), frames can be broken down into two categories, namely, issue-specific and generic frames. There has been a succession of studies having used issue-specific frames. In this study, the generic frames will be utilized for analysis for the reason that generic frames are able to transcend and apply to various themes with different cultural backgrounds and temporal frameworks. It has been found that there are only few studies that have employed generic frames as opposed to issue-specific frames. Although the latter could also be informative, it could only be applied to specific cases without limited contributions to or inform the extant literature. However, it is worth noting that generic frames can be tested for future studies and that the conclusions can be generalized further. While most studies have only devoted to searching various frames used by divergent interest groups on the same event or issue (Entman & Rojecki, 1993), this chapter also intends to study how these generic frames evolve over the timeline to inform the existing theory on framing and frames and how the evolution in terms of these frames from the 5 newspapers affects the strategies taken by journalists in the construction of news.

2.2 Established Pluralism within Elite Hegemony

Chang (1990) found that the US elite media coverage of China is dominated by the president, his confidantes, key cabinet members, and congress. Lee (2002) also believed that if the elites can reach a consensus, the media will often only imitate the assumption of elite hegemony, approving the policies laid out by elites and demonizing their foes. If the elites fail to reach a consensus, then the media can have considerable freedom to report political conflicts and even challenge policy frameworks. Furthermore, Lee (2002) asserted that the reports of conflicts in Sino–US diplomatic relations belong to the latter. When the US media reported a foreign policy crisis or conflict, they acted as a little helper for the government. The Sino–US trade war is not only a diplomatic conflict, but also an all-round conflict in economics, politics, technology, and diplomacy. Lee (2002) also affirmed that the primary definer is the structural reality of power, while media serve as the secondary definer of reality. When the media criticize the White House, they tend not to challenge the basic assumptions and institutions of Americanism. Likewise, it can be postulated that when journalists and practitioners evaluate and criticize the Sino–US trade war, they are less likely to criticize these basic assumptions and systems. From another perspective, the media are less inclined to criticize all the aspects of national interests entailed in the established power structure but tend to criticize the public interests in which case elites may not have reached a consensus. Therefore, Lee (2002) believed that the discourse of elite media in the US is a pluralistic view within a narrow range, which is the established order or the official position of the country, which he called "established pluralism."

2.3 The Overview of the Chinese Newspapers

As far as the Global Times is concerned, in the study of political science, party adaptation refers to the dynamic process of continuous adjustment and the change of political party organizations to adapt to environmental changes. Unlike the earlier view that the CPC as a Leninist political party lacks adaptability and cannot adjust, today's political scholars tend to believe that after the 1980s, the ruling party of China is gradually showing the characteristics of adaption, becoming a system with adaptability, and creating itself into a system with adaptability. "A political system that is more responsive to the needs and interests of diverse sectors of society" (Dickson, 2000), thereby increasing regime resilience (Nathan, 2003).

Nevertheless, research on the adjustment of political parties in China is mainly concentrated in the field of political science. It mainly focuses on the absorption of elites, the reconstruction of organizations, the expansion and involvement of the political party system, and the system construction (Dickson, 2000; Zhang & Guo, 2012). Among the existing literature on party adaption, how to adapt the party's communication and propaganda system and its discourse composition, which is an important part of the party system, has not been paid enough attention. In fact, since the reform and opening up, the propaganda and communication system grasped by the Communist Party of China has been in the process of adjustment, which is a part of the adaptive regime system. This communication adjustment involves not only the construction of the communication platform, the reconstruction of the communication system, and the change of control policy but also the discourse level, such as the reconstruction of ideology.

Nonetheless, in the existing research of communication scholars, the focus of this communication adjustment is mainly on the market-oriented media sector, while the observation of the party media system, which is composed of the newspapers of party committees at all levels as the core, tends to think that its agenda remains unchanged, and its adjustment is not well understood.

This study tried to understand the propaganda system of trade war, especially the adjustment made by the party newspaper in its structure and role. Since the 21st century, the rise of the Internet, especially the rise of social media, has affected the leadership of the Chinese regime. The Communist Party of China has begun adjusting its propaganda system to make it more suitable for the emerging media ecology, which includes the strengthening of the supervision of the new media public opinion field and the establishment of websites and societies for the party media. The delivery of media accounts, Global Times, is a typical manifestation of the efforts of the ruling party to make its voice heard in the "public voice" of the new media. This dissertation hopes to take it as a case and combine various research methods to provide observation for understanding the adjustment and change of the communication system and mode exercised by the ruling party in the new era. This observation will enrich our understanding of the mode of communication in contemporary China to be compared and contrasted with the national interest vs. the public interest model in the discourse of American press, as signified in NYT, more business focused WSJ, and more conservative WP.

Communication scholars have paid more attention to the changes of the communicative system and discourse of the Communist Party of China after the reform and opening up. However, in the literature of communication scholars, the theoretical resources mainly come from the concept of "hegemony" of Marxist scholar Gramsci rather than the abovementioned concept of party adjustment. These documents are profoundly crucial for us to understand the adjustment of the communication system as an integral part of the political party system.

Communication scholars have found that since the reform and opening up, the ruling party of China has constantly been adjusting its media relations to cope with the impact of the introduction of market-oriented mechanism. With the rise of market-oriented newspapers, the structure of China's newspaper industry has gradually become diversified (Wu, 2000). The rise of market-oriented newspapers has expanded and expressed new media roles, such as information transmission and public opinion supervision (Pan & Chan, 2003). It has also impacted the "commandist" propaganda system with the core of traditional party media (Lee, 1990). The latter is inefficient to some extent. Therefore, although the party media, as the core of the ruling party's control over the media system, is the slowest to change, it is also experiencing gradual adjustment. The core of these adjustments is a conscious response to the impact of marketization. Its purpose is to help the ruling party to rebuild its cultural leadership in the face of crisis and impact, and this adjustment involves structure, system, role, and discourse.

Regarding the media policy and the definition of media role, in terms of media policy and the definition of media role, although the propaganda of the party's principles and policies has always been regarded as the core role of the party media, the ruling party has been trying to adjust and expand its traditional role and adjust its media policy in the past years of reform and opening up. For example, views reflecting public opinion, not just the will of the party, are gradually accepted. The media are regarded not only as the mouthpiece of the party but also as the mouthpiece of the people (Li, 1995). Vocabulary, such as "public opinion guidance" and "public opinion guidance," has been employed by the government to define the role and function of party newspapers (Luo & Yao, 2012). Instead of just trying to tell the public what they think in a rigid way, the party media are turning to "agenda setting" as the classical western communication theory says. Moreover, it opens up the media's expression of the public's voice, while at the same time, the party still dominates the media.

At the discourse level, when facing the crisis of discourse breakage brought by the party's pursuit of economic development (such as the "abandonment" of farmers and rural areas by economic development), the ruling party has also constantly reconstructed its ideology by reinventing new discourse packages or calling on traditional socialist ideology to reduce it. The gap between social reality and traditional ideology and its legalization (e.g., the problem that rural development lags far behind urban development) are being widened (Huang, 2013; Song & Chang, 2012). "Clear propagandist practices" give way to the practice of framing practices with an intrinsically compact meaning framework (Song & Chang, 2012, p. 334).

Notwithstanding, despite the conscious adjustment made by the party media, it has never been able to solve a dilemma, that is, the internal contradiction between meeting its basic role (propaganda and public opinion guidance) and meeting the needs of the people. Once the function of propaganda and public opinion guidance given by the party is fulfilled, it will make the public feel that they are full of official morality and respect. If we blindly satisfy people's interests and base ourselves on expressing people's resentment, then it will deviate from the role track entrusted to it by the party. The rapid decline in the reading rate of party newspapers in recent years is a manifestation. The attraction of party newspapers and media to the people is greatly weakened, thereby making it difficult to convey the voice of the party newspapers to the people, and the various roles and missions it undertakes have lost their realistic basis. This crisis began to be noticed by the observers of the party media in the mid and late 1990s and was described as the conflict between "two public opinion fields" (Zheng, 2003). In fact, the oral communication of the common people constitutes a "public opinion field" or "folk public opinion field," which lies outside the party newspapers and forms a structure with the party newspapers and periodicals. Official public opinion has different concerns, interests, and views.

The Global Times (GT), on the one hand, to be welcomed by readers, on the other hand, to meet the requirements of the party, and, at the same time, to accomplish these two missions with inherent contradictions. This research is performed under this background for the sake of comparison and contrast with the framing practices by US media. Taking the Global Times as an example, the study attempts to observe the adjustment measures taken by the ruling party in the context

of the impact of new media. Through its observation, this study also aims to investigate the adjustment and change of the party media under the new social conditions. Specifically, what we want to explore is as follows: what kind of strategy does this new and adaptive communication structure choose, how to adjust the propaganda mode of the traditional party media such as the Global Times, and how to interpret and understand this adjustment?

2.4 Racism Frames

Most researchers use the values of national scholars to judge American media coverage, ignoring the value of American journalists (Lee, 2002), especially on the various issues of Sino–US differences represented by the trade war. Thus, this chapter uses racism as the main framework to study how American journalists view the Sino-US trade war.

Dorogi (2001) asserted that international news in the US always has strong ideological tendencies using American progressive standards to interpret foreign cultures. That is to say, even if American democracy needs reform, there is no fundamental problem. Although the media framework has fluctuated in different historical periods, the mainstream of reporting on Chinese social and political issues still has negative racism (Lee, 2002). International news is seen as a variation on domestic themes related to American national and public interests. Gans (1980) defined racism as the journalists' own country above all else and evaluated whether the behavior and value of the smaller US could be benchmarked outside the country.

Moreover, Lee (2002) may highlight the superiority of capitalism from the guarantee of communism everywhere and downplay human rights abuses committed by the US and its allies. Therefore, the China issue reflected in the media actually reflects what happened in the US and the interaction between the two. This chapter thus tackles the racism framework as one of the main frameworks for studying the American media's framework for trade show issues.

2.5 Conflict Frames

Conflict frameworks are the most common framework in US news reporting. Conflict frameworks welcome attention by emphasizing individual, organizational, or institutional identification conflicts. The conflict framework is smooth, and complex political disputes are reduced to simple conflicts (Neuman et al, 1992). The ideological frames put forth by Lee (2002) includes containment, contact, and globalization, but it cannot be reflected in various aspects, such as economics, military, sports, and other fields. The most controversial ideological conflicts of trade and democracy can also be studied simultaneously from the two frames of capitalism and human rights. Neuman, et al. (1992) also contended that conflicts mainly emphasize conflicts between individual groups or between countries. The conflict frames a common news framework for the media. For instance, in the news reports and coverage of American journalists in the trade war, there have been several news reports on the harmful effects of the US government's policies and strategies during different phrases of the Sino–US trade war on American consumers and employees.

2.6 Responsible Capitalism Frames

Gans (1980) considered responsible for capitalism to be a lasting value of American journalists. He also assumed that competition will create more wealth but hurt people; hence, it must avoid unreasonable profits and excessively exploit workers and customers. In news reports, Gans found that the US News has always been a capitalist framework to criticize the communist and democratic socialist economy. American journalists within the US often reach a consensus that the communal system and other socialist schemes award the abolition of private property, hurt productivity, and increase the brokerage. They also criticize the new type of the bureaucracy of the socialist economy.

2.7 Human Rights Frames

Tien and Nathan (2001) argued that the attitudes of the US popular dialogue have not changed during the ten years of the Tiananmen incident. In the reports on trade wars and on Sino–US conflicts, previous studies have shown that there is a large amount of ideological output on the ideology of American elite media and human rights issues. Therefore, the coverage on the trade war is able to reflect the established pluralism in the larger framework of Americanism, the consensus made among American elite journalists.

2.8 A Two-Level Analysis Model

These frames in the five-frame theory are the following (Neuman et al., 1992): (1) the conflict frame, (2) the economic consequence frame, (3) the human-interest frame, (4) the attribution of responsibility frame, and (5) the morality frame.

In political news reports, the thematic and episodic frameworks are also a pair of common framework models (Lene, 2011). According to Lene (2011), the former focuses on political issues and events in the macro context proposing a common, abstract, and general evidence-based discourse construction model. For instance, this framework has been employed in news reports that use statistics to prove that governments are cutting welfare spending in the context of the global financial crisis. The latter focuses on the specific event process and personal life and constructs the understanding of events from the perspective of individual narrative rather than political issues. While scenario frameworks tended to be used to construct specific events and problems, human accidents usually use a more macro perspective.

This study is to draw on the widely used five-frame theory, together with the Liu (2017) crisis frame theory, to construct a two-layer analysis model to explore the issue. The so-called "two-layer analysis model" refers to, on the one hand, from "what happened" (nature and magnitude of the issue), "what are the consequences" (consequences and losses), "how to face" (emotional and moral), "why it happened" (attribution of accountability), and "how to do" (measures and plans) to comprehensively analyze the focus on the various aspects of the Sino–US trade war. Due to the relationship between accountability logic, this study aims to include the

thematic framework and the episodic framework commonly used in media analysis into the analysis model. This model was developed according to Liu's (2017) crisis framing model, integrating the aforementioned frames: conflict frame, communism frame, responsible capitalism frame, human rights frame, the economic consequence frame, and morality frame.

"What happened" emphasizes the identification of the nature and magnitude of the event by the actors. It is the basis of emergency management and follow-up political works to accurately grasp the development of events and scientifically determine the direction of journalists' agenda setting in their efforts to draw public attention, and it is the key to the natural to social transition of crisis. "What is the consequence" emphasizes paying attention to the casualties and economic losses and the possible secondary harm, which is not only the continuation of qualitative events but also the basis of crisis management, economic compensation, and political accountability. Furthermore, "why did it happen" is the construction of the cause of the events and the allocation of responsibility. The pursuit of a causal mechanism is the basis of responsibility attribution. The interpretation of causes and responsibilities for the event is directly related to the public's trust and image of the government. It is an important basis for improving relevant mechanisms to ensure that the event will not repeat again. "How to face" (humanistic care/humanitarianism) shows the emotional attitude of political actors toward events and the value norms and ideologies they uphold. As an important part of "emotional politics" in the political discourse, the government tries to arouse value and emotion by expressing "good and evil," "innocent or guilty," "taking responsibility or escaping," and "right or wrong."

The feelings of compassion, anger, bravery, and fearlessness of politicians in the face

of crisis have some internal relations with the evolution and handling of the situation,

accountability, and even political change. Finally, "what to do" represents a

construction that seeks solutions and ensures that events do not occur again. The

construction of the above issues by political actors determines whether the crisis

political situation can be changed and what kind of political and policy achievement

can be brought. The successful construction and implementation of the discourse

framework can help the government survive the crisis, restore government trust,

improve the image and reputation of the government, and even open the window of

policy and trigger policy change through crisis discussion.

Episodic frames contrast with thematic frames in many ways. Whereas an episodic frames tend to focus on an individual, a thematic frames are more inclined to focus on the issues. in addition, while An episodic frames focuses on a single event; thematic frames focuses on trends over time.
All the frames being contrasted and compared across various newspapers including US elite print media (NYT, WSJ, and WP), and Global Times and China Daily are placed somewhere on the continuum between episodic and thematic frames.

Figure 1
The Diagram on Generic, Episodic and Issue Frames

Figure 2
National Interest vs. Public Interest

Chapter 3 Research Design and Methodology

3.1 Overview of Research Methodology

The frames were examined in a two-year period or timeline, punctuated by momentous events occurring along with the trade war to examine whether there were associations between the types of frames used and the tone of media coverage (positive, neutral, and negative), and associations between the frames and sources having fed the news pieces. The framing analysis was also performed to examine the trends of a wide array of frames over the timeline, namely, the evolution of an extensive range of thematic and episodic frames in a diachronic fashion from a comparative perspective on the three U.S. elite newspapers and two Chinese government-affiliated news agencies. The articles for this study were taken from the LexisNexis news database using guided news search, including the less salient information pieces and more salient articles from the editorial desks on the trade war or peripherally related to the trade war. Following a deductive method, derived from the extant literature on frames and framing, coders were assigned to code numerous dominant and secondary frames of the selected articles. Besides, all these articles were also rated by their overall tone of coverage (from negative to positive) to measure valence frames and the salience of certain themes and issues, on Likert scales or as categorical variables, with the inter-coder reliability being calculated. Therefore, the associations among various frames, between the sources and the aforementioned frames, and most particularly, between the frames and tone of coverage was made salient in various Chinese and U.S. contexts regarding the Sino-U.S. trade war in order to examine the multifarious dimensions of discrepancies.

Therefore, the findings retrieved from an array of diachronic framing analyses, having been conducted under a comparative perspective, were also triangulated with the findings from existing literature, a wide range of multivariate regression analyses including both OLS and to study the effects of ownerships of the newspapers, countries of the newspapers (Chinese vis-à-vis U.S. newspapers), along with the two dimensions of the sources, two of the core concepts in this research, viz. the locality of the sources and power reliance of the source, namely, the number of authorities including both government sources, and those associated with government and establishments in both China and U.S., such as government spokespersons, government officials, and other authorities, on the eight major frames most prevalent, having been identified in the chapter 5, with a wide range of chi-square tests having been conducted to test the statistical significant differences in these major frames among the three U.S newspapers, the New York Times (NYT), the Washington Post (WP), the Wall Street Journals (WSJ), and the two Chinese newspapers, China Daily (CD) and Global Times (GT).

This research also focused on the underlying reasons and underpinnings that lead to these intranational (e.g. GT vis-à-vis CD and a three-way comparison among NYT, WP, and WSJ) and cross national (viz. Chinese vis-à-vis American newspapers) discrepancies through a more qualitative approach such as interviews and discourse analysis, using both grand and middle range theories as paradigm, as efforts to examine the recent tendencies of journalistic practices and professionalism in the U.S. elite press with a plethora of views toward multitudinous aspects of the trade war, for the purpose of achieving theoretical saturation and informing the extant

literature. As mentioned earlier, there are certain existing studies in the literature that provide further justifications for the media's differing framing practices, not only covering the issues confined to the political realm as in the case studies and discourse analysis in the U.S. elite media's perception on Tiananmen, Berlin Wall, and moreover how Americans saw through China Daily under a hegemonic frame, but also seeking more generalizable justifications behind the salient discrepancies of framing practices, going beyond the narrow scope of China and transcending the mere political realm in which the framing is based on the differences in their ideology (Lee, 1981; Lee, 2002; Lee & Li, 2013).

3.2 Content Analysis and Framing Analysis

This research intended to use a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods including content analysis, in-depth interviews, framing analysis, discourse analysis, multivariate regression analysis, along with diachronic framing analysis, to provide empirical evidence for the conceptual framework hypotheses in Chapter 4.

Content analysis is a beneficial research method to study communication processes over time. Its advantages involve collecting data and analyzing quality data. According to Cole (1988), content analysis is used to analyze newspapers, hymns, and magazines as a method to a analyze written, spoken, or illustrative communication messages. In this case, it is a study of unobtrusive recorded human communication to study observable content. However, the content analysis is employed in this research to analyze the manifest or observable content in

combination with the framing analysis to study the less salient information or latent content, in other words, the underlying meaning of the content, in news in both US elite press and the two Chinese newspapers, Global Times and China Daily. The content analysis was conducted in the following way. The inquiry was made into exploring what boiling words were most frequently utilized or highlighted in their reporting. Additionally, the framing analysis is also crucial to inform the areas of research interest. As mentioned early, the research is to inform whether public interest or national interest along with other issues was given more salience in the news coverage of the five newspapers.

3.3 Research Design

In this study, the content analysis and framing analysis were conducted to determine whether there was dynamism of divergent frames to be used along the course of the Sino–US trade war on the five newspapers. Regarding the framing analysis, 7 coders were assigned to code all the news articles related to trade wars, the Sino–US trade war, and Sino–US conflicts, all which are keywords to locate the news pieces from the five newspapers to study the framing practices by journalists, and this study explored how it played out along the course of the trade war punctuated by major landmark events in terms of public interest frames vs. national interest frames and the salience given to other issues.

The framing analysis in this research was broken down into two parts. The first part was a descriptive analysis on the number of reports per event and the type of

news. The types of news include but were not limited to the following categories: news, news features, news analysis, news commentaries, background analysis, and miscellaneous. The second part examined the various generic frames of the trade war on the three U.S. newspapers in the US aforementioned on the timeline of the Sino–US trade war, starting from July 6th, and ending on May 12th, 2020, punctuated by major events, such as the bilateral trade talks and truces, along with rollbacks, with the purpose of examining how the frames on the 5 newspapers evolve along the timeline with the progression of the event along with their similarities and differences. The third part investigates the two major newspapers in China, People's Daily and Global Times, to make contrasts and comparisons with the results from the second part as efforts to conduct cross-regional studies. The frames that make certain information more salient were compared and contrasted with the results from the three newspapers to explore whether there were discrepancies that exist. In the meantime, the keywords from various sources are also to be compared and contrasted capturing the nuances. Moreover, in order to better understand how trade frictions between China and the US escalated step by step, the timeline, since the beginning of Sino–US trade war, provided the grounds for the further diachronic framing analysis on the three U.S newspapers later on in Chapter 6.

In addition to the content analysis and framing analysis intended to explore the intranational and cross-national framing discrepancies, an array of multivariate regression analyses were also conducted to predict the effects of the ownership of the five newspapers, the country of the newspapers, along with the two dimension of the sources, namely, the locality of the sources, and the power reliance of the sources, on

the frequency and the probability of the presence of the major frames identified in the earlier sections of Chapter 5. The framing analysis, content analysis and ensuing diachronic framing analyses, on the two Chinese papers were conducted in accordance with the same timeline of the trade war and analyzed and coded by the same divergent generic frames and with the aforementioned elaborations, along with the analysis on the valence frames. As part of the qualitative inquiry into the discrepancies in framing practices in U.S. press, three interviews with interview guidelines (Appendix 1) were conducted to explore the discrepancies in the salience given to certain issues and investigate the more recent trends of journalistic practices of American journalists.

The codebook (Appendix 2) is necessary to inform the coders to code the frames of news articles in questions. As in this study, the unit of analysis is the paragraphs; thus, each entry could involve various generic/issues frames, and all paragraphs were coded in caliber with economic frames, political and ideological frames, consequence frames, power reliance frames, technology frames, conflict frames and most importantly, the counter frames in the form of public interest frames vis-à-vis national interest frames, in the trade war escalating along the timeline from both sides, revengeful measures being taken, and the temporary stays of economic measures, such as tariff raise and embargo on technology components to Chinese corporation-based technology theft claims.

3.4 Media Frames and Measurements

The identification methods of news frames mainly include the induction and deduction methods. Compared with the induction method, which can only be used in studies that use fewer samples, the deductive method can be applied to a larger number of samples, and the data results can be copied. This research was based on the nearly 2-year timeline of the trade war and 1189 news samples including both information pieces and editorials randomly selected based on constructive weeks from the five major newspapers for analysis. Accordingly, this study mainly used the deductive method to identify the news frame. As mentioned earlier, there are other types that are less generic but are more specific frames, such as political frames, which emphasize the political agenda and foreign policies related to trade war, economical frames, which highlight the influence on the economic indicators of China, the US, and other countries (as opposed to packages on ideological and political conflicts), and technological frames, which, as demonstrated in various reports, may involve the forced technological transfer and alleged technology theft.

The unit analysis for framing analysis and the following two-step diachronic framing analyses in Chapters 6 and 7, the paragraphs, as opposed to passages, as each reporting passage covering trade wars during different phases may include multiple frames. Notwithstanding, the nuances of all these frames can be further identified. As far as the technology frames are concerned, they are mostly concerned with forced technology transfer or technology theft, both of which could be either national interest framed or public interest framed, depending on how the report is framed. Regarding economic interest, on the same token, they can be either national interest framed or public interest framed, depending on whether these reports are related to

the well-being of the general public of the American public and the employment of Americans or the soft power of American economy, the ascendancy of US dollars under the threat of the Asian Investment Bank, launched by China, and One Belt, One Road policies in contradictions of US national interests. Likewise, when it comes to the political frames, the reporting is for the most national interest framed, and human rights frames are mostly public interest framed, since they mostly involve the interests of American citizens and enterprises in China. Thus, in this research, a total of 12 primary frames and their secondary frames will also be coded and analyzed to determine both cross-national and intranational framing discrepancies. Moreover, a diachronic framing analysis was also conducted on all the concerned newspapers on the timeline, punctuated by landmark events, starting from November 2018 to May 2020 until the first phase deal clinched by U.S. and China.

3.5 Sampling Methods and Coding

With regard framing analysis, the keywords, such as trade wars or Sino–US conflicts, can be used to locate the passages and paragraphs in question. 8 coders were assigned to code the random sampled 1189 paragraphs with inter-coder reliability being calculated. Selection criteria are based on the ideological representation of each newspaper in the country and the role of opinion leaders in other mass media and audiences (Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Entman, 2008; Papacharissi & Oliveira, 2008). The NYT, Washington Post, and WSJ were selected to represent US elite newspapers, and China Daily and the Global Times were chosen to represent Chinese newspapers. All the news articles on the three U.S. newspapers

are in English, whereas the sampled articles on the two Chinese China Daily and Global times are in mostly in English, with around 30% in Chinese.

Due to the considerable size of the selected news articles retrieved from the database (7924 articles), the constructed week sampling technique was adopted. Specifically, an issue of the newspaper was selected randomly, the day (Monday) of the issue was selected, the next issue of the ensuing Tuesday was selected, and the day of the issue loops back into Monday again. A fixed interval of 7 weeks and the systematic probability sample section method will be used on all five newspapers. According to Hester and Dougal (2007), while a single constructed week allows the reliable estimates of content in a population of six months of newspaper editions, at least two constructed weeks and as many as five constructed weeks are crucial to accurately represent online news content gathered during the same period, depending on the type of variable being analyzed. Other merits contributing to the effectiveness of the studies lie in the fact that the day of the week effect can be avoided (Riff, Aust, & Lacy, 1993). Consequently, a total of 1189 articles were randomly selected from the pool for further analysis. 8 undergraduate and graduate students who are bilingual in Chinese and English were recruited to be trained as coders. All coders are asked to code 30 to 40 articles to ensure the required 85% as stipulated by Kassarjian (1977). For the validation of the inter-coder reliability, both Cohen's kappa and Scott's pi were calculated.

3.6 Coding Schemes, Recoding and Measurements

All the 12 primary frames integrated by the two-level model were either measured by ordinal or nominal measurement scales. All the major frames identified in Chapter 5 as major frames measured by ordinal variables were recoded into dummy variables (0= no presence, 1= presence) for the convenience of the following logistic regression analysis in Chapter 5. This research also aimed to identify how the three elite U.S. press and 2 Chinese newspapers changed and existed in terms of the 8 major frames in the development of the trade war, as demonstrated in Chapter 6 and 7 respectively.

Power reliance frames were quantified by the frequency of quotes elicited from government officials and institutional authorities as an ordinal variable (1. No presence 2. Few 3. Several 3. Many). Another variable was also measured for secondary power reliance frames in terms of the quotes cited from different regions and governments (1 = members of the Chinese Communist Party, 2 = Chinese government sources, 3 = Chinese government spokesperson, 4 = source close to the Chinese government and agency, 5 = members of political parties in the US, 6 = US government sources, 7 = US government spokesperson, and 8 = sources close to the US government and agencies). The conflict frames were coded into a ordinal variable to measure its frequency and compare its discrepancies among the five newspapers, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, before being recoded into a dummy coded variable (0 = no; 1 = yes) to measure its presence and for the optimal operationalization of the following logistic regression analysis in Chapter 5. This variable was operationalized

as the presence of the discordance of opinions or conflicts of views from government agencies, institutions, and individuals present in the news reports.

Accountability/responsibility attribution frames first and foremost refer to the fact that parts of the news hold certain parties responsible for the social, economic, and political problems arising from the Sino–US trade war in this study. It was firstly measured in its frequency on a ordinal scale, but there was another variable for accountability/responsibility attribution frames for categorization (0 = no; 1 = US individuals; 2 = the US government and Trump; 3 = US corporation and business; 4 = Chinese individuals; 5 = the Chinese government; 6 = Chinese corporation and businesses; and 7 others, specify: ___). If in one article there are two or more parts, for instance, indicating the problem can be attributed to both the US government and US corporations, then both 2 and 3 will be coded by coders. There were also other questions designed to measure the problem attribution. Likewise, technology frames, the counter frames in the form of national interest vis-à-vis public interest frames, power reliance frames, and consequence frames were also measured on both ordinal scales and categorical scales for the purpose of understanding the nuances and locality of the frames (see Appendix 2, Codebook). For instance, the secondary national frames were measured on a categorical scale (1= U.S. national interest are advanced; 2 = U.S national interest are compromised; 3= Chinese national interest are advanced; 4= Chinese national interest are compromised.)

Moreover, political and ideological frames, economic frames, consequence frames, public interest frames, and national interest frames, consequence frames,

conflict frames, and power reliance frames, were all coded as ordinal measures before being recoded into categorical dummy variables in terms of their presence (0 = no presence; 1 = presence), as they were identified as the major frames due to their strong presence in Chapter 5, and employed as the dependent variables in the multivariate regression analysis to explore their relationships with the two dimensions of news source.

The other four generic frames are the racism frames, responsible capitalism frames, human rights frames, and morality frames were not used to examine the changes and tendencies in the elite US media news reports and coverage at diverse stages of the trade war due to their marginal and negligible presence, as delineated in Chapter 5. These aforementioned frames were also not employed to conduct meaningful framing analyses of the trade war between the two mainstream official media in China, considering the fact that the human rights frame, racist frame, and responsible capitalist frame have very marginal existence and no practical significance, nor can it form meaningful cross-region framing analysis and research.

3.7 Ethical Considerations, Problems, and Limitations

Regarding the in-depth, all the interviewees were given informed consent before the survey, before interviews were conducted. Given that some interviewees were journalists working in the NYT, WSJ, confidentiality was a rule of thumb in the study.

Chapter 4 Developing a Theoretical Framework and Identifying Research Gaps

The objective of this chapter is to elucidate the theoretical framework that was developed in this study to bridge the gap in the existing research, in pursuit to investigate the image of China and momentous events, such as the Sino-U.S. trade war, framed by the elite U.S. press in contrast with the two major elite Chinese newspapers. In addition, it was attempted to identify the extrinsic as well as intrinsic factors pertaining to the framing practices on multiple levels. The previous chapters reviewed the literature and discussed numerous studies devoted to the use of framing theory and framing analysis, both of which are of cardinal importance to research on notable media events and the factors that influence the images of China and such events in news and editorials.

There exist limitations in the framing theory on exogenous or independent variables that provide explanations for the framing practices, including issue frames, valence frames, generic frames, episodic frames. Notwithstanding the fact, news framing is the primary analytical framework for analysis conducted in the study, detailed in this thesis, to establish ontological understanding of the practices by journalists to identical textual practices by evaluating the salience and omission of words in news content (Entman, 1993b). This is because framing theory is a very flexible and inter-disciplinary analytical tool to understand the images of China and significant events presented in press. Besides, there are two other major theoretical frameworks central to this study, namely the hierarchical model of influences on

media content by Reese and Shoemaker (1996) and impression management by

Erving Goffman (Goffman, 1959; Shoemaker et al., 2020).

4.1 Hierarchical Model of Influences on Media Content

The literature and empirical studies on media content assert that discourse can

potentially construct a myriad of realities. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) proposed a

multi-level hierarchical model of influences on media content, identifying five levels,

viz. individual, media routines, organizational, extra-media, and ideological. In

another interview with Shoemaker (Chen, 2002; Compaine & Gomery, 2000; Shaver,

2001), a supera-level of gatekeeping or influence was introduced. More specifically,

WeChat, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, all such social media platforms are known as

supera gatekeepers as they are controlling content. Such control is not the same as the

gatekeeper control of individual users and mass media. Supera gatekeepers search the

Internet for mass media messages, social media posts, personal blog content, etc.

Upon analysis, based on the superiority in level in comparison with the other

communicators, they integrate, reshape, and reproduce the content, to revamp it

essentially. These swarming media news sources present the changing social reality

with the passage of time. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) further argued that each level

of the hierarchy has its own effects on the media content as gatekeepers, even though

the influence is confined to the superior level of each hierarchy. According to this

model, the circles expand outward from the influence exerted by the individual

communicator workers at the very center, such as their personal attitudes and

orientations, to the next level, namely the routines of media workers such as the beat

system, notions of newsworthiness, official sources, and last yet significant, the

deadlines. It further extends outward from the concentric rings including the

influence on the content from the organizational level, such as the corporate policies,

political endorsements, editorial positions, etc.

According to Shoemaker and Reese's hierarchical model (1996), an extensive

influence on content, come from the broader categories, also known as extra-media

influence, namely, the impact of the economic environment, the marketplace, cultural

and national variables, and public relation engagement. However, the most far-

reaching influence on the media content ensues from ideology and societal-level

factors, such as the way societal deviance and normalcy are defined and centered in a

society.

4.2 Research Gaps in the Hierarchical Model of Influences on Media Content

Historically, there was an expansive range of empirical studies devoted to the

identification of the effects, both external or internal at different levels on the news-

making process, before Shoemaker and Reese (1996) offered a more cohesive theory

of media content, synthesizing what is known about the influence of media content

into a more interrelated system. To begin with, there are studies that only examined

gatekeeping as a consequence of extremely simplistic individual decisions, as

demonstrated by Lewin (1947) and White (1995). The findings of the empirical study

by Shoemaker and Reese (2001) only deal with the effects of individual influence and

media routine on media content, consistent with the hierarchical model by Shoemaker

and Reese (1996). These two studies predominantly focused on the influences on a higher macro level, in contrast to those dealing with the influences on a lower organizational level, for instance, the organizational level in which there are multitudinous cases characterizing the corporate ownership shaping media content (Zhou, 2008). Likewise, there is a wide array of sources in the literature examining the forces affecting the issue and generic frames, with the latter divided into both episodic and thematic frames.

However, there is a dearth of the research primarily intended to deal with the influences on media content, particularly media frames at a higher level. The question "What is news?" examines news values within mainstream journalism and considers the extent to which they may be changing, with the point of departure being Galtung and Ruge's 1965 taxonomy of news values (Galtung & Ruge, 1965b, 1965a; Joye et al., 2016). After the use of the rationale developed by Galtung and Ruge (1965a, 1965b) to empirically assess studies of content analysis and a review of extant literature contextualizing the findings of content analysis of news values on the U.K. media for 15 years, it was realized that news values remain relevant today. This is similar to the case of expansive studies revisiting the model, notwithstanding the emergence of social media (Harcup & O', 2001; Kheirabadi & Aghagolzadeh, 2012; Monday, 2015), and the fact that no taxonomy suffices to explain a revised taxonomy on the U.S. elite press and its superimposition with the two Chinese national newspapers in question.

Furthermore, there are limited empirical studies that intended to examine the influence at the higher level, such as the comparative study by Entman (1993a) on the influences of the cultural dimensions on press content across a variety of countries in terms of the salience of political orientation. Another empirical study by Lee (2002) established pluralism and examined the influence at the ideological level via discourse analysis on more salient media content, namely, editorials on Chinese policies. One of the primary objectives of this study was to explore the ideological frame packages and the professional cultural values of the U.S. journalists through the lens of trade war.

4.3 Framing in Press

4.3.1 Framing and Ideological Factors

Framing refers to the process of making some components of the press salient, while concealing others. The idea of framing was first defined as the embodiment of social principles of organization that determine social events (Tuchman, 1973; Gitlin, 2003; Kalb, 2009). Framing was also defined by Lee (2002) as emphasizing how the communicator constructs frames through selection of certain aspects of the perceived reality, making them more salient in communication texts, in a way to "promote a particular problem definition casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (Lee, 2002, p.52)". In simple words, framing entails salience and selection. The significance attached to the journalists' roles in construction of frames has also been echoed by Schudson (1989) and Lee (2002), who argued that news functions as social construction and resource. The fundamental

basis of the concept of framing relates to the process of meaning construction, where certain aspects or attributes of an issue of an event, or certain ideas, themes, and experiences are highlighted, and others are overlooked. A synthesized definition was put forth by Reese (2009), who stated that frames are organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time and work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world, and framing is concerned with the way interests, communicators, sources, and culture combine to yield coherent ways of understanding the world. It is worth noting that the selection process by journalists is under no circumstances random. Instead, journalists follow a culture logic without being conscious of the reasoning as the latter derives the presumptions, they make implicitly regarding the social world.

However, as revealed by Lee (2002), framing is appropriate to examine journalists' practices, in order to gain insights into the production of news, as opposed to the mere consequence of factual reporting with objectivity and impartiality. However, the selection process is influenced by the journalists' beliefs and value systems that help them interpret events. Frames are textual practices that symbolize the beliefs and cultural values to which the journalists adhere. Among all factors contributing to the roles of journalists in the construction, frames are the most specific and explicit agents of ideological process are embedded in the web of culture (Reese, 2009). International events are frequently represented and placed in different systems of interpretation. The ideological factors influencing the frames can also be found in the research by Lee (2002), who based on the discourse analysis on editorials about China policy, far more salient than cultural values and ideologies

conveyed in news, from 1990 to 2000, had synthesized three ideological packages

harbored by the U.S. elite journalists: containment, engagement, and globalization,

and symbolizing different ideological packages under the umbrella of a peaceful

evolution. The term-established pluralism was used to characterize the discourse by

the U.S. elite media from the perspective of social interactionism and constructivism,

to capture the plurality in opinions within the established institution and domesticate

the reality of China in the course of construction of Orientalist discourse (Cappella &

Jamieson, 1997; Schmuck et al., 2017; Shahin, 2015). Another cross-national study

conducted under the lens of the mediatization of journalism (Peruško et al., 2017),

was targeted to explore the influences of the media system and organizations on

journalistic practices in European digital mediascapes. The study concluded that both

the structural framework of the media system and the mezzo level of media

organizations account for the variations of mediascape in terms of four dimensions

determined a priori in their influence on the journalistic practice and the perceived

influence on their practices by journalists.

4.3.2 Operationalization of the Four Types of Frames.

The approaches to operationalization frames have been classified into five

categories by Matthes and Kohring (2008):

Hermeneutic approach	It provides an interpretive account of media texts, tying frames with broader cultural elements.
Linguistic approach	It identifies the frames by analysis of the selection replacement and structure of specific words and sentences in a text.
Manual holistic approach	It starts with a qualitative examination of a certain segment of news texts to generate a set of frames before coding these frames for analysis.
Computer-assisted approach	It utilizes computer programs to code for frames, instead of human coders.
Deductive approach	It derives frames from the literature and codes them in standard content analysis.

Table 1
The Approaches to Operationalizing Frames Classified into Five Categories by Matthes and Kohring (2008)

In this study, the analysis was made with articles on Sino-U.S. trade war as opposed to narratives selected from the corpus on the topic. In this thesis, the findings of a qualitative examination of some portion of news texts to determine a set of generic, episodic, and thematic frames derived from the past literature are presented. Therefore, both the manual holistic and deductive approaches are detailed. All the generic, episodic, and thematic frames are discussed comprehensively in literature review and methodology.

4.3.3 Source and Frames

Other than the generic and episodic frames, an issue that needs to be addressed is the valence frame (positive, negative, or neutral). In this study, the interplay between the locality of the sources and the valence frames, generic frames, and episodic frames was established. Contrary to a wide range of extrinsic/external and intrinsic/internal factors identified through political and economic studies, the core concept of this study lies in the various dimensions of the sources the journalists quoted in their news reporting. This multidimensionality of the sources stated in the unit of analysis are used as independent variables in the study. There was an extensive selection of studies using a wide array of research methods to approach the sources of topics, but there are only a few studies examining the effects of the various dimensions of sources quoted in the news articles related to the U.S. media on the valence and generic frames. This study was aimed to analyze the influences of various dimensions of sources and on the generic and valence frames of Sino-U.S. trade war and image China.

4.4 Framing Analysis and Frame Building

Three different paradigms of news framing research have been identified by D'Angelo (2002): cognitive, constructionist, and critical. The cognitive paradigm focuses on the explication of the mental process through which news framing affects individual's perception of reality (Zhou, 2008). The critical framing research draws attention to the hegemonic influence exerted by powerful elites over news framing (Mills, 1956), under the category of external influences identified in the summary by

Scheufele (2006). There are a large number of examples for the critical framing research by a wide range of researchers (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Lee, 2002; Lim, 2015; Strömbäck & Luengo, 2001). Last but not least, constructionist paradigm explores interpretive processes in which the journalistic agencies interact with social structure (Boesman et al., 2017; Entman, 2010; Hossain, 2015; Kuang & Wei, 2018; Shahin, 2015; Vu & Lynn, 2020).

There is a wide range of scholarly works intended to capture the multifaceted nature of news framing. News framing focuses on the dynamic rather than static communicative processes and entails numerous stages including frame-building along with frame-setting. Entman (1993) noted that frames have a series of locations, including the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture, and therefore the process of media framing is comprised of the stages of frame-setting, frame-building, and individual factors, along with the more macro societal levels. The media-framing, taking a sociological path, represents the first stream of media-framing research, and focuses on the formation of the media and how different frames emerge. Frame-building process encompasses the factors that contribute to the determination of news frames in terms of structural qualities. These factors include the external factors and equally crucial internal factors (Shoemaker, 1996). The existing literature demonstrates that frame-building process is a continuous interaction between journalists along with social movements. The consequences of the frame-building process are the manifestation of frames in the text. The media-framing research typically follows the sociological path as it studies the formation of the frames via a top-down method by looking at the media's projection of certain images in the press,

and examines their intentions or reasons for such projections, and how it is intended to create image frames from a constructionist standpoint. However, the frame-building, in its epidemiological inquiry, can be following both the constructionist and critical approaches, under the umbrella of either the sociological or psychological path, if these factors contributing to the frame building are analyzed with cognitive process.

Frame-setting, on the other hand, highlights the interplay between media frames and individuals' prior predisposition and knowledge, and is predicated on the assumption that frames in the press may affect learning, interpretation, and evaluation of issues and events. It has been studied comprehensively on both individual and societal levels. On the individual level, it customarily follows the psychological path, by examining how the frames are perceived by audience, such as the extent to which and under what circumstances audiences reflect and mirror frames available to them in press or news. In straightforward terms, it is to explore how audience acquires the views after their exposure to the images projected by media. The media effects or the consequences of framing can be perceived at both individual and societal levels. Regarding the media effects of framing on the individual level, the individuals' attitudes toward certain issues might well be shifted due to their exposure to frames.

Evidently, the frame-building analysis are a top-down approach, starting from the how frames are formulated and how media frames are resulted from expansive external and internal factors. In a sharp contrast, frame-setting is a stream of research in opposite direction of bottom-up, in its efforts to examine how audiences' view are

reflected in the frames accessible to them. Further research is warranted regarding the association between the three processes of media framing, frame building and frame setting. There is abundance of studies that intended to investigate the process of journalists' interaction with the sources and framing practices (Schneider, 2002; Toni, et al., 2017; Strömbäck, 2009), who investigated the proper use of framing in actual news reporting and its relationship with the sources.

4.5 Issue and Generic Frames

According to the literature on framing and its operationalization, there are different categories of frames in the conceptualization of framing. The issue frame uses an inductive approach, as opposed to using a priori defined or determined frames to analyze the news stories. A large number of problems with the issue frames are due to their inability to replicate and be generalizable. Not all frames demonstrate the same level of abstraction; issue-specific frames are restricted to a particular issue, whereas generic frames transcend the limitations in themes and events as these frames are identifiable across diversified events and issues. Matthes (2009), with a thorough investigation on more than 100 framing studies, discovered that four-fifths of the studies on framing analysis used issue-specific frames and only a few studies used generic frames. Iyengar's study (1991) has used the dichotomous sets of episodic and thematic frames (de Vreese, 2003, 2005). It is also worth noting that there are also other studies devoted to game frames (de Vreese, 2003, 2005).

The second approach is a deductive method, using generic frames which have been defined and operationalized a priori. Cappella and Jamieson (1997) stated four different criteria for the frames to meet. First, there must be identifiable conceptual and linguistic features. Second, these frames must be able to be observable in journalistic practice. Third, it must be possible to distinguish the frames reliably from others. Last, though equally significant, a frame must have representational validity as opposed to being merely based on the imagination (de Vreese, 2005). As mentioned earlier, one of the generic frames being studied in its distinctions between the thematic frames on society levels and episodic frames on individual levels are the consequence frames.

4.6 Valence Frames

There are numerous studies using the equivalency or emphasis frames. However, the equivalency frames emerge from a succession of Asian disease studies, with the purpose of studying the psychological process, with the definition of framing being rather narrow. On the other hand, a large number of studies using emphasis frames present qualitatively different yet potentially relevant considerations, in a way closer to real journalistic practice. One of the reasons for the preference to emphasis framing over equivocal frames is that most of the issues or events can never be characterized into or meaningfully reduced to two identical scenarios since frames are an integral part of political arguments, journalistic norms, and social movements' discourse. Moreover, they refer to the alternative way of defining events and are endogenous to the social and political world. However, it is worth noting that a

majority of frame studies have been characterized by a specific valence, such as positive and negative valenced frames. Valence frame are highly understudied but are central to many research studies particularly regarding the media effects and persuasion. Equivalency framing generally displays the valence openly, by emphasizing the positive or negative outcomes of one set of considerations. However, valence frames constitute one of the most important traits of political discourse, in which the elites attempt to exert influences on support or rejection of an issue by connecting its merits and demerits with different considerations, and therefore are applied to emphasis framing. For instance, political actors can frame altered privacy laws in a positive manner in terms of an increased need to fight criminal activities, or in a negative manner by emphasizing that such altered legal standards could come at the cost of the privacy of innocent citizens. Some studies show that valence news frames have the capacity to affect support for an issue, while natural frames may only affect the issue interpretations. Several other framing studies have supported this finding and indicated that negative frames, especially, are extremely powerful in affecting the opinions and attitudes of people. In this work, the news reporting and editorials on Sino-U.S. trade war are considered highly political discourses, therefore the use of valence frames was studied in the framework to make inquiry into how they have been used by journalists in pursuit to advocate for an issue, afford salience to certain considerations affecting the readers' opinions and attitudes, as represented by various generic frames. The objective of this study was also to explore how valence frames get shaped by and interact with a wide range of factors, and how they evolve along the timeline together with the previously defined timeline and landmark

events. Based on the research gaps identified from the existing literature, the research questions can be formulated as follows:

Research Question 1:

What are the discrepancies among the five newspapers in their employment of sources?

Research Question 2:

What were the relationships between the sources and major frames used in the stories in the U.S. press about Sino-U.S. trade war and Chinese newspapers in question?

Hypothesis 2a:

Locality of news sources exerted significant influences on the major frames identified in the news coverage of the trade war.

Hypothesis 2b:

Political power reliance of news sources significantly influenced the major frames salient in the news coverage of the trade war.

4.7 Factors in Frame Building

4.7.1 Newspaper Format, Focus, and Genres

4.7.1.1 Newspaper Formats and Frame Building

The extant research has demonstrated that the newspapers in question had

different features, and that a number of traits influence the media content, including

the newspaper format (broadsheet and tabloid), genres (e.g., news, columns/features,

editorials, and commentaries), and audience reach (national and regional), as well as

the focus of the newspapers (business and non-business). The editorials and

commentaries contain more explicit opinions compared to other genres in press.

Since all five newspapers in this study are national newspapers, the only three

relevant intrinsic factors are format, genres, and focus of the newspapers, all integral

to the news content. Regarding the newspaper format, the newspapers in question are

the three broadsheet national newspapers in the U.S. press, one broadsheet Chinese

newspaper, China Daily (CD), and the Global Times (GT), one Chinese tabloid

newspaper with nationalistic perspective and propaganda and international focus. A

broadsheet newspaper is conceptualized as those which focus on political and

economic news at both the domestic and international levels with a reasonably more

sophisticated writing style. New York Times (NYT), The Washington Post (WP), and

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) fit into the styles of broadsheet newspapers. A

detailed review of the existing research indicates that news formats influence the

frames of news content to affect the readers in terms of their impression, perception,

and understanding of various issues. It has also been demonstrated that news formats

have impact on the valence frames of the news: broadsheet newspapers are inclined

to use more authoritative, serious, and professional tones towards events, while

tabloids have more sensational, local, and biased implications. In the present case, the tabloid in question, the Global Times, is an exception as it tends to focus on topics that are more global in nature. Some scholars have asserted that market-oriented media emerging out of commercialization is an additional offering from party organs as opposed to independent operations, thereby having no connection with press freedom. Even worse, it has been argued that commercialization may eventually transform media into conformist institutions, or media mafia.

Likewise, there are also studies demonstrating that tabloid sheets, in comparison to their broadsheet counterparts, are more inclined to adopt more soft issue frames than the hard ones. However, this thesis only looks at the more generalizable generic frames. Therefore, by following the typology and conceptualization of frames by Matthes and Kohring (2008), for instance, the technological, economic, and political frames, etc., fall under the category of hard frames. On the other hand, the soft frames refer to the generic frames, such as human interest and morality frames. Therefore, it can be readily hypothesized that tabloid newspapers, such as GT, compared to broadsheet newspapers, feature the reason that the former is essentially more sensational in their style and focus chiefly on narrower perspectives.

Research Question 3:

Were there significant differences in valence frames towards the trade war on more business focus WSJ and more commercialized tabloid-like GT in general?

Hypothesis 3a:

News stories comprising both more salient editorials and commentaries and less salient information pieces on tabloid-like and more commercialized newspaper GT tend to present significantly fewer negative or more valence frames than CD, a Chinese broadsheet newspaper.

Hypothesis 3b:

News stories on Trade War from WSJ present valence frames significantly more neutral in comparison to those in stories from non-business newspapers in question, namely, the New York Times and the Washington Post.

4.7.1.2 Newspaper with Business Focus vs. Non-business Focus

The business newspapers specialize in spreading economic, business, and management news, different from more general newspapers. Their purpose is to supply the readers with intellectual stimulation, relaxation, diversion, titillation, and fantasy. It is worth noting that there are, indeed, apparent distinctions between the business newspapers and the business or finance sections of general newspapers, where the differences lie predominantly in the agenda setting of the business focus newspapers. One study was targeted toward studying the thematic framing of merger and acquisition by the U.S. elite newspapers to inform the existing framing theory from a social constructionist point of view (Kweon, 2000). Likewise, another study compared the influences of notable events as catalysts on the succession of thematic frames of nanotechnologies on elite U.K. newspapers (Anderson et al., 2005).

However, the distinctions in the light of framing between the two types of

newspapers are hitherto under-explored. It was discovered that majority of the

business professionals and consumers who take an interest in economic and business

news would choose newspapers with a business focus as opposed to the mere

business or economic sections of the general or generic newspapers. Regarding the

target readers for newspapers with a focus on business, finance, or economics, such

as the WSJ, it is found that among all 42 million digital readers of the WSJ, a

significant proportion of the readers have received tertiary education and are

millionaires and managerial professionals.

4.7.1.3 Ownerships and Organizational Level Factors

As mentioned earlier, an elitist perspective of the valence frames dictates that

these frames are to be used to advocate certain issues. It was indicated by the

Shoemaker and Reese's hierarchical model (2003) that the organizations and agencies

are an integral constituent shaping the media content. Regarding the two Chinese

newspapers, the commercialization that gives rise to market-oriented media is merely

an additional offering from the party organs and has no connection with the media

freedom, and therefore the commercialization may give rise to media turning into

conformist and news mafia. To corroborate these claims, a case study into the

Shenzhen Press Group noted that Chinese press, instead of acting only as a state

propaganda instrument, has been working as a publicity company for the party. In

other words, the conglomerate processes have rendered the quasi-business model,

where they make huge profits on one hand, and legitimate party's mandates by

promoting its images. These conglomerates, emerging out of marketization and commercialization, as exemplified by the Shenzhen Press Group, have demonstrated several characteristics. They have generated a more centralized managerial structure and operation with duopolistic competition replaced with market monopoly and greater price-fixing abilities. Moreover, they have been observed to be highly dependent on state office subscriptions, dampening enthusiasm of the journalists for media freedom and political reforms in favor of economic interests. Furthermore, they provide opportunities for overseas expansion, and are furnished with a two-tier system, serving both the party and the market. Arguably, these conglomerates demonstrate a complicitous accommodation between power and money, shaped by Post-Maoist bureaucratic-authoritarian regime (Lee et al., 2007). In Chinese print media, the emergence of city newspapers has grabbed minimal attention in western communication during post-WTO era. CCP's provincial organs have founded large quantities of commercialized and urban-reader oriented daily newspapers, called the city newspapers (Huang, 2001). However, it has been argued that market-oriented media emerging out of commercialization is by no means an independent operation, but rather an additional offering from party organs, having no connection with press freedom (Huang, 2000). Other researchers are concerned that commercialization might turn media into a conformist institution (Lee et al., 2000; McCormick 2002/2003; Pan 2000) or produce a news mafia (Li, 2006).

The Global Times (GT) is a mass appeal, second tier newspaper under the auspices of China's Communist Party's People's Daily, serving not only for commercialization, or in other words, cash cow, but also competing in the overseas

market. On the other hand, another newspaper in question, China Daily, in English language, is also looking to expand overseas. China Daily, has the widest print circulation of any English-language newspaper in China. It has an editorial office in Beijing and branches in major cities of China, and several prominent foreign cities. The paper is also expanding overseas as it is published in satellite offices in Hong Kong, the U.S., and Europe. It has frequently purchased advertising spaces on major newspapers such as the New York Times and Washington Post. The editorial stance generally tends to be more liberal than most newspapers. However, it is still typical for the party media model, which remains structured in dominance, but it has shifted beyond a single model to comprehend Chinese media institution and practices in creative but dynamic tensions among professionalization, political and commercial instrumentalization, and pressure for popular participation in the epoch of socialized and digitized communication(Zhao, 2012). It is still relevant for Schramm's comparisons Soviet system with the conventional authoritarian systems in four theories by Hallin and Mancini (2004, 2012) to capture the role the state or the party-state play in media. China Daily is the first-tier newspaper directly under the auspices of the publicity department of CCP, whereas the Global Times is the second-tier under the People's Daily, even though both of them have been serving as propagandists to a certain extent, under the paradigm of the soviet model (Zhao, 2012). However, in spite of the authoritarians and patrimonial dimensions, the normative expectations of promoting positive freedom, defending territorial sovereignty, promoting national integration, as well as creating social-economic development ought to be under analysis (Zhao, 2012), for the reason that communism and developmentalism, and nationalism were closely mingled historically in the

mobilizing ideologies of Chinese Communist Party (Bernstein, 2007). However, in spite of the strong CCP or state strategic control over the media system and its ideological orientation, production, and distribution, especially in entertainment, lifestyle, and business areas are no longer monopolized. One of the reasons that account for the aforementioned is that the emergence of commercialization of newspapers in China was neither politically calculated, nor has it led to the decline of the party, as the state-subsidized press is no longer viable (Zhao, 2012). Mancini and Hallin (2004, 2012) have emphasized the party-press parallelism in the CCP conglomerates, honed with innovative personnel and management practices, as demonstrated by media executives in these organizations being assigned to party leadership position to reinforce such arrangements (Zhao, 2012). Research on the framing effect on Chinese newspapers indicates that the party and non-party newspapers demonstrate similarity with respect to the use of three frames, but small variations on the other four. Thus, a strong control of the Chinese government on the reporting of international news can be insinuated. It is also worth noting that the government control has stronger effects on the party newspapers than on their non-party equivalents (Kuang & Wang, 2020). Kuang and Wang's study (2020) corroborates the claims in earlier studies that sources have been shaping the news productions, even though as previously mentioned, production and distribution in entertainment, lifestyle, and business are no longer monopolized. There are other ways for government or authorities exerting influence on news organizations through the process of laws, regulations, and licensing, and censorship. There are traits of how authoritarian political authorities exert a more direct control on news media and journalists than in democracies, with varying degree of control from political power,

as some authoritarian states, such as communism-led China, maintain strategic controls over the media system, but no longer monopolize in different areas in distribution, production, entertainment, business, and lifestyle (Zhao, 2012). Besides their influences as sources, political authorities can exert direct control on the news organizations through licensing, laws and regulations, and censorship (Harcup, 2009). In authoritarian states, the influence of political power on news production is more direct than democracies. This is because the journalists in these non-democracies, like most of their democratic counterparts, would report news issues by involving debates from political elites more frequently than the other sources such as the grassroots, which is known as indexing (Bennett, 1990, 2003). Besides, news organizations in authoritarian countries receive direct control from the government. As a result, the news media in such countries is considered more authoritative and conservative (Ostini & Fung, 2002). Taking China as an example, with a sophisticated news censorship program, the Chinese propaganda authorities can control the reporting of every news segment, though they do not usually do so because of some political considerations (Kuang, 2018). For example, as part of its efforts to monitor and manage local governments, the central government encouraged news organizations at higher levels to report on wrongdoings of the local cadres so that legitimate ruling of the state led by the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter "Party-state") was not ruined (Kuang, 2018; Liebman, 2011; Lorentzen, 2014). A study (Loh, 2017) based on framing analysis on the Hong Kong umbrella movement on major mainland newspapers, namely Global Times, Xinhuanet, and China Daily, analyzed how defensive soft power was used to fend off negative and project positive national images. The study facilitated the understanding of how China as a sovereign

state fended off attacks on its national image. One of the factors that influence the framing practices of Chinese news outlets in English language is commercialization, for the reason that it is contained within the existing media structure and in no manner undermines political instrumentalization substantially (Zhao, 2012).

In this thesis, there are two Chinese nationalistic newspapers under analysis, namely The Global Times (GT), China Daily (CD), for the consideration of constructing perceptions of China beyond its borders and engaging their targeted foreign audience in their familiar language. Another reason for the analysis of the two Chinese newspapers in English language is related to the aim of this study regarding efforts to study the perception contestation between the liberal model and its representations in the three U.S. media outlets in question, and how the national image of China is constructed within this dynamic ambiance by the western media. The findings of the study are consistent with the claim by Zhao (2012) that it is more useful to shift beyond a single model to understand the structured dominance party media of China, in the dynamic and creative tensions among professionalization, pressure for popular participation, commercial and political instrumentalization in the new epoch of socialized and even digitalized communication. Another rationale that led to the selection of the two Chinese newspapers in English language is their band of popularity in order to get an accurate representation of the English-language online news outlets (Loh, 2016). Therefore, the research questions and hypotheses can be formulated as follows:

Research Question 4:

What were the discrepancies in the master and emplotting frames (generic, thematic, and episodic frames) in stories in the U.S press and Chinese press on Sino-U.S. trade war in general?

Hypothesis 4a:

The three elite U.S. newspapers and the two Chinese news outlets tended to present news stories on the trade war in significantly different master and emplotting frames (generic, thematic, and episodic).

Hypothesis 4b:

In terms of generic, thematic, and episodic frames, news stories on tabloid newspaper GT and more business focused WSJ tend to present significantly more soft frames and fewer hard frames than China Daily, a Chinese broadsheet newspaper, and three broadsheet U.S. newspapers respectively.

Hypothesis 4c:

In terms of generic, thematic, and episodic frames, news stories on tabloid-like newspaper GT and more business focused WSJ tend to present significantly less national interest frames and more public interest frames than China Daily, a Chinese broadsheet newspaper, and three broadsheet U.S. newspapers respectively.

Research Question 5:

How did the process of frame-building of trade war develop over the timeline punctuated by the critical events? In other words, how the master and emplotting frames (generic, thematic, and episodic) evolve over time?

Hypothesis 5a:

Various news agencies and organizations tended to adopt different major and emplotting news frames over the timeline, both intra-nationally and cross-nationally, in a diachronic and dynamic process.

Hypothesis 5b:

In terms of generic, thematic, and episodic frames, along the timeline of the trade war, the newspapers tended to give salience to the alternative or oppositional frames to renew, defend, and revise the dominant and master frames.

3.7.1.4 Genres: News Reports vs. Explicit Opinions, Editorials, and Commentaries

There are two types of news articles discussed herein: the news reports and explicit opinions, commonly referred to as editorials, columns, and commentaries. The former presumably convey the facts regarding the information with maximum objectivity, whereas the latter provides the interpretation along with the opinionated standpoints. However, news is reported in a very subtle and nuanced manner of expressing viewpoints, even though it is done in a way not as explicit as the opinions, by citing specific sources, and framing the events by choosing the stories to cover and

the information to present. In this thesis, the core concept is the locality of the sources that are cited in news reporting, covered in the following section of the chapter in order to study how the construct relates to the thematic and episodic frames, and particularly to the power reliance frames. Several academicians have studied the differences between the more salient explicit opinions, commentaries, editorials, and the news reports. Arguably, the news reports present an impartial account, whereas editorials have a proclivity toward controversial stands, though as stated previously, the news reports convey the opinion in a less salient but nuanced way by citing sources and framing events. In the context of this work, how the newspapers in question cite distinctive sources as internal factors to exert impact on frames were studied.

Research Question 6 (Editorials vis-à-vis Information Pieces):

Were news stories and editorials significantly different in the use of valence and generic frames of Sino-U.S. trade war?

Hypothesis 6:

There are significant differences regarding generic and valence frames between newspaper editorials and information pieces in the U.S. elite press.

4.7.2 Authorship and Relevant Internal Factors

In the process of frame-building, there is a wide selection of internal and external factors determining the media content, as identified by de Vreese (2005).

More specifically, regarding the journalistic influence, there are multitudinous studies pointing out the personal attributes of the journalists affecting the media content frames. Some of these attributes were identifiable as more personal to the author. The various instances of journalists-centered influences are personal attitudes or opinions, and professional role conception, as well as professional orientation of the media where the journalists are engaged, such as the tabloid and broadsheet in which case there exist substantial differences (Fürsich, 2002). It has been noted that different journalistic strategies may lead to different frames and narratives as journalism is more of a cultural practice than an occupation wherein a community of professionals use their interpretive authority to shape cultural memory in their practices (de Vreese, 2005). The internal factors include the news values held by journalists and editorial policies, both capable of shaping the journalists' practices (Donsbach, 2004; Scheufele, 2006), corresponding to the routine and individual levels of the hierarchical model shaping the media content. These factors indicate that media content is shaped by the authors' personalities, the news values they adhere to, and the professional roles they assume. More precisely, the personal attributes, such as the personal political affiliation and attitudes (conservatist, leftist, centrist, or others), the professional role the journalists assume, gender, locality of the author, weekends or the weekday versions of the newspaper, are responsible for the media content. One research studied the intersection between the gender of the journalists and the news coverage of elections and politics (Meeks, 2013). Likewise, another study explored the professional and occupational roles the journalists take over (Altmeppen, 2008), and equally noteworthy study conducted by Pew Research Center (2015) attempted to establish the role that the journalists' affiliations played in media content. Recently,

the locality has become a major factor in research with studies conducted to interpret its role in media content and framing. One prominent research analyzed the role of locality of the news, specifically, the geographical distance relative to the Hong Kong newspapers and the types of the newspapers accounts for the variations in three frames, namely authority, conflict, and attribution, after a content analysis on 14 Hong Kong newspapers of mass appeal, elite, and pro-establishment (Guo, 2011). In this thesis, the locality of the sources being quoted is the focus, which will be elaborated in the section on sources. Previously, Sachsman et al. (2004) presented a significant research work regarding the influence of locality of newspaper on the frequency of their framing of risk assessment in news reporting on environment by journalists, based on the census data. It is worth noting that another study that summarized the 7 studies on what users do with media content reported that the differences arise from the weekday and weekend versions of the newspapers in terms of different dimensions such as political orientations, design differences, and psychological differentiation (Towers, 1985). Most of the variables are self-evident from the analysis of the news content and open information. Regarding how these internal factors interact with each other and external factors, interviews are to as triangulation for the saturation of the theory in question. Some researchers have identified the types of the newspapers as one of the most crucial factors influencing the media contents and frames and also identified the substantial differences as a result of being broadsheet newspapers and tabloid (Donsbach, 2004; Scheufele, 2006) or editorials and reported news. The differences in framing and news content resulting from editorials and news reporting are covered in another section under this chapter. However, it is stated that the difference due to news pieces are informed,

whereas explicit opinions are intended to express opinions labeled as subjective or at least not objective. Moreover, most editorials contain more than one individual's opinions, and sometimes contain pieces from people from all walks of life, such as scholars, experts, local politicians, etc., all those who take over the role of journalists within the boundary but express explicit opinions in editorials.

4.7.3 Sources and Political Power Reliance

The three major elite U.S. papers in question, along with the local newspapers, are coping with constant reductions in production costs, the prevailing ignorance of customs, culture, history, language, and thoughts and feelings of people in other places, and the denial to the access to the societies and political systems, and therefore recourse to authority and official rhetoric is inevitable. The presence and prominence of power is represented in the citations and opinions needed, threaded in coherent narratives, and therefore the journalists' perspectives are determined by sources of those quotes (Guo, 2011). The importance of reporting the source of news is highlighted in the study on the 2009 European Parliament election, which noted that it affects the content of the news stories and, more specifically, the media agendas and frames (Stromback et al., 2013). Tuchman (1978) stated that the use of sources or citations is a pivotal component in the construction of a story. Regarding the relations between the sources and framing practices, journalists' decisions on who is able to speak and who is not in news coverage enable the journalists to be involved in framing practice without appearing to do so (Schneider, 2012). By quoting authoritative sources, journalists are able to demonstrate that they are only conveying

the opinions of others while actually they are shaping the story through citations, and specific quotations at their disposal as their efforts to display who counts in the society and whose voice has legitimacy (Ross, 2007). These sources are the primary definers (Hall et al. 1978), playing a role of forming an integral part of journalists' news gathering networks and background information provision (Boyce, 2006). For constructing the narratives of trade wars, journalists have used authority to entail the government and people with political power and reliance of power. In this study, the sources cited include the government and N.G.O. sources along with expert opinions from China, the U.S., and other countries, as different tiers of authorities in the role of journalists shaping their stories on the Sino-U.S. trade war. Therefore, the citizens and marginalized sources, although equally important, fall beyond the scope of the study, as this study exclusively focuses on the core dimension of power reliance and authorities in news framing. The sources are one of the most significant factors in the news-making process, as demonstrated by a wide range of the empirical studies on the various dimensions of the sources. However, the influence of the locality of the sources and the political power reliance of the sources on the frames were under-developed. As elaborated in the following chapter, the political powered reliance pinpoints to the number of quotes cited by journalists from authorities, including government, established institutions, individuals associated with government, and so forth. There exists a study (Guo, 2011) having studied how local news vis-à-vis non-local news relates to the three major generic frames, namely, authority, conflict and attribution frames, on three types of Hong Kong newspapers (mass appeal, elite, and pro-establishment), providing an insight into the role of locality of the news itself on the framing practices of journalists contextualized in Hong Kong. This research,

however, as opposed to study the locality of the news, which is less relevant to the case of trade war, is to study relationship between the locality of the sources, viz., the intranational sources (sources within the geographical boundary of U.S. or China), antagonistic sources, and the sources far beyond the geographical boundaries of U.S. and China, such those western countries, and the major frames, either generic or thematic. The inquiry into the two dimension of the sources are meaningful, since it provides the insights into the individual level influence on the news-making process, in a more meaningful ontological fashion than the aforementioned more simplistic individual factors, gender, profession , or ascribed social status of the writers and contributors of the news articles, in terms of enriching the extant literature on news making and framing practices. Therefore, the 1st and 2nd research question, along with the hypothesis 1a and hypothesis 1b are formulated to make an inquiry into the issue.

Figure 3

Concepts, Models, Research Questions, and Hypothesis

Chapter 5 The Research Findings and Confirmatory Hypothesis Testing: A Comparative Study on the Framing of the Sino-U.S. Trade War

5.1 Introduction

This chapter sorts out the current status of the Sino-U.S. trade war and the related news reports, summarizes the research results of the different frameworks in this field, and refines the research questions as follows from the four aspects of these reports, namely the volume, risks, consequences, and attribution:

1. How much coverage was devoted to the trade war in the newspapers in mainland China and the U.S., and how did that change with time?

2. How was the trade war covered along with a wide range of frames?

3. How was the trade war covered along with the consequences?

4. With what kind of associations, if any, do the Chinese news and U.S. news attribute risks with the individual-level (episodic) or social-level (thematic) frames?

In order to adequately and reliably answer the above research questions, this study utilized the mainstream news media reports spanning three years as the data selection scope, and the search data keywords included at least one among Chinese, China, Beijing, CCP, Communist Party, Xi Jinping, Huawei, Meng Wanzhou, Ren Zhengfei, 中国, 北京, 共产党, 习近平, 孟晚舟, 任正非, 中美, trade war, technology war, economic war, 贸易战, technology transfer, technology theft, or tech war. This

research broadly has two major characteristics: (1) It was a comparative analysis of the large-scale Chinese online Sino-U.S. trade war news in China and the U.S.; (2) This research utilized automated processes to acquire and analyze the textual materials facing a large number of Chinese and U.S. readers over the past three years. Data preprocessing was performed to optimize the data relevance and accuracy. The text target samples that mentioned one of the keywords at least twice were selected for analysis.

After the selection of the data sample sources and considering the attributes and influence of the media comprehensively, five mainstream news media were selected, two based in mainland China, and three in the U.S.

The aforementioned trade war-related vocabulary was used as the keywords for the search data. In order to optimize the relevance and accuracy of the data, the research team performed data preprocessing, based on the number of keywords. If an article mentioned any keyword less than twice, the sample range was excluded.

Figure 4
Heat words of Sino-U.S. Trade War

5.2 The Codebook

The codebook includes three principal parts: the frames, sources, and consequences. The codebook can be described as an extremely intricate content coding system, including the skip-the-question design using the text data mining and analysis of public number with DiVoMiner. Regarding the production process of the codebook, this chapter demonstrates that, on the one hand, the codebook was designed according to the research questions in the early stage to cover the research needs. On the other hand, the codebook could easily be adapted at any time during the data processing. This chapter deploys big data technology to assist online content analysis and select 1,189 articles (10%) out of the total sample selection of 7,924

articles. The research design uses DiVoMiner to process the data in batches. In order to test and explain the accuracy of coding, the researcher randomly selected 30 articles for the training. DiVoMiner is an online data mining and analysis platform that facilitates research. With content analysis as its core, DiVoMiner uses machine learning coding and operation involving both humans and machines to most of the step of content analysis online. In the meantime, DiVoMiner is also a cloud-based coding and statistics tool that can process quantitative and qualitative data. Users can upload texts or quantitative data for coding and statistical analyses as well.

The author led eight trained research assistants to complete the manual coding part. The reliability among the coders with regard to different parameters is as follows: Cohen's kappa = .88 (p < .001), Holsti's coefficient of reliability = .91 (p < .001), Scott's pi = .91 (p < .001), Krippendorff's alpha = 0.88 (p < .001). All the values were well above the acceptable level of inter-coder reliability before the final sampling of 1,189 articles.

5.3 The Sampling Methods

A total of 1,189 articles randomly selected from the pool were selected for the coding. The table below demonstrates the breakdown of the randomly selected articles in topic.

Newspaper	Quantity
GT	316 (27%)
China Daily	311 (26%)
WSJ	238 (20%)
WP	181 (15%)
NYT	143 (12%)

Table 2
The Sample in the Study

Number and Percentage of Newspapers

Figure 4
The Number and Percentage of Sampled Articles on the 5 Newspapers

As demonstrated in the table, following the search criterion, a larger proportion of the samples based on the criterion of search of the trade war-related articles were from the Global times (316, 27%) and China Daily (311, 26%),

followed by the Wall Street Journal (238, 20%), the Washington Post (181, 15%), and the New York Times (143, 12%), respectively. As remarked previously in the literature review meant to identify the research gap, one of the research questions is intended to identify the causality of the sources and the frames to be identified later on in this chapter.

Chinese Newspapers vs. U.S. Newspapers

Figure 5
Chinese vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers

The analysis of the sampled articles in the concerned U.S. and Chinese

newspapers showed that during the past three years, there were 562 articles (47.27%)

published in the former and 627 newspaper articles (52.73%) published in the latter.

No. of Sources in Each Article	More Than Three Sources (Including the Three Sources)		One or Two Sources		No Presence or Unidentifiable Sources		Total	
GT	239	75.63%	57	18.04%	20	6.33%	316	100%
China Daily	236	75.64%	58	18.59%	18	5.77%	312	100%
WSJ	210	88.24%	17	7.14%	11	4.62%	238	100%
WP	166	92.22%	10	5.56%	4	2.22%	180	100%
NYT	116	81.12%	15	10.49%	12	8.39%	143	100%
Total	81.33	81.33%	157	13.20%	65	5.47%	1,189	100%

Table 3

Number of Sources: All 5 Newspapers

Note. Chi-square (8 N = 1189) = 40.861, p = .000, smaller than 0.05, significant.

No. of Sources in Each Article	Chinese Newspapers		U.S. Newspapers	
More than three sources	475	49.12%	492	50.88%
One or two sources	115	73.25%	42	26.75%
No presence or unidentifiable sources	38	58.46%	27	41.54%

Table 4

The Number of Sources: The Chinese Newspapers vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (2, N = 1189) = 32.431, p = .000, smaller than 0.05, significant.

	More than three sources (including three sources)		One or two sources		No presence or unidentifiable sources		Total	
GT	239	75.63%	57	18.04%	20	6.33%	316	100.00%
China Daily	236	75.64%	58	18.59%	18	5.77%	312	100.00%
WSJ	210	88.24%	17	7.14%	11	4.62%	238	100.00%
WP	166	92.22%	10	5.56%	4	2.22%	180	100.00%
NYT	116	81.12%	15	10.49%	12	8.39%	143	100.00%
Total	967	81.33%	157	13.20%	65	5.47%	1,189	100.00%

Table 5

The Number of Sources: The Five Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (8, *N* = 1189) = 40.861, *p* = .000, smaller than 0.05, significant.

The two chi-square tests of independence were performed to examine the relation between the number of news sources and types of the newspaper. As one can see from the first table, the relation between these variables is significant (Chi-square [8, $N = 1,189$] = 40.861, $p < .01$). As you can see from Table 5, the preference by the journalists writing on the trade war can be identified as follows. The three U.S. newspapers were more likely to quote more than three sources and two sources in their editorials and news reporting. Moreover, in contrast to NYT, GT and China Daily were apparently more likely not to cite any identifiable source or have no sources at all than their U.S. counterparts in their reporting of the trade war during the three-year period.

As one can see from the 2nd table, the relationships between the countries of the newspapers and the number of sources is significant (chi-square [2, $N = 1,189$] = 38.421, $p < .01$). The preferences for the cited sources from others were not equally distributed between the Chinese and U.S. newspapers. It is also worth noting that the

three U.S. newspapers in question tended to be more likely to quote more than three sources, but less likely to quote only two sources. In contrast, the concerned Chinese newspapers were more likely to have no presence of or unidentifiable sources.

	Sources in US		Sources in China		Sources in other courtiers		Own correspondents		Other sources, please specify____.		Total	
WSJ	210	49.53%	94	22.17%	63	14.86%	50	11.79%	7	1.65%	424	100.00%
WP	168	54.90%	48	15.69%	41	13.40%	46	15.03%	3	0.98%	306	100.00%
China Daily	153	29.54%	228	44.02%	92	17.76%	29	5.60%	16	3.09%	518	100.00%
GT	125	25.30%	248	50.20%	52	10.53%	54	10.93%	15	3.04%	494	100.00%
NYT	116	46.03%	60	23.81%	42	16.67%	26	10.32%	8	3.17%	252	100.00%
Total	772	38.72%	678	34.00%	290	14.54%	205	10.28%	49	2.46%	1,994	100.00%

Table 6
The Locality of the Sources across the Five Newspapers
Note. Chi-squared (16, *N* = 1994) = 215.021, *p* = .000, smaller than 0.05, significant.

	Own Sources		Sources from the Antagonistic Country		Other Sources		Total	
WP	125	71.43%	48	27.43%	2	1.14%	175	100.00%
WSJ	125	56.05%	94	42.15%	4	1.79%	223	100.00%
GT	123	41.69%	105	35.59%	67	22.71%	295	100.00%
China Daily	95	32.42%	92	31.40%	106	36.18%	293	100.00%
NYT	63	49.22%	60	46.88%	5	3.91%	128	100300%
Total	531	47.67%	399	35.82%	184	16.52%	1,114	100.00%

Table 7
The Locality of the Sources across the Five Newspapers (Chi-squared Analysis 5X3)

Note. Chi-squared (8, *N* = 1114) = 194.54, *p* = .000, smaller than 0.05, significant.

	Own Sources		Sources from the Antagonistic Country		Other Sources		Total	
US newspapers	313	59.51%	202	38.40%	11	2.09%	526	100.00%
Chinese newspapers	218	37.07%	197	33.50%	173	29.42%	588	100.00%
Total	531	47.67%	399	35.82%	184	16.52%	1,114	100.00%

Table 8

The Locality of the Sources across Five Newspapers (Chi-square Analysis 3X2)

Note. Chi-squared $(2, N = 1114) = 156.724$, $p = .000$, smaller than 0.05, significant.

As can be seen from Table 6, there were significant results regarding the locality of sources among the five newspapers (Chi-squared $[16, N = 1994] = 215.021$, $p = .000$). The chosen sample explicitly demonstrates that GT and China daily provided more diversification in their sources than their U.S. counterparts. In addition, it is worth noting that WP quoted the least diversified sources. Moreover, the three U.S. newspapers tended to provide more Western sources and more authoritative sources, such as the BRICS countries and IMF, compared to the two Chinese newspapers, whose sources ranged predominantly from Western to African and Asian countries. However, after recoding the locality of the sources into three categories, own sources, sources from antagonistic countries, and sources from others, as can be seen from Table 7 and 8, there are significant results demonstrating the differences in terms of the locality of the sources among the five newspapers.

5.4 The Political and Ideological Frames

Political Frame	No Presence		Few		Several		Many	
China Daily	214	68.81%	50	16.08%	30	9.65%	17	5.47%
GT	199	63.38%	45	14.33%	31	9.87%	39	12.42%
WSJ	178	74.79%	26	10.92%	20	8.40%	14	5.88%
WP	99	55.31%	29	16.20%	19	10.61%	32	17.88%
NYT	88	61.54%	16	11.19%	22	15.38%	17	11.89%

Table 9

Political Frames on 5 Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (12, $N = 1185$) = 39.455, $p = .000$, smaller than 0.05, significant.

Figure 6

Political Frames on Five Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (12, $N = 1185$) = 39.455, $p = .000$, smaller than 0.05, significant.

	No presence		Few		Several		Many	
Chinese Newspapers	413	66.08%	95	15.20%	61	9.76%	56	8.96%
U.S. Newspapers	365	65.18%	71	12.68%	61	10.89%	63	11.25%

Table 10

Chinese Newspapers vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers: Political or Ideological Frames

Note. Chi-squared (3, N = 1185) = 3.288, p = .3495, greater than 0.05, not significant.

Regarding the political frames, after examining the sampled articles, at least peripherally related to the trade war, it was observed that except for WSJ, both WP and NYT were more inclined to include the political frames in the descriptions of the trade war. The chi-square test was conducted to attain the following results: chi-square (12, N = 778) = 39.455, p = .001. Therefore, the hypothesis regarding the differences in the political frames employed across five newspapers and between the Chinese and U.S. English-language newspapers has been significantly confirmed, at least partially. It is also worth stating that WP and NYT, the two major newspapers appeared to be more likely to employ the political frames than not only WSJ, but also their Chinese counterparts. Besides, in the category of no presence of the political frames, in the two Chinese newspapers, GT and China Daily, the number and percentage of the articles devoid of political frames were significantly higher. An examination of Table 10 reveals that all the English-language newspapers combined tended to be more likely to employ the political frames, as most apparent in the category of "many" and "several" than their Chinese counterparts (chi-square [3, N = 778] = 3.288, p = .3494). Therefore, the results cannot be generalized to a larger population of all the articles with keyword searched from the pool. Thus, the results

cannot significantly further corroborate the hypothesis on the political frames across the five major newspapers. As a consequence, it is fair enough to draw to the conclusion that the hypothesis can be confirmed to a certain extent, while the null hypothesis cannot be entirely rejected.

5.5 The Power and Authority Reliance Frames (Secondary Frames, Level 3 Coding)

For the presence of the political or ideological frames, the political authority frames were quantified by the frequency of quotes elicited from the government officials and institutional authorities. The coders of this study were trained into deciding if there existed any political authority frames or power reliance frames.

	Few		No Presence		Several		Many		Total	
GT	41	35.65%	28	24.35%	25	21.74%	21	18.26%	115	100%
China Daily	36	37.11%	36	37.11%	14	14.43%	11	11.34%	97	100%
WP	27	33.75%	15	18.75%	24	30.00%	14	17.50%	80	100%
WSJ	18	30.00%	14	23.33%	18	30.00%	10	16.67%	60	100%
NYT	17	30.91%	16	29.09%	16	29.09%	6	10.91%	55	100%
Total	139	34.15%	109	26.78%	97	23.83%	62	15.23%	407	100%

Table 11
Power Reliance Frames
Note. Chi-squared $(12, N = 407) = 16.587$, $p = .1658$, greater than 0.05, not significant.

Power Reliance Frames									
	Few		No Presence		Several		Many		Total	
Chinese newspapers	77	36.32%	64	30.19%	39	18.40%	32	15.09%	212	100%
US newspaper	62	31.79%	45	23.08%	58	29.74%	30	15.38%	195	100%
Total	139	34.15%	109	26.78%	97	23.83%	62	15.23%	407	100%

Table 12

Power reliance frames: Chinese Newspapers vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (3, N = 407) = 16.587, p = .0456, smaller than 0.05, significant.

As can be seen from Tables 11 and 12, an exploration into the differences in terms of the power reliance frames amongst the five major newspapers turns out to be statistically insignificant, as there are mixed results, even though all newspapers demonstrate a high level of presence of the power reliance frames, with WP, WSJ, and GT having the highest percentage, and China Daily having the lowest. However, the comparison with regard to the power/authority reliance frames shows that there was a significantly higher presence of power reliance frames in the U.S. newspapers (77%) than their Chinese counterparts (70%). Therefore, it can be concluded that the hypothesis on the significant differences in the power reliance frames can be partly validated.

	U.S. government sources		Chinese government sources		Chinese Communist Party or Members of Chinese Communist Party		Sources Close to the Chinese Government and Agency		Members of the Political Parties in the U.S.		Chinese Government Spokesperson(s)		Sources Close to the U.S. Government and Agencies		U.S. Government Spokesperson(s)		Total	
WP	39	30.71%	14	11.02%	9	7.09%	9	7.09%	27	21.26%	4	3.15%	15	11.81%	10	7.87%	127	100%
WSJ	32	29.63%	24	22.22%	12	11.11%	7	6.48%	13	12.04%	9	8.33%	8	7.41%	3	2.78%	108	100%
GT	24	15.29%	39	24.84%	26	16.56%	31	19.75%	6	3.82%	25	15.92%	5	3.18%	1	0.64%	157	100%
NYT	23	34.33%	17	25.37%	6	8.96%	3	4.48%	2	2.99%	3	4.48%	9	13.43%	4	5.97%	67	100%
China Daily	20	21.28%	31	32.98%	12	12.77%	10	10.64%	4	4.26%	6	6.38%	8	8.51%	3	3.19%	94	100%
Total	138	24.95%	125	22.60%	65	11.75%	60	10.85%	52	9.40%	47	8.50%	45	8.14%	21	3.80%	553	100%

Table 13

Typology of Sources among All Five Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (28, *N* = 138) = 114.44, *p* = .000, smaller than 0.05, significant

If there is a presence of the power/authority reliance frames, this analysis is intended to measure which regions, government, and authorities regarding all these political authority/reliance frames are from. It is noteworthy that GT and China Daily cited the least U.S. government sources and CCP member sources. The former also quoted the largest percentage of sources close to the Chinese government and agencies. Counter-intuitively, WSJ and NYT also cited a higher percentage of Chinese government sources. It has also been found that WP and WSJ quoted the highest percentage of sources from the members of the political parties in the U.S., whereas the two Chinese Newspapers and NYT quoted them the least. Moreover, it is worth noting that GT cited the most Chinese government spokespersons, considerably higher than the percentage from other newspapers. WP and NYT tended to quote the most from the sources close to the U.S. government and agencies, while WSJ did not quote the U.S. government sources as much. WP was observed to quote the much higher percentage of the U.S. government spokesperson(s). It shall be

remarked that GT and China Daily were more inclined to rely on the authority

sources in China, while WP relied primarily on the U.S. official sources, and last but

not least, NYT relied heavily on both Chinese and U.S. sources of power and

authority.

5.6 Conflict Frames

	Very Few		Several		Many		No Presence	
GT	95	30.06%	93	29.43%	75	23.73%	53	16.77%
China Daily	89	28.71%	95	30.65%	71	22.90%	55	17.74%
WSJ	80	33.76%	51	21.52%	56	23.63%	50	21.10%
WP	49	27.22%	75	41.67%	26	14.44%	30	16.67%
NYT	41	28.67%	39	27.27%	32	22.38%	31	21.68%

Table 14
Conflict Frames on Five Newspapers
Note. Chi-squared (12, $N = 1186$) = 24.317, $p = .0184$, smaller than 0.05, significant.

Conflict Frames

Legend: Very Few | Many | Several | No Presence

	Very Few	Many	Several	No Presence
NYT	41 / 28.67%	39 / 27.27%	32 / 22.38%	31 / 21.68%
WP	49 / 27.22%	75 / 41.67%	26 / 14.44%	30 / 16.67%
WSJ	80 / 33.76%	51 / 21.52%	56 / 23.63%	50 / 21.10%
China Daily	89 / 28.71%	95 / 30.65%	71 / 22.90%	55 / 17.74%
GT	95 / 30.06%	93 / 29.43%	75 / 23.73%	53 / 16.77%

Table 15

Conflict Frames

Note. Chi-squared (12, N = 1186) = 24.317, p = .0184, smaller than 0.05, significant.

Conflict Frames Chinese vis-à-vis US	Very Few		Many		Several		Presence		Total	
Chinese newspapers	184	29.39%	188	30.03%	146	23.32%	108	17.25%	626	100%
U.S. newspapers	170	30.36%	165	29.46%	114	20.36%	111	19.82%	560	100 %
Total	354	29.85%	353	29.76%	260	21.92%	219	18.47%	1,186	100%

Table 16
Conflict Frames: Chinese vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers
Note. Chi-squared (12, N = 314) = 24.317, p = .0184, smaller than 0.05, significant

Conflict mainly emphasizes the conflict among individuals, groups, or countries. The chi-square test is meant to focus on the research question of whether and to what extent are the references to the conflicts represented in each article. The chi-square test revealed there was significant difference in the employment of the conflict frames among the five major newspapers in their reporting of the Sino-U.S. trade war. However, it is extremely difficult to corroborate the hypothesis and deduce which newspapers were more likely to employ the conflict frames. WP and the two Chinese newspapers are expected to contain more conflict frames than WSJ and NYT, even though there were fewer incidence and percentage of the conflict frames in the category of many, as revealed in the results. Therefore, it can be concluded a nuanced review of all the five newspaper with a chi-square test being conducted cannot confirm the hypothesis regarding the conflict frames in its totality. This can be seen from the Table 16, when all the three Chinese newspapers and the U.S. elite newspapers are recorded into the two categories. A chi-square test reveals there are no significant results regarding the two variables, between the U.S. and Chinese

newspapers, and the preference of the conflict frames: Chi-square (3, $N = 314$) = 2.366, $p = .499$.

5.7 The Human Rights Frames

Frequency	No Presence		Very Few		Several		Many		Total	
GT	309	98.10%	4	1.27%	1	0.32	1	0.32%	315	100%
China Daily	305	98.39%	2	0.65%	-	-	3	0.97%	310	100%
WSJ	225	94.94%	6	2.53%	3	1.27%	3	1.27%	237	100%
WP	167	92.78%	3	1.67%	6	3.33%	4	2.22%	180	100%
NYT	133	93.01%	7	4.90%	3	2.10%	-	-	143	100%
Total	1,139	96.12%	22	1.86%	13	1.10%	11	0.93%	1,185	100%

Table 17

Human Rights Frames on Five Newspapers
Note. Chi-squared (12, $N = 1185$) = 32.299, $p = .0012$, smaller than 0.05, significant

Human Rights Frame Distribution

Figure 7
Human Rights Frames Bar Charts
Note. Chi-squared test (12, $N = 1185$) = 32.299, $p = .0012$, smaller than 0.05, significant

The chi-squared test was conducted to determine the validity of the hypothesis on the human right frames. It has been found that the differences in the employment of the human rights frames are significant (chi-square [12, $N = 1,185$] = 32.30, $p = .0012$). It is worth noting that in reporting the trade war, the application of the human rights frame was extremely rare, with the majority of the newspapers failing to feature the human rights frames, as typical in the other types of news reporting and editorials. Furthermore, all the three U.S. newspapers had a slightly more occurrence

and percentage of the human rights frames, whereas they were marginally employed by GT and China Daily. Therefore, the results of this analysis warrant the validation of the hypothesis regarding the human rights frames posited in the previous chapter.

5.8 The Economic Frames

	Many		Very Few		Several		No Presence		Total	
China Daily	135	43.41%	66	21.22%	53	17.04%	57	18.33%	311	100%
GT	103	32.59%	76	24.05%	79	25.00%	58	18.35%	316	100%
WSJ	94	39.66%	63	26.58%	39	16.46%	41	17.30%	237	100%
WP	59	32.60%	38	20.99%	52	28.73%	32	17.68%	181	100%
NYT	49	34.03%	32	22.22%	39	27.08%	24	16.67%	144	100%
Total	440	37.01%	275	23.13%	262	22.04%	212	17.83%	1,189	100%

Table 18
Economic Frames on 5 Newspapers
Note. Chi-squared test (12, $N = 1189$) = 22.804, $p = .00294$, smaller than 0.05, significant

Economic Frames

Figure 8

Economic Frames on Five Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared test (12, N = 1189) = 22.804, p = .00294, smaller than 0.05, significant

Economic Frames	Many		Very Few		No Presence		Several		Total	
Chinese newspapers	238	37.96%	142	22.65%	132	21.05%	115	18.34%	627	100%
US newspaper	202	35.94%	133	23.67%	130	23.13%	97	17.26%	562	100%
Total	440	37.01%	275	23.13%	262	22.04%	212	17.83%	1,189	100%

Table 19

Economic Frames: U.S. Newspapers vis-à-vis Chinese Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (3, $N = 440$) = 1.234, $p = .7449$, greater than 0.05, not significant

This section discusses whether there are any economic frames or any mention of the economic consequences while describing the trade wars. The Table 19 and Figure 10 demonstrate that most of the news articles employed or applied economic frames in their reporting. Only approximately 20% of the articles of all the five newspapers concerned themselves on the other dimensions or aspects of the trade war over the three-year period. The chi-square test conducted in this section validates the hypothesis that there exist significant differences in the economic frames among the five newspapers and between the Chinese newspapers and U.S. newspapers (Chi-squared [12, $N = 1,189$] = 22.849, $p = .0294$, smaller than 0.05, significant). Table 19 reveals that China Daily and GT are more likely than their U.S. counterparts in the employment of the economic frames, with a few exceptions in certain categories, with the rationale to be provided in the following chapters. Therefore, undoubtedly, the hypothesis provided earlier regarding the employment of the economic frames is well validated. Another glimpse into the Chinese versus U.S. newspapers, after another chi-square test illuminates that there is no significant difference (Chi-squared [3, $N = 1,189$] = 1.234, $p = .745$ greater than 0.05, not significant). However, the first analysis lends substantiation to the confirmation of the hypothesis, largely, though not exhaustively.

4.7 The Consequence Frames

Figure 9

Consequence Frames

Note. Chi-squared (7, N = 2455) = 58.834, p = .000, smaller than 0.05, significant

Consequence Frames																
	The U.S. Corporations		The U.S. Government and Trump		No Presence		Chinese Corporation(s) and Business		Chinese Government		The U.S. Individuals		Chinese Individuals		Others	
U.S. newspaper	243	21.15 %	206	17.93 %	197	17.15 %	140	12.18 %	153	13.32 %	143	12.45 %	57	4.96 %	10	0.87 %
Chinese newspapers	195	14.93 %	214	16.39 %	199	15.24 %	230	17.61 %	215	16.46 %	117	8.96%	108	8.27 %	28	2.14 %

Table 20

Consequence Frames: Chinese vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (7, N = 2455) = 58.834, p = .000, smaller than 0.05, significant

This section chiefly discusses whether the five newspapers used the consequence frames that denote the political, economic, and other results at both individual and societal levels as a result of the trade war. The Table 20 indicates significant differences between the two Chinese newspapers and the three U.S.

newspapers in terms of both number and percentage in various types of consequence frames (chi-square [7, $N = 1,189$] = 54.834, $p = .000$, smaller than 0.05, significant). As can be demonstrated from Table 20. The three U.S. newspapers tended to include significantly higher percentage than their Chinese counterparts in delineating the consequences of the trade war at the level of U.S corporations, with the frames on the consequences inflicted on the U.S. corporations accounting for 21.15% amongst all the consequence frames, in stark contrast to a mere 14.93% in the two Chinese newspapers. The same trend was also witnessed at the U.S. individual level of consequence frames, with the U.S. individuals characterized as those more susceptible to the consequences of the trade war, with 12.45% of the total consequence frames, much higher than the Chinese newspapers (8.96%). Altogether, the three U.S. newspapers in question focused more on the consequences of the trade war on the U.S. corporation and individuals, whereas the percentage of consequences on the U.S. government and Trump (17.93%) is only slightly higher than that recorded on Chinese newspapers (16.39%). However, the converse is not absolutely true, such that the concerned Chinese newspapers not just recorded a significantly higher percentage of the consequence frames on the Chinese individuals and corporations, but also that on the Chinese government.

Consequence Frames																	
	The U.S. Corporation(s) and Business		U.S. Government and Trump		No Presence		Chinese Corporation(s) and Business		Chinese Government		The U.S. Individuals		Chinese Individuals		Others		Total	
WSJ	115	23.05%	79	15.83%	73	14.63%	69	13.83%	68	13.63%	61	12.22%	27	5.41%	7	1.40%	499	100%
China Daily	108	15.88%	107	15.74%	96	14.12%	120	17.65%	100	14.71%	76	11.18%	54	7.94%	19	2.79%	680	100%
GT	87	13.90%	107	17.09%	103	16.45%	110	17.57%	115	18.37%	41	6.55%	54	8.63%	9	1.44%	626	100%
WP	74	20.39%	75	20.66%	69	19.01%	34	9.37%	43	11.85%	52	14.33%	15	4.13%	1	0.28%	363	100%
NYT	54	18.82%	52	18.12%	55	19.16%	37	12.89%	42	14.63%	30	10.45%	15	5.23%	2	0.70%	287	100%
Total	438	17.84%	420	17.11%	396	16.13%	370	15.07%	368	14.99%	260	10.59%	165	6.72%	38	1.55%	2,455	100%

Table 21

Secondary Consequence Frames on 5 Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (28, $N = 2455$) = 87.409, p = .000, smaller than 0.05, significant

Consequence Frames

Figure 10

Secondary Consequence Frames on 5 Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (28, *N* = 2455) = 87.409, *p* = .000, smaller than 0.05, significant

There are also significant differences in terms of the nuances of the

consequence frames among the five major newspapers in question (chi-square [28, *N*

= 1,189] = 87.409, *p* = 0.000, smaller than 0.05, significant). Therefore, the null

hypothesis can be rejected with statistically significant differences in the sub-types of

the consequence frames recorded between the two Chinese and three U.S.

newspapers. In addition, the statistically significant differences among all the five

major newspapers can be validated. Among all the five newspapers, NYT (19.16%)

and WP (19.01%) had the highest percentage of the consequence frames, well above

the average percentage (16.13%), with GT (16.4%) slightly above the average,

whereas the remainder two slightly below the average in terms of the presence of

consequence frames. The Table 21 above well delineates the differences in the

application of the consequence frames among the five newspapers, as opposed to

merely illustrating the differences in the employment of the consequence frames

between the Chinese and U.S. newspapers. It shall be noted that the three U.S

newspapers, NYT (18.12%), WSJ (23.05%) and WP (20.39%) provided massive

importance to the consequence suffered by the U.S. corporations, at the expense of

the attention to the Chinese enterprise entities, with merely 12.89%, 13.83%, and

9.37% by NYT, WSJ, and WP, respectively. A reverse trend was observed in the two

Chinese newspapers, with remarkable attention paid to the consequences incurred to

the Chinese corporations and business. However, with regard to the consequences

inflicted on the government of the two countries as a result of the trade war, only WP

(23.39%) and NYT (18.82%), the two major U.S. newspapers gave them salience,

whereas only GT (17.09%) had interest in giving prominence to the consequences to

the U.S. government and Trump administration, though slightly below the average

percentage of all the newspapers (17.11%) on this sub-type of framing. With respect

to the frames on the consequences incurred to the Chinese government, the trend is in

consonance with the trend in the previous tables outlining the differences between the

newspapers in two countries, with China Daily (14.97%) and GT (18.37%) boasting

much greater percentages of the consequence frames on the Chinese government than

its U.S. counterparts, with NYT (14.63%), WSJ (13.63%), and WP (11.85%), all well

above the average. Interestingly, all the newspapers except GT had a higher

percentage of consequence frames on the U.S. individuals than the Chinese

individuals, despite the fact that all the concerned U.S. newspapers had considerable

discrepancies than their Chinese counterparts in terms of consequence frames

between the U.S. and Chinese individuals, notwithstanding the fact that all the

newspapers displayed negligible interest in the consequences on individuals in

contrast with the interest in the consequences on higher social levels discussed above.

5.9 The Technology Frames and Forced Transfer of Technology

5.9.1 The Technology Frames

Newspaper	No Presence		Few		Many		Several		Total	
GT	244	77.22%	38	12.03%	20	6.33%	14	4.43%	316	100%
China Daily	226	72.67%	43	13.83%	23	7.40%	19	6.11%	311	100%
WSJ	176	73.95%	32	13.45%	13	5.46%	17	7.14%	238	100%
WP	139	77.22%	23	12.78%	11	6.11%	7	3.89%	180	100%
NYT	109	76.22%	15	10.49%	9	6.29%	10	6.99%	143	100%
Total	894	75.25%	151	12.71%	76	6.40%	67	5.64%	1,188	100%

Table 22

Technology Frames among the 5 Countries (Primary)
Note. Chi-squared (12, $N = 1188$) = 5.855, $p = .9232$, greater than 0.05, not significant

Chinese vs. U.S. newspapers	No Presence		Few		Many		Several		Total	
Chinese newspapers	470	74.96%	81	12.92%	43	6.86%	33	5.26%	627	100%
US newspapers	424	75.58%	70	12.48%	33	5.88%	34	6.06%	561	100%
Total	894	75.25%	151	12.71%	76	6.40%	67	5.64%	1,188	100%

Table 23

Technology Frames Chinese vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (3, N = 1188) = 0.835, p = .8411, greater than 0.05, not significant

As discussed in the previous chapter, the technology frames are one of the core generic frames that shall be deemed worthy of investigation. When the technology frames were analyzed among the five newspapers, there existed mixed results regarding the presence of the technology frames with the mention of the U.S. innovation edges, China's innovation progress, intellectual property infringement, intellectual property, forced technology transfer, technology theft, China 2025, innovation, etc. (chi-square [12, N = 1,189] = 5.855, p = .9232, greater than 0.05, not significant). Therefore, the hypothesis contending that there are statistically significant differences in the technology frames can be rejected. The 2nd table displays the differences between the Chinese and U.S. newspapers, still demonstrating mixed results with no statistical significance (chi-square [3, N = 1,189] = 0.835, p = .8411, greater than 0.05, not significant).

Secondary Technology Frames: What Sort of Secondary Technology Frames in the Setting of the Trade War are Employed in Each Article?									
	Technology Dispute		China's Technological Advances and Innovation by the Chinese Government or its Corporate Entities		U.S. Dominance in Technology and Innovation		Others		Total	
WSJ	36	48.00%	15	20.00%	17	22.67%	7	9.33%	75	100%
WP	31	58.49%	10	18.87%	10	18.87%	2	3.77%	53	100%
China Daily	27	26.73%	50	49.50%	16	15.84%	8	7.92%	101	100%
GT	27	30.34%	40	44.94%	19	21.35%	3	3.37%	89	100%
NYT	20	45.45%	8	18.18%	15	34.09%	1	2.27%	44	100%
Total	141	38.95%	123	33.98%	77	21.27%	21	5.8%	362	100%

Table 24

Secondary Technology Frames

Note. Chi-squared (4, $N = 362$) = 32.864, $p = .000$, smaller than 0.05, significant.

Even though the hypothesis with reference to the technology frames shall be rejected, it demonstrates that there exists a statistical significance in the secondary technology frames. It is worth observing that WSJ, WP, and NYT had significantly more frames on the technology dispute exemplified by the forced technology transfer (48%), technology theft by China or its corporate entities (58.49%), technology spy (45.45%), etc., noticeably higher than China Daily, GT, and the overall average. A converse trend was witnessed in the technology frames on China's technological advances and innovations by the Chinese government or its corporate entities, as exemplified by China 2025, with China Daily and GT standing at 49.50% and 44.95%, respectively. As far as the U.S. dominance in technology is concerned, NYT (34.09%) and WSJ (22.67%) gave an appreciably higher prominence to the issue frame, compared to WP (18.87%), China Daily (15.84%), and GT (21.35%).

5.9.2 The Technology Theft and the Forced Transfer of Technology (Secondary Frames)

Technology Theft or Forced Technology Transfer	No Presence		Very Few		Several		Many		Total	
GT	30	71.43%	9	21.43%	2	4.76%	1	2.38%	42	100%
China Daily	27	64.29%	11	26.19%	4	9.52%	-	-	42	100%
WSJ	13	30.95%	20	47.62%	7	16.67%	2	4.76%	42	100%
WP	9	28.13%	14	43.75%	5	15.63%	4	12.50%	32	100%
NYT	7	31.82%	9	40.91%	4	18.18%	2	9.09%	22	100%
Total	86	47.78%	63	35.00%	22	12.22%	9	5.00%	180	100%

Table 25

Secondary Technology Frames on the 5 newspapers: Technology Theft and Forced Transfer of Technology

Note. Chi-squared (12, $N = 180$) = 30.334, p = .0025, smaller than 0.05, significant.

Technology Theft & Forced Technology Transfer

Figure 11

Secondary Technology Frames: Technology Theft and Forced Technology Transfer

Note. Chi-squared (12, N = 180) = 30.334, p = .0025, smaller than 0.05, significant.

Among all the technology frames identified above, the worthiest for a thorough investigation is the alleged technology theft or the forced technology transfer. Among all the newspapers in the study, all the three U.S. newspapers gave prominence to the issue of the forced transfer of technology, with variations in the number of quotes. However, the number of articles on the transfer of technology in

technology framing in the two Chinese newspapers were significantly less (Chi-squared [12, $N = 86$] = 30.334, $p = .0025$, smaller than 0.05, significant). In a nutshell, the concerned U.S. newspapers were not only significantly more prominent in the provision of technology frames, but also had a statistically significant presence of the allegedly forced technology transfer and technology theft, even with the total number and percentage of both the frames being negligible as compared to the political, economic, and conflict frames. Therefore, the hypothesis revolving around the technology theft has been exhaustively validated, even though the hypothesis regarding the technology frames in the five newspapers is not validated, as the results cannot be generalized to the general population with no statistical significance.

5.10 The Morality Frames, Responsible Capitalism Frames, Racism Frames, and Accountability/Attribution of Responsibility Frames

Morality Frames

Figure 12

Morality Frames (excluding "no presence")

Note. Chi-squared (12, N = 1,187) = 40.777, p = .000, smaller than 0.05, significant.

Morality Frames	No Presence		Very Few		Several		Many		Total	
China Daily	304	97.75%	5	1.61%	1	0.32%	1	0.32%	311	100%
GT	303	96.19%	8	2.54%	4	1.27%	-	-	315	100%
WSJ	232	97.48%	3	1.26%	2	0.84%	1	0.42%	238	100%
WP	166	92.22%	3	1.67%	9	5.00%	2	1.11%	180	100%
NYT	133	93.01%	6	4.20%	-	-	4	2.80%	143	100%
Total	1,138	95.87%	25	2.11%	16	1.35%	8	0.67%	1,187	100%

Table 26

Morality Frames

Note. Chi-squared (12, $N = 1,187$) = 40.777., $p = .000$, smaller than 0.05, significant.

As can be seen from the above Table 26, there are statistically significant differences in terms of the morality frames among the five major newspapers, even with the number and percentage of the morality frames being minimal. The rationale behind the inclusion of this discussion on the morality frame is for it to possibly entail the ideological packages journalists from various media establishments of the two countries that may have exerted an influence upon the general public and public opinions under the lens of the trade war. It is noteworthy that only the three U.S. newspapers manifested the existence of a higher percentage of the morality frames than their Chinese counterparts. However, counter-intuitively, mixed results were observed in the analysis on the responsible capitalism frames, racism frames, and accountability/attribution of responsibility frames, with no significant results in the differences among the five newspapers, even though these frames were predominant in reporting on an extensive range of topics, their existence was negligible in the reporting dedicated to or tangential to the Sino-U.S. trade war, as demonstrated in the Table 26 and Figure 13.

Responsible Capitalism Frames	No Presence		Very Few		Several		Many		Total	
GT	306	96.84%	6	1.90%	2	0.63%	2	0.63%	316	100%
China Daily	300	96.46%	8	2.57%	3	0.96%	-	-	311	100%
WSJ	223	93.70%	5	2.10%	7	2.94%	3	1.26%	238	100%
WP	167	92.78%	5	2.78%	3	1.67%	5	2.78%	180	100%
NYT	135	95.07%	1	0.70%	2	1.41%	4	2.82%	142	100%
Total	1,131	95.28%	25	2.11%	17	1.43%	14	1.18%	1,187	100%

Table 27

Responsible Capitalism Frames

Note. Chi-squared (12, N = 1,187) = 32.864, p = .072, greater than 0.05, not significant.

Racism Frames	No Presence		Very Few		Several		Many		Total	
China Daily	308	99.04%	2	0.64%	1	0.32%	-	-	311	100%
GT	308	98.40%	2	0.64%	1	0.32%	2	0.64%	313	100%
WSJ	236	99.16%	1	0.42%	-	-	1	0.42%	238	100%
WP	173	96.65%	2	1.12%	3	1.68%	1	0.56%	179	100%
NYT	140	97.90%	3	2.10%	-	-	-	-	143	100%
Total	1,165	98.40%	10	0.84%	5	0.42%	4	0.34%	1,184	100%

Table 28

Racism Frames

Note. Chi-squared (12, N = 1,184) = 14.821, p = .072, greater than 0.05, not significant.

5.11 The Public Interest Frame versus National Interest Frame

5.11.1 The Public Interest Frame

As stated in Chapter 2, 3 and 4, both the public interest frames and national interest frames, along with reference to the causal chain between the two frames and the trade war, have been discussed in terms of their importance to the elite discourse. The purpose of this section is to discuss the existence of statistically significant differences among the three U.S. news outlets and the statistically significant

differences between the Chinese and U.S. newspapers in terms of the public interest versus. national interest frames, in conjunction with their secondary frames. As evident in the following tables and charts, there exist statistically significant differences between the Chinese and U.S. news outlets in terms of the public interest frames. Therefore, the two hypotheses asserting significant differences in terms of the public frames can be validated. However, the following table depicts that the percentage of public frames in the U.S. news outlets were significantly greater than the Chinese outlets, even with an enormous salience of the public interest in the two Chinese newspapers. Among the five newspapers, WSJ, a business or economics focused newspaper, ranks the first with regard to the salience of public interest being approximately 32% of its total news report on the trade war, followed by NYT and WP, both standing at approximately 30% of the total. As the chi-square results are significant, it can be deduced that the results retrieved from the sampled pools of the news articles on the trade war can represent the larger population. Regarding the public interest being upheld or compromised as a result of the trade war, as apparent from the statistical tabulation, all the three U.S. outlets provided statistically more salience than their Chinese counterparts in terms of the U.S. public interest being compromised. In other words, the fact that the livelihood of the general public in the U.S. was compromised as a consequence of the trade war was afforded markedly higher salience. Among all the three U.S. news outlets, WP ranked the first in the salience of the U.S. public interest being compromised, standing approximately at a staggering 65.15%, followed by NYT (56.36%) and WSJ (46.32%), slightly higher than China Daily, in which there existed the presence of the public interest of U.S. and the general public of the U.S. being aggravated. Not surprisingly, GT and China

Daily prided themselves with a remarkable proportion of articles with master frames or the frames on the public interest or the peripheral frames emplotting the master frames, twice the percentage of those in WP and WSJ, but not for NYT that stood approximately at 25% amounting to the average percentage of all the sampled articles dedicated to or touching upon the livelihood, civil rights, and human rights being affected negatively as the direct or indirect repercussions of the trade war, and much higher than the presence of the public frames present in the other two U.S. outlets. It can be concluded that NYT provided notably greater salience in comparison with the other two U.S. news outlets. The results of the content analysis on public frames align with the paradigm of established pluralism advocated by Lee (2002) in his detailed analysis of the U.S. elite discourse in NYT. However, the nuances of these variations can only be foregrounded by their comparison with the presence of national interest frames, along the timeline of the trade war. It is worth noting that all the five newspapers boasted an appreciably higher presence of the adverse facets of the public interest, both in the U.S. and China than its positive sides. Moreover, all the three U.S. news outlets delineated the public interest of the U.S. being more salient than their Chinese counterparts with regard to the employment of the master or peripheral public interest frames. In terms of China's public interest being upheld, except for WSJ, where there was a strong presence of the positive public frames concerning China, the other two U.S. news outlets manifested a marginal presence of the same, whereby the two Chinese news outlets, featured a significantly higher presence of salient coverage on the China's public interest being upheld owing to the trade war. The positive public interest frames concerning China corresponds to the significantly higher percentage of the positive frames by the Chinese newspapers in question. An

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in-depth assessment of the discourse of the editorials and commentaries in these Chinese newspapers revealed that the media logic of GT and China Daily, particularly the former is based on the discourse that the trade war was able to accelerate the industrial transformation of China's economy and the advancement in its technology, with conspiracy theories and antagonistic nationalism fed to the readers that the rivalry of the two super powers rendered the trade war, conspired by the U.S., for inevitable peaceful evolution and in spite of the hiccups and adverse impacts caused by the Trump administration, the rise in the momentum of China to be absolutely destined.

Primary Public Frames

Figure 13
Public Interest Frames
Note. Chi-squared $(12, N = 1{,}185) = 22.433$, $p = .0329$, smaller than 0.05, significant.

Public Interest Frames in the five News Outlets	No Presence		Few		Many		Several		Total	
GT	255	80.95%	33	10.48%	10	3.17%	17	5.40%	315	100%
China Daily	232	74.84%	31	10.00%	28	9.03%	19	6.13%	310	100%
WSJ	162	68.07%	31	13.03%	25	10.50%	20	8.40%	238	100%
WP	126	70.39%	18	10.06%	19	10.61%	16	8.94%	179	100%
NYT	100	69.93%	16	11.19%	15	10.49%	12	8.39%	143	100%
Total	875	73.84%	129	10.89%	97	8.19%	84	7.09%	1,185	100%

Table 29

Public Interest Frames in Five News Outlets

Note. Chi-squared (12, N = 1,185) = 22.433, p = .0329, smaller than 0.05, significant.

Public Interest Frames	No Presence		Few		Many		Several		Total	
Chinese newspapers	487	77.92%	64	10.24%	38	6.08%	36	5.76%	625	100%
U.S. newspaper	388	69.29%	65	11.61%	59	10.54%	48	8.57%	560	100%
Total	875	73.84%	129	10.89%	97	8.19%	84	7.09%	1,185	100%

Table 30

Public Interest Frames: Chinese vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (3, N = 1,185) = 13.946, p = .0329, smaller than 0.003, significant

Primary Public Frames: Chinese vs. U.S.

Legend: No presence | Few | Many | Several

US newspaper:
- No presence: 69.29%
- Few: 11.61%
- Many: 10.54%
- Several: 8.57%

Chinese newspapers:
- No presence: 77.92%
- Few: 10.24%
- Many: 6.08%
- Several: 5.76%

Figure 14

Public Interest Frames: Chinese vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (3, N = 1,185) = 13.946, p = .0329, smaller than 0.003, significant.

Secondary Public Interest Frames: Causal Chains Between Trade War and Public Interest										
	The Public Interest of the U.S. is Compromised.		The Public Interest of China is Compromised.		The Public Interest of the U.S. is Advanced.		4. The Public Interest of China is Advanced		Total	
China Daily	45	45.45%	35	35.35%	7	7.07%	12	12.12%	99	100%
WSJ	44	46.32%	18	18.95%	22	23.16%	11	11.58%	95	100%
WP	43	65.15%	11	16.67%	10	15.15%	2	3.03%	66	100%
GT	35	43.21%	27	33.33%	5	6.17%	14	17.28%	81	100%
NYT	31	56.36%	14	25.45%	7	12.73%	3	5.45%	55	100%
Total	198	50.00%	105	26.52%	51	12.88%	42	10.61%	396	100%

Table 31

Public Interest Frames (Secondary)

Note. Chi-squared (12, *N* = 396) = 38.85, *p* = .003, smaller than 0.003, significant.

Secondary Public Frames: 5 newspapers

Figure 15

Secondary Public Interest Frames

Note. Chi-squared (12, *N* = 396) = 38.85, *p* = .003, smaller than 0.003, significant.

5.11.2 The National Interest Frames

National Interest Frames	4. No presence		3. Few		1. Many		2. Several		Total	
Chinese newspapers	307	48.96%	127	20.26%	114	18.18%	79	12.60%	627	100.00%
US newspaper	291	52.06%	115	20.57%	85	15.21%	68	12.16%	559	100.00%
Total	598	50.42%	242	20.40%	199	16.78%	147	12.39%	1,186	100.00%

Table 32

The National Interest Frames: Chinese vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (3, *N*=1186) = 2.181, *p* =0.5358, greater than 0.05, not significant.

National Interest Frames: U.S. vs. China

Legend: No presence, Few, Many, Several

US newspaper:
- No presence: 52.06%
- Few: 20.57%
- Many: 15.21%
- Several: 12.16%

Chinese newspapers:
- No presence: 48.96%
- Few: 20.26%
- Many: 18.18%
- Several: 12.60%

Figure 16

National Interest Frames: Chinese vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (3, *N*=1186) = 2.181, *p* =0.5358, greater than 0.05, not significant.

Primary National Interest Frames All Newspapers										
	No Presence		Few		Many		Several		Total	
China Daily	154	49.52%	61	19.61%	62	19.94%	34	10.93%	311	100%
GT	153	48.42%	66	20.89%	52	16.46%	45	14.24%	316	100%
WSJ	110	46.22%	53	22.27%	43	18.07%	32	13.45%	238	100%
WP	102	56.98%	31	17.32%	26	14.53%	20	11.17%	179	100%
NYT	79	55.63%	31	21.83%	16	11.27%	16	11.27%	142	100%
Total	598	50.42%	242	20.40%	199	16.78%	147	12.39%	1,186	100%

Table 33

The Presence of Primary National Interest Frames on all Five Newspapers
Note. Chi-squared (12, N = 1,186) = 12.146, p =. 4348, not significant.

Primary National Interest Frame All Newspapers

Figure 17

Primary National Interest Frames Present on 5 Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (12, N = 1,186) = 12.146, p =. 4348, not significant

Secondary National Interest Frames	The National Interests of the U.S. are Compromised		The National Interests of China are Compromised		The National Interests of China are Advanced.		The National Interests of the U.S. are Advanced.		Total	
GT	86	38.05%	71	31.42%	55	24.34%	14	6.19%	226	100%
China Daily	83	38.25%	81	37.33%	38	17.51%	15	6.91%	217	100%
WSJ	76	46.06%	55	33.33%	13	7.88%	21	12.73%	165	100%
WP	59	61.46%	28	29.17%	1	1.04%	8	8.33%	96	100%
NYT	48	57.14%	24	28.57%	3	3.57%	9	10.71%	84	100%
Total	352	44.67%	259	32.87%	110	13.96%	67	8.50%	788	100%

Table 34

Secondary National Interest Frames

Note. Chi-squared (788, $N = 1,186$) = 63.358, p = .000, significant

Secondary National Interest Frames

Legend:
- National interests of US compromised
- National interest of China compromised
- National interests of China advanced,
- National interests of US advanced.

Newspaper	US compromised	China compromised	China advanced	US advanced
NYT	57.14%	28.57%	3.57%	10.71%
WP	61.46%	29.17%	1.04%	8.33%
WSJ	46.06%	33.33%	7.88%	12.73%
China Daily	38.25%	37.33%	17.51%	6.91%
GT	38.05%	31.42%	24.34%	6.19%

Figure 18

Secondary National Interest Frames: All Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (788, N = 1,186) = 63.358, p = .000, significant

The results of the evaluations performed demonstrate that no statistically significant differences between the U.S. and Chinese news outlets with regard to the employment of the national interest frame. Moreover, no significant differences were observed in the light of the national interest among all the five newspapers. However, compared to the other frames that were examined, some with only marginal or negligible presence, undoubtedly, despite no statistically significant differences, the strong presence of the national interest frames, as displayed by their high percentage,

corroborates the strong salience of the national interest frames in all the news outlets in question. It can be inferred that the national interest frames warrant further discussion in the following chapters not only regarding how they evolved across the trade war timeline, but also how they interacted with the social events from the perspective of Constructivism and social Interactionism to understand their subtle nuances by moving up the ladder of abstraction, considering the dearth of concrete research dedicated to the knowledge regarding their temporal evolution. However, it ought to be remarked that a statistical examination of the secondary national interest frames in relation to their causal chains, namely how the national interest frames interacted with trade war, regardless of its temporal shifts, demonstrated that there exist statistically significant differences in how the national interest having been compromised or upheld in China and the U.S. in all the five newspapers explored in this study, regardless of whether them being Chinese news outlets or their U.S. counterparts, established pluralism exists and serves as the helper for the government despite the contestation and convolution, particularly in their foreign policies reporting.

5.11.3 Accountability and Attribution of Responsibility Frames

Chi-squared (12, $N = 72$) = 83.2, $p = 0.1726$, greater than 0.05, not significant. There are only negligible level of accountability and attribution of responsibility frames present on the five newspapers in question. Therefore, a further inquiry into the attribution of responsibility frames would not be meaningful even as emplotting frames, as the findings demonstrate that accountability or attribution of responsibility

frames fail to serve as the alternative or the oppositional ideologies as described by

Williams (1977), to renew and redefine the dominant structure, as connoted by

visibility the master and dominant frames the five newspapers tended to present over

the timeline.

5.12 The Sources, Their Locality, and Their Power Reliance

5.12.1 The Measures, Coding, and Methodology

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the coding scheme involved a wide

range of apparent and latent measures, not only relevant to the research question of

the sources, but also to the research regarding the causality between the

characteristics of the sources and the framing practices of the journalists in both

China and the U.S. The dependent variables to study the causality are the seven major

frames that demonstrated not only strong salience and dominance, but also

discrepancies in their coverage of the trade war among the five major newspapers in

question and/or between the Chinese and U.S. newspapers. The dependent variables

of these major frames include political and ideological frames (V3) and conflict

frames (V6) entailing the presence of or the frequency of the conflicts mentioned in

the articles, economic, technology, public interest, national interest, and consequence

frames. Except for the consequence frames, as only their presence was counted in the

coding process, all these frames were quantified either as the dummy-coded variables

(0 = *no presence*; 1 = *presence*) or as ordinal variables (0 = *no presence*, 1 = *few*, 2 =

several, 3 = *many*), as both the logistical regression analysis and OLS regression

analysis were operationalized. The political power reliance of the sources (X2) or

political authorities cited indicator relates to the frequency of quotes elicited from 1) Chinese Communist Party or its members; 2) Chinese government sources; 3) Chinese government spokesperson(s); 4) Sources close to the Chinese government and agencies; 5) Members of political parties in the U.S.; 6) The U.S. government sources; 7) The U.S. government spokesperson(s); and 8) Sources close to the U.S. government and agencies. In the framing analysis, all these otherwise distinctive constructs demonstrated significant discrepancies in a separate investigation as a part of this research, the statistical analysis was conducted on the relationships between the responsive latent variables measuring the frames and the overarching construct of the power reliance, as opposed to the separate and distinct concepts defined by its geographic closeness and political relativity, in order to not only the causality of the construct of the power reliance of the sources and the presence or frequency of the frames, but also to compare the results between the news outlets in the U.S. and those in China to ensure that the same construct can be analyzed at the same level of commensurability, considering the distinction of the different authoritative institutions not being absolutely meaningful in the Chinese context. Despite a plethora of studies revolving around the global universalization of the U.S. journalism, and the value shared by the Chinese journalists with those in countries with more liberal media models (Zhang, 2007), this study is extremely worthwhile with regard to assessing this trend on journalism via an analysis conducted on the commensurable, if not over-generalized, construct. The latent measure, the political power reliance of sources, is set as an ordinal variable (0 = *no presence*, 1 = *few*, 2 = *several*, 3 = *many*). Another latent measure is the under-studied locality of the sources labeled as X1 in the OLS and logistic regression analysis, intended to

measure the geographical closeness of the sources: own sources vis-à-vis sources

from the antagonistic countries and others, in its role as the causal indicator to predict

the presence or the frequency of the studied major frames. The locality of the sources

needs to be recorded into three categorical measures, with their own sources set as the

dummy code (own source = 0), i.e., as a reference, the sources as China is coded as 2,

summing the sources from Western countries other than the U.S. and other countries,

and the rest of the sources is coded as 3, excluding those coded as unclear or

unknown. The only apparent measure is the newspapers as one of the three

independent variables. For the purpose of pairwise comparison, the three U.S.

newspapers are compared with NYT set as the dummy code variable or the baseline,

and the WP set as 1 (X3a), and the WSJ set as 2 (X3b). Likewise, the two Chinese

newspapers are also under analysis separately, with China Daily set as the dummy

code variable. Apart from the analysis on the causality, the locality of the sources and

the power reliance of the sources were connected with the five newspapers and the

two countries of the newspapers, with chi-square tests performed individually.

Regarding the locality of the sources, the linearity test and the chi-square test

demonstrated that the U.S. newspapers, as a whole, were bent on using their own

sources from their own correspondents and assets along with the sources from U.S.

government, established institutions, and individuals associated with U.S. authorities.

Locality of Sources: All Newspapers	Own Sources		Sources from the Antagonistic Country		Other Sources		Total	
NYT	63	49.22%	60	46.88%	5	3.91%	128	100%
WP	125	71.43%	48	27.43%	2	1.14%	175	100%
WSJ	125	56.05%	94	42.15%	4	1.79%	223	100%
GT	123	41.69%	105	35.59%	67	22.71%	295	100%
China Daily	95	32.42%	92	31.40%	106	36.18%	293	100%
Total	531	47.67%	399	35.82%	184	16.52%	1,114	100%

Table 35

Locality of Sources: All Newspapers
Note. Chi-squared (8, *N* = 1,114) = 194.54, *p* = .000, smaller than 0.005, significant.

Locality of Sources All Newspapers	Own Sources		Sources from the Antagonistic Country		Other Sources		Total	
US newspaper	313	59.51%	202	38.40%	11	2.09%	526	100%
Chinese newspapers	218	37.07%	197	33.50%	173	29.42%	588	100%
Total	531	47.67%	399	35.82%	184	16.52%	1,114	100%

Table 36

Locality of Sources: U.S. vis-à-vis Chinese Newspapers
Note. Chi-squared (2, *N* = 1,114) = 156.724, *p* = .000, smaller than 0.005, significant.

Political Power Reliance Frames	No Presence		Few		Several		Many		Total	
The Chinese newspapers	64	30.19%	77	36.32%	39	18.40%	32	15.09%	212	100%
The U.S. newspapers	45	23.08%	62	31.79%	58	29.74%	30	15.38%	195	100%
Total	109	26.78%	139	34.15%	97	23.83%	62	15.23%	407	100%

Table 37

Power Reliance Frames: Chinese vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers
Note. Chi-squared (3, *N* = 407) = 8.021, *p* = .0456, smaller than 0.005, significant.

Power Reliance Sources	No Presence		Several		Many		No Presence		Total	
GT	41	35.65%	25	21.74%	21	18.26%	28	24.35%	115	100%
China Daily	36	37.11%	14	14.43%	11	11.34%	36	37.11%	97	100%
WP	27	33.75%	24	30.00%	14	17.50%	15	18.75%	80	100%
WSJ	18	30.00%	18	30.00%	10	16.67%	14	23.33%	60	100%
NYT	17	30.91%	16	29.09%	6	10.91%	16	29.09%	55	100%
Total	139	34.15%	97	23.83%	62	15.23%	109	26.78%	407	100%

Table 38
Power Reliance Sources
Note. Chi-squared (12, $N = 407$) = 16.587, $p = .165$, greater than 0.005, not significant.

	GT		China Daily		WSJ		WP		NYT		Total	
Presence	87	29.19%	61	20.47%	46	15.44%	65	21.81%	39	13.09%	298	100%
No Presence	28	25.69%	36	33.03%	14	12.84%	15	13.76%	16	14.68%	109	100%
Total	115	28.26%	97	23.83%	60	14.74%	80	19.66%	55	13.51%	407	100%

Table 39
Power Reliance Sources: Dichotomous Variable
Note. Chi-squared (4, $N = 407$) = 8.733, $p = 0.067$, greater than 0.005, not significant.

As can be seen from Figures 4.49 to 4.53, with regard to the hypotheses on the

locality of the sources and the political power reliance of the sources, the locality of

the sources is intended to measure the geographical closeness of the sources feeding

the news coverage of the trade war (own sources vis-à-vis antagonistic sources and

others). In other words, in the case of the three U.S. newspapers, the sources from the

Chinese government and the affiliated institutions and individuals were defined and

therefore coded as the antagonistic sources and the sources feeding the news coverage

of the trade war, with geographical locations from countries other than China and the

U.S. It is noticeable that under this analysis, the sample size of the political power

reliance sources was much smaller than that of the locality of the sources. Regarding

the latter, the inclination toward the usage of the sources from outside the country is more prominent among the Chinese newspapers as a whole, as there were stronger predilections of the Chinese newspapers to use sources other than China and the U.S. to feed their news coverage with a staggering 29.42%, in stark contrast with merely 2% of the sources from other countries feeding the coverage of the trade war to the U.S. newspapers. The analysis also suggests the stronger presence of the sources within the U.S. feeding the coverage of the trade war to the U.S. newspapers, with 59.51%, in contrast with only 37.07% from the Chinese newspapers. Such inclinations suggest that the Chinese newspapers altogether tended to use the sources farther from its geographical locations, whereas the three U.S. news outlets tended to use a majority of the sources within the U.S., and an analogous trend as their Chinese counterparts in using the sources from the antagonistic country. The reluctance as suggested by the U.S. media in their usage of the sources outside the geographical boundaries of the two countries demonstrates to a certain extent the tendency for involution in their reporting and source using, even though the trade war staged by the U.S. government during the time had immense global impacts, socially, economically, and politically, and rolled out, synchronized with the trade disputes with the other countries going far beyond the geographical boundaries of the two major countries. However, the analysis depicted in Figure 4.50 is insufficient to comprehensively explore the nuances of the large number and proportion of the sources by the Chinese newspapers to feed their coverage on the trade war, owing to the limitations of the research purview. Among the three U.S. news outlets, WP manifested the most obvious involution trend, due to its significant incorporation of the sources taken within the geographical boundaries of the U.S., with the lowest

reliance on the sources from China among the three newspapers, with merely

27.43%, and other countries with an inconsequential 1.14%, compared to the other

two news outlets. A meticulous examination with the chi-square and linearity analysis

further corroborated the claim on the predilections toward involution, as shown in the

high reliance on the sources in the U.S. by NYT and WSJ. Even though the two were

also immensely reliant on the sources from China, the proportion of the sources from

the geographical locations other than China and the U.S. were negligible compared to

the two Chinese news outlets. The statistical analysis on the three U.S. newspapers

within the same geographical boundaries suggests their trends of involution with a

notable reliance on its own sources at the expenses of retrieving sources to feed its

coverage from the antagonistic country, in this case, China, along with the other

countries. Furthermore, an entirely different trend was witnessed in the source

retrieval of the two Chinese newspapers, wherein, there was observed minimal

referring to the sources from the geographical boundary of its own country, compared

to its U.S. counterparts, in contrast to their enormous presence of the sources from the

other countries. Remarkably, both GT and China Daily used a much higher

percentage of sources from the U.S. than WP, but slightly lower than NYT and WSJ.

In this context, in terms of the locality of the sources, these two U.S. newspapers,

despite their justifiable discrepancies, strongly suggested the existence of the

involution trend compared to their two Chinese counterparts, and the tendency

characterized by the two Chinese newspapers toward the use of sources outside its

geographical limits to feed the news coverage, with China Daily taking the

precedence in using more sources from other countries. Notwithstanding their similar

ideological allegiance toward the regime and the shared predilections toward the

sources going beyond their geographical boundaries, extending not only to the U.S. and the sources from other countries, there was compelling evidence suggesting the discrepancies in the two Chinese newspapers in terms of the locality in the source retrieval, as China Daily was observed to be more reliant on the sources from the areas farther from the geographical boundaries of the pertinent parties of the trade war, and on the contrary, GT, despite its heavy and conspicuous presence on a wide range of the online platforms, including Weibo, Twitter, and Toutiao, boasted a tremendous reliance of the sources within its geographical boundaries. The high dependence of the two Chinese papers on the sources outside its geographical boundaries contradicts the proclivity toward involution as demonstrated in the three U.S. newspapers, and concurrently accentuates the re-framing practices of the Chinese newspapers, considering that a larger percentage of the sources were retrieved from the locations outside the geographical boundaries of China and demonstrated with the cross-sectional and diachronic discrepancies in the salience of the major and emplotting frames over the timeline, elucidated in the previous chapter. Regarding another construct, the political power reliance of the sources, there were no statistically significant discrepancies among the five newspapers in question, regardless of whether the construct of the number of authoritative quotes was cited in the coverage of the trade war calculated as an ordinal measure or a dichotomous variable quantifying its presence. Nevertheless, the comparison between the Chinese and U.S. newspapers in general on the political power reliance of the sources demonstrated statistically significant results, i.e., the U.S. newspapers were typically more likely than their Chinese counterparts in quoting authorities or political sources, despite the obscurity regarding the nuances and discrepancies among the newspapers

of the same country. Moreover, the inclination of the Chinese newspapers toward lesser employment of political and authoritative quotes as substantiated by the empirical evidence in this chapter, together with their seemingly paradoxical stronger prevalence of the political, national interest, and economic frames, along with conflict and consequence frames, over the time frame, an explicit reflection of the politicization of the re-framing practices of the journalists, despite the past studies reporting the existence of their shared professionalism common in more liberal media systems.

The OLS Regression Analysis: The Effects of Newspapers, Locality of Sources, and Political Power Reliance on Percentage of Frames

Independent Variable	β	SE β	t	p	Adjusted R^2	R^2
Dependent Variables						
Political Frames						
(Constant)	0.10	0.59	0.18	.86	.665	.667
Locality of Sources						
Antagonistic Countries	0.20	0.59	0.34	.73		
Others	0.59	0.59	0.54	.59		
Political Power Reliance	0.97***	0.02	0.02	.00		
Newspapers						
WP	-0.04	0.07	-0.61	.54		
WSJ	-0.21**	0.06	-3.29	.00		
China Daily	-0.10	0.06	-1.76	.08		
GT	-0.08	0.06	-1.42	.16		
Conflict Frames						
Independent Variable	**β**	**SE β**	**t**	**p**	**Adjusted R^2**	**R^2**
(Constant)	2.90***	1.078	2.69	.00	.05	.04
Locality of Sources						
Antagonistic Countries	-1.26	1.07	2.693	.24		
Others	-1.99	1.08	-1.845	.07		
Political Power Reliance	0.00	0.037	-.233	.816		
Newspapers						
WP	0.20	0.12	1.66	.10		
WSJ	-0.13	0.11	-1.16	.25		
China Daily	0.10	0.11	0.89	.37		
GT	0.10	0.11	0.88	.38		
Economic Frames						
Independent Variable	**β**	**SE β**	**t**	**P**	**Adjusted R^2**	**R^2**
(Constant)	0.05	1.13	0.05	.96	.00	.00
Locality of Sources						
Antagonistic Countries	1.12	1.13	0.989	.323		
Others	1.17	1.13	1.035	.301		
Political Power Reliance	0.07	0.04	1.918	.055		
Newspapers						
WP	0.02	0.13	0.15	.89		
WSJ	0.02	0.12	0.13	.90		
China Daily	-0.05	0.11	-0.46	.64		
GT	0.07	0.11	0.6	.55		
Technology Frames						
Independent Variable	**β**	**SE β**	**T**	**p**	**Adjusted R^2**	**R^2**
(Constant)	-0.06	0.86	-0.07	.95	.01	.01
Locality of Sources						
Antagonistic Countries	0.48	0.86	0.56	.58		
Others	0.32	0.86	0.36	.72		
Political Power Reliance	0.07*	0.03	2.32	.02		
Newspapers						
WP	-0.07	0.10	-0.73	.46		
WSJ	0.00	0.09	0.1	.92		
China Daily	0.06	0.09	0.69	.49		
GT	-0.04	0.09	-0.45	.66		
Public Interest Frames						
	β	SE β	t	p	Adjusted R^2	R^2
Independent Variable						
(Constant)	0.08	0.93	0.09	.93	.04	.03
Locality of Sources						
Antagonistic Countries	0.49	0.93	0.53	.60		
Others	0.19	0.93	0.21	.84		
Political Power Reliance	0.11***	0.03	3.58	.00		
Newspapers						
WP	-0.04	0.10	-.43	0.67		
WSJ	0.02	0.098	0.21	0.83		
China Daily	-0.08	0.093	-.91	0.36		
GT	-0.29**	0.093	-3.16	0.00		
National Interest Frames						
Independent Variable	**β**	**SE β**	**t**	**p**	**Adjusted R^2**	**R^2**
(Constant)	-0.25	1.126	-.23	0.82	0.03	0.04
Locality of Sources						
Antagonistic Countries	1.05	1.12	0.93	0.35		
Others	0.48	1.13	0.43	0.67		
Political Power Reliance	0.11***	0.04	2.81	0.00		
Newspapers						
WP	-0.01	0.13	-.09	0.93		
WSJ	0.25*	0.119	2.09	0.04		
China Daily	0.25*	0.113	2.24	0.03		
GT	0.20	0.113	1.78	0.08		

Table 40

Note. * *p* < .05
** *p* < .01
*** *p* < .001
Locality of Sources is dummy coded as 0. For locality of source, the reference category is "Own Sources,''
whereas for newspapers, the reference category is NYT. "Political Power Reliance" is an ordinal variable, ranging
from No Presence (0), Few (1), Several (2), to Many (3).
The equation for a simple multinomial OLS regression model is as follows: $Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 X_i + \varepsilon_i$
β in the multinomial OLS regression model is the parameter of the explanatory variable, in this case, the frequency
of political power reliance, newspapers, and locality of sources to predict the frequency or percentage of news
frames. α in the multinomial OLS regression model is the intercept/constant.

5.12.3 The Logistic Regression Analysis Vis-à-vis the OLS Regression Analysis

  The multinomial OLS regression model involves the three exogenous variables: the locality of sources, political power reliance, and newspapers, in their relationships with the endogenous variables, an expansive range of news frames. For a pairwise comparison, two dummy-coded independent variables were created, separated into two blocks, along with one ordinal variable, the political power reliance, in efforts to compare the independent variables in pairs to determine which measures in relation to the sources or as dimensions of sources were preferred and had greater quantitative properties, serving as explanatory measures for the major frames boasting the most salience over the time reported in pertinent chapter, except for the consequence frames, a categorical measure, and therefore OLS was not applicable. Alternatively, the construct consequence frames as the endogenous variable were required be recorded into a dichotomous variable (0 = *no presence*, 1 = *presence*) in a separate multinomial logistic regression model.

In the OLS regression model, the locality of the newspapers (0–2) was a categorical measure, with own sources including the sources from the correspondents of the newspapers and the sources from the government or established institutions and individuals within the geographical boundaries of their countries as the reference category (dummy coded as 0); newspapers as a categorical measure with NYT as the reference category (dummy coded as 0); political power reliance as the ordinal measures (0–3), with 0 representing *no presence* and 3 indicating *many*. The origins of the newspapers are another categorical explanatory measure, with the U.S. newspapers serving as the reference category. The equation for a simple multinomial OLS regression model is as follows:

$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 X_i + \varepsilon_i$; β in the multinomial OLS regression model is the

parameter of the explanatory variable, in the context of Table 41, the frequency of

"political power reliance" (β_2), "origin/type of newspapers" (β_3), and "locality of

sources" (β_1) are the three measures to predict the frequency or percentage of the

news frames; α in the multinomial OLS regression model is the intercept/constant.

With regard to Table 40, the frequency of "political power reliance" (β_2),

"newspapers" (β_3), and "locality of sources" (β_3) were used as the three explanatory

measures to describe and predict the major frames, except for the consequence frame,

recorded as an endogenous variable. Tables 42 and 43 adopt the similar analysis

technique, except for using the logistic regression in predicting the presence of the

major frames including the consequence frame as an endogenous dichotomous

variable. However, for the purpose of a pairwise comparison, the analysis of the

structure of all the exogenous variables remains the same, with two independent

category variables featuring the same reference or baseline categories as the previous

OLS regression analyses.

The OLS Regression Analysis: The Effects of the Locality of Sources, Political Power Reliance, and Countries of the Newspapers on the Presence of Major Frames

			Dependent Variable			
			Political Frames			
Independent Variable	β	SE β	*t*	*p*	Adjusted R^2	R^2
(Constant)	0.26**	0.08	3.4	.00	.66	.66
Locality of Sources						
Antagonistic Countries	-0.05	0.08	-0.69	.49		
Others	0.15	0.12	1.19	.23		
Political Power Reliance	0.98***	0.02	47.97	.00		
Type of newspapers (Chinese)	0.00	0.03	0.14	.89		
			Conflict Frames			
Independent Variable	β	SE β	*t*	*p*	Adjusted R^2	R^2
(Constant)	0.64***	0.14	4.64	.00	.05	.05
Locality of Sources						
Antagonistic Countries	1.01***	0.14	7.33	.00		
Others	0.54**	0.22	2.46	.01		
Political Power Reliance	0.00	0.04	-0.13	.9		
Type of Newspapers (Chinese)	0.09	0.06	1.45	.15		
			Economic Frames			
Independent Variable	β	SE β	*t*	*p*	Adjusted R^2	R^2
(Constant)	0.6***	0.15	4.06	.00	.06	.06
Locality of Sources						
Antagonistic Countries	1.2***	0.15	8.1	.00		
Others	0.71***	0.24	3.01	.00		
Political Power Reliance	-0.15***	0.04	-3.73	.00		
Chinese Newspapers (Chinese)	0.08	0.07	1.25	.21		
			Technology Frames			
Independent Variable	β	SE β	*t*	*p*	Adjusted R^2	R^2
(Constant)	0.06	0.11	0.55	.58	.01	.01
Locality of Sources						
Antagonistic Countries	0.35***	0.11	3.14	.00		
Others	0.46**	0.18	2.58	.01		
Political Power Reliance	0.06*	0.03	2.07	.04		
Type of Newspapers (Chinese)	0.03	0.05	0.51	.61		
			Public Interest Frames			
Independent Variable	β	SE β	*t*	P	Adjusted R^2	R^2
(Constant)	0.28*	0.12	2.32	.02	.03	.03
Locality of Sources						
Antagonistic Countries	0.3**	0.12	2.48	.01		
Others	4.89	0.19	0.00	1		
Political Power Reliance	0.11**	0.03	3.33	.001		
Type of Newspapers (Chinese)	-0.19**	0.05	-3.44	.001		
			National Interest Frames			
Independent Variable	β	SE β	*t*	*p*	Adjusted R^2	R^2
(Constant)	0.22	0.14	1.51	.13	.03	.03
Locality of Sources						
Antagonistic Countries	0.68***	0.14	4.72	0.00		
Others	0.15	0.23	0.64	0.00		
Political Power Reliance	0.1*	0.04	2.44	.02		
Type of Newspapers (Chinese)	0.13	0.07	1.92	.05		

Table 41

*Note. *p* < .05*
***p* < .01*
****p* < .001*
Locality of Sources is dummy coded as 0. For the locality of source, the reference category is "Own Sources," whereas for "Origins/Type of Newspapers," the reference category is the U.S. Newspapers. "Political Power Reliance" is an ordinal variable, ranging from No Presence (0), Few (1), Several (2), to Many (3).
The equation for a simple multinomial OLS regression model is as follows: $Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 X_i + \varepsilon_i$
β in the multinomial OLS regression model is the parameter of the explanatory variable, in this case, the frequency of "Political Power Reliance," "Origins/Type of Newspapers," and "Locality of Sources" to predict the frequency or percentage of news frames. α in the multinomial OLS regression model is the intercept/constant.

5.12.4 The Political Frames

A rigorous examination of the results retrieved from the OLS regression analysis and logistic regression analysis reveals a similar trend, despite certain variations. As demonstrated in the Table 41 the percentage variations in political frames can be explained by the frequency of the political power reliance (Table 40: β = 0.97; $p < .001$. Table 4.55: β = 0.98; $p < .001$). In other words, when the other two independent variables, locality of sources and newspapers are controlled, as the frequency of authoritative sources are cited, was an increase in the number of the political frames. Also, it is interesting to notice that compared to NYT, WP was slightly less likely to provide salience to the political frames, even with other variables as constant (Table 41: β = 0.97; $p < .01$). In the same vein, the logistic regression, depicted in Table 42, with other independent variables in the model as constant, WSJ, compared to NYT, was 55% less likely to provide political frames (β = -0.81; $p < .05$).

5.12.5 The Frequency and Presence of Conflict Frames

Regarding the conflict frames, the OLS regression analysis and logistic regression analysis demonstrated that the locality of the sources accounted for a noticeable variance in the conflict frames. The OLS regression, as shown in Table 4.55, demonstrated that with the other two exogenous variables in the tested models held constant, compared with the articles adopting the sources within its own geographical boundaries, regardless of the newspapers being from the U.S. or China, those newspapers reports quoting more sources from the antagonistic countries (β =

1.01; $p < .001$) and countries other than the U.S. and China such as Japan and
European countries. ($\beta = 0.54$; $p < .01$) were more likely to mention more conflicts.
The same trend was further affirmed with the logistic regression analysis, as
demonstrated in Table 43. Compared to the articles fed by sources within the
newspapers' own geographical sources, regardless of the fact the sources were from
individuals, governments, established institutions, and so forth, the news coverage fed
by such sources were retrieved from antagonistic countries, and source from other
countries excluding the U.S. and China were 7.92 times and 7.24 times more likely to
present the salience of conflicts, respectively. Different from the political frames,
according to the findings from the OLS and logistic regression analysis, either the
traits of the newspapers and the political power reliance measured by the number of
the quotes from the authorities, failed to provide sufficient statistically significant
explanatory powers to predict the frequency or the presence of the conflicts in their
news coverage.

Logistic Regression Predicting the Effects of Locality of Sources, Power Reliance, and Newspapers on Presence of Major Frames

			Dependent Variable				
	Political Frames						
Independent Variable	β	OR	SE β	z	p		Pseudo R^2
(Constant)	-18.92		1.33e+04	-0.00	.10		.57
Locality of Sources							
Antagonistic Countries	17.13		1.33e+04	0.00	1		
Others	17.64		1.33e+04	0.00	1		
Political Power Reliance	31.77		2.42e+05	0.00	1		
Newspapers							
WP	-0.15		3.90e+01	-0.38	.70		
WSJ	-0.81*	0.45*	3.90e+01	-2.08	.04		
China Daily	-0.06		3.20e+01	-0.19	.85		
GT	-0.25		3.40e+01	-0.74	.46		
	Conflict Frames						
Independent Variable	β	OR	SE β	z	p		Pseudo R^2
(Constant)	18.78		1.33e+04	0.01	.10		.04
Locality of Sources							
Antagonistic Countries	-17.21		1.33e+04	-0.001	.10		
Others	-18.58		1.33e+04	-0.001	.10		
Political Power Reliance	-.15		9.00e+02	-1.69	.09		
newspapers							
WP	0.21		2.90e+01	0.72	.47		
WSJ	-.07		2.60e+01	-0.27	.79		
China Daily	0.24		2.60e+01	0.8	.43		
GT	0.31		2.60e+01	1.2	.23		
	Economic Frames						
Independent Variable	β	OR	SE β	z	p		Pseudo R^2
(Constant)	-18.64		1.33e+04	-0.001	.10		.03
Locality of Sources							
Antagonistic Countries	19.08		1.33e+04	0.00	.10		
Others	20.21		1.33e+04	0.00	.10		
Political Power Reliance	0.22**	1.25 **	8.00e+02	2.92	.003		
Newspapers							
WP	0.11		2.40e+01	0.45	.66		
WSJ	-0.16		2.20e+01	-0.74	.46		
China Daily	-0.35		2.10e+01	-1.63	.10		
GT	0.09		2.20e+01	0.41	.68		
	Technology Frames						
Independent Variable	β	OR	SE β	z	p		Pseudo R^2
(Constant)	-19.23		1.33e+04	-0.001	1		.02
Locality of Sources							
Antagonistic Countries	17.98		1.33e+04	0.001	1		
Others	17.39		1.33e+04	0.001	.10		
Political Power Reliance	0.27***	1.31***	1.33e+04	3.66	.00		
Newspapers							
WP	-0.15		0.27	-0.56	.58		
WSJ	0.14		0.25	0.56	.58		
China Daily	0.24		0.24	0.56	.58		
GT	-0.07		0.24	-0.29	.78		
	Public Interest Frames						
Independent Variable	β	OR	SE β	z	p		Pseudo R^2
(Constant)	-18.78		1.33e+04	-0.00	1		.03
Locality of Sources							
Antagonistic Countries	17.89		1.33e+04	0.00	1		
Others	16.92		1.33e+04	0.00	1		
Political Power Reliance	0.24*	1.27*	8.00e+02	3.24	.001		
Newspapers							
WP	-0.14		2.50e+01	-0.55	.58		
WSJ	0.09		2.30e+01	0.38	.7		
China Daily	-0.21		2.30e+01	-0.94	.35		
GT	-0.64*	0.53*	2.40e+01	-2.71	.007		
	National Interest Frames						
Independent Variable	β	OR	SE β	z	p		Pseudo R^2
(Constant)	-19.29		1.33e+04	-0.00	1		.04
Locality of Sources							
Antagonistic Countries	19.09		1.33e+04	0.00	1		
Others	17.72		1.33e+04	0.00	1		
Political Power Reliance	0.2**	1.22**	7.00e+02	2.83	.005		
Newspapers							
WP	-0.18		2.30e+01	-0.78	.44		
WSJ	0.38		2.20e+01	1.76	.08		
China Daily	0.3		2.10e+01	1.45	.15		
WP	0.3		2.10e+01	1.43	.15		
	Consequence Frames						
Independent Variable	β	OR	SE β	z	p		Pseudo R^2
(Constant)	18.67		1.33e+04	0.001	1		.03
Locality of Sources							
Antagonistic Countries	-17.99		1.33e+04	-0.001	1		
Others	-19.25		1.33e+04	-0.001	1		
Political Power Reliance	-0.11		7.00e+02	-1.5	.13		
Newspapers							
WP	-0.06		2.40e+01	-0.25	.81		
WSJ	0.29		2.30e+01	1.29	.2		
China Daily	0.32		2.20e+01	1.48	.14		
GT	0.25		2.10e+01	1.17	.24		

Table 42

Locality of Sources is dummy coded as 0. For locality of source, the reference category is" Own Sources,''
whereas for newspapers, the reference category is NYT. "Political Power Reliance" is an ordinal variable, ranging
from No Presence (0), Few (1), Several (2), to Many (3).
The reference category for the type of Newspapers is U.S. newspapers
The equation for a multinomial logistic regression model is as follows: $\log [\pi X_i/(1 - \pi X_i)] = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 X_i + \varepsilon_i$, where πx denotes the probability of presenting a type of news frame when an explanatory variable X,
e.g., the presence of political frames, takes value x; α is the intercept and β is the parameter of the explanatory
variable.

Logistic Regression Predicting the Effects of the Locality of Sources, Power Reliance, and Countries of Newspapers on Presence of Major Frames

				Dependent Variable				
	Political Frames							
Independent Variable	β	OR	SE β	z	p		95% CI	Pseudo R^2
(Constant)	-1.81***		0.367	-4.93	.00		(-2.53, -1.09)	.57
Locality of Sources								
Antagonistic Countries	-0.34		0.36	-0.93	.35		(-1.05, 0.37)	
Others	0.36		0.55	0.65	.52		(-.72, 1.43)	
Political Power Reliance	32.02		2.77e+0.5	0.00	1.00		(-5.43e+05, 5.43+05)	
Type of Newspapers	0.2093		0.208	1.01	.315		(-0.20, 0.62)	
	Conflict Frames							
Independent Variable	B	OR	SE β	z	p		95% CI	Pseudo R^2
(Constant)	-0.47		0.27	-1.75	.08		(-.994, 0.06)	.05
Locality of Sources								
Antagonistic Countries	2.07***	7.92***	0.27	7.67	.00		(1.54, 2.60)	
Others	1.98***	7.24***	0.51	3.87	.00		(0.98, 2.99)	
Political Power Reliance	-0.15		0.09	-1.76	.08		(-.32, 0.02)	
Type of Newspapers	0.22		0.16	1.42	.16		(-0.08, 0.52)	
	Economic Frames							
Independent Variable	β	OR	SE β	Z	P		95% CI	Pseudo R^2
(Constant)	-0.69*		0.27	-2.51	.012		(-1.2, -.15)	.06
Locality of Sources								
Antagonistic Countries	2.19***	8.94***	0.28	7.95	.00		(1.65, 2.73)	
Others	1.48**	4.39**	0.44	3.33	.001		(0.61, 2.35)	
Political Power Reliance	-0.29***	0.75***	0.08	-3.72	.00		(-0.48, -0.14)	
Type of Newspapers	0.15		0.15	1.02	.31		(-0.14, 0.43)	
	Technology Frames							
Independent Variable	β	OR	SE β	z	p		95% CI	Pseudo R^2
(Constant)	-3.07***		0.6	-5.15	.00		(-4.24, -1.90)	.02
Locality of Sources								
Antagonistic Countries	1.85**	6.36**	0.6	3.11	.002		(0.69, 3.03)	
Others	2.01**	7.46**	0.7	2.88	.004		(0.64, 3.37)	
Political Power Reliance	0.24**	1.27**	0.07	3.3	.001		(0.10, 0.39)	
Type of Newspapers	0.07		0.14	0.5	.62		(-0.20, 0.34)	
	Public Interest Frames							
Independent Variable	β	OR	SE β	z	p		95% CI	Pseudo R^2
(Constant)	-1.74***		0.39	-4.53	0.00		(-2.50, -0.99)	0.02
Locality of Sources								
Antagonistic Countries	0.86*	2.36*	0.38	2.22	.026		(0.10, 1.62)	
Others	-0.13		0.65	-0.2	.84		(-1.41, 1.15)	
Political Power Reliance	0.22**	1.25**	0.07	3.00	.003		(0.08, 0.36)	
Type of Newspapers	-0.41**	0.66**	0.13	-3.08	.002		(-0.68, -.15)	
	National Interest Frames							
Independent Variable	β	OR	SE β	z	p		95% CI	Pseudo R^2
(Constant)	-1.71***		0.34	-5.04	.00		(-2.37, -1.05)	.03
Locality of Sources								
Antagonistic Countries	1.62***	5.05***	0.34	4.79	.00		(0.96, 2.28)	
Others	0.43		0.51	0.83	.4		(-.57, 1.42)	
Political Power Reliance	0.18**	1.20**	0.07	2.49	.013		(0.04, 0.31)	
Type of Newspapers	0.2		0.12	1.61	.11		(-.04, 0.43)	
	Consequence Frames							
Independent Variable	β	OR	SE β	z	p		95% CI	Pseudo R^2
(Constant)	-0.78**		0.27	-2.85	.004		(-1.31, -0.24)	.03
Locality of Sources								
Antagonistic Countries	1.56***	4.76***	0.27	5.71	.00		(1.03, 2.10)	
Others	0.61		0.42	1.46	.15		(-0.28, 0.01)	
Political Power Reliance	-0.13		0.07	-1.83	.07		(-.28, 0.01)	
Type of Newspapers	0.19		0.13	1.47	.14		(-0.06, 0.43)	

Table 43

Note. CI=confidence interval for odds ratio (OR)
*p < .05
p < .01*
p < .001
Locality of Sources is dummy coded as 0. For locality of source, the reference category is "Own Sources," whereas for "Countries for Newspapers," the reference category is the U.S. newspapers. "Political Power Reliance" is an ordinal variable, ranging from *No Presence* (0), *Few* (1), *Several* (2), to *Many* (3).
The reference category for the type of Newspapers is the U.S. newspapers.
The equation for a multinomial logistic regression model is as follows: $\log[\pi X_i/(1 - \pi X_i)] = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 X_i + \varepsilon_i$, where πx denotes the probability of presenting a type of news frame when an explanatory variable X, e.g., the presence of political frames, takes value x; α is the intercept and β is the parameter of the explanatory variable.

5.12.6 The Economic Frames

As seen from the findings in the previous chapter, all the five newspapers in question demonstrated strong presence of the economic frames over the concerned time frame. The OLS and logistic regression analyses confirmed once again the dearth of discrepancies, as the "newspapers" failed to be a statistically significant explanatory exogenous variable to predict the presence and frequency of the economic frames. However, as evident in Tables 41, 42, and 43, both the "locality of the sources" and the "political power reliance" demonstrated their explanatory power in predicting the presence and frequency of the economic frames. The logistic regression analysis, as shown in Tables 42 and 43 failed to provide conclusive assertions regarding their explanatory power of the power reliance for predicting the economic frames and providing salience to economic issues, as paradoxical results were shown in the two logistic regression models structured differently (Table 42: $\beta = 0.22$; $p < .01$. Table 43: $\beta = -0.29$, $p < .001$).

Therefore, it is probably hard to determine any likelihood that an increase or decrease in the number of quotes cited from authoritative sources can determine the presence of the economic issues. Nevertheless, according to the OLS regression model, as demonstrated in Table 41, if there is any presence of quotes cited from the government sources in the news coverage, an increase in the number of the quotes cited from the authoritative sources from government, established institutes, and government-related individuals tended to lead to a decrease in the number of the economic frames and vice versa ($\beta = -0.15$; $p < .001$).

The logistic regression analysis (Table 42) demonstrates that compared to the news articles fed by sources within the country, the news articles fed by sources from antagonistic countries ($\beta = 2.0$; $p < .001$) and sources from countries other than the U.S. and China ($\beta = 1.98$; $p < .001$) are both about seven times more likely to predict the presence of the economic frames. The same trend can also be demonstrated further the above claim. As demonstrated by the OLS regression analysis in Table 41, compared to the news articles fed only by local sources within the country on which the newspapers are based, those news articles with the coverage fed by the sources from antagonistic countries ($\beta = 1.2$; $p < .001$) and those fed by sources from countries outside the geographical boundaries of China and the U.S. ($\beta = 0.71$; $p < .001$) were more likely to mention and present more salience of the economic issues.

5.12.7 The Consequence Frames

While influence from other factors was adequately controlled, according to Table 43, the variable that can explain the presence of consequence is the "sources from antagonistic countries" ($\beta = 1.56$; $p < .001$). In other words, the probability of the news coverage with the "sources from the antagonistic countries" was 4.76 times higher than the reference category, i.e., the news coverage fed by sources within the geographical boundaries of the U.S. and China.

5.12.8 The Technology Frames

The logistic regression analysis from Table 42 ($\beta = 0.27$; $p < .001$). and Table 43 ($\beta = 0.24$; $p < .01$). demonstrate analogous results regarding the influence of political power reliance on the probability of presence of the technology frames. In other words, the news coverage with quotes cited from authoritative sources one unit more, regardless of their nuances of the sources under this dimension, were 27% to 30% more likely to present salience to the technology issues. The identical tendency of the explanatory power, as demonstrated in the similar positive effect size of political power reliance in predicting the frequency of technology frames can also be seen in Table 40 ($\beta = 0.07$; $p < .05$) and 41 ($\beta = 0.06$; $p < .05$). The OLS regression analysis in Table 41 demonstrates that the news coverage with sources fed by antagonistic countries ($\beta = 0.35$; $p < .001$) and countries beyond the geographical boundaries ($\beta = 0.46$; $p < .01$) of U.S. and China, were significantly more likely than the news coverage fed by the sources originating from within the country, either from the government-related sources or individuals to provide more salience to the technology issues and more frequency of technology frames. The logistic regression analysis in Table 43 reveals similar results showcasing the relationship of locality of the sources and the technology frames. There was a significantly higher probability of news fed by the sources from antagonistic countries ($\beta = 1.85$; $OR = 6.36$; $p < .01$) and the sources from countries other than China and the U.S. ($\beta = 0.46$; $OR = 7.46$; $p < .01$) than the news fed by the sources within their respective geographical boundaries in predicting the presence of the technology issues.

5.12.9 The National Interest Frames Vis-à-vis Public Interest Frames

Power reliance is one of the independent variables explaining the frequency and presence of the national and public interest frames. According to the OLS regression analysis in Tables 40 and 41, when the number of quotes cited from the authoritative sources increased or decreased, the frequency of the national interest and public interest frames moved in the same direction (β = 0.11). Likewise, according to the logistic regression analysis presented in Tables 42 and 43, when the number of the quotes cited from authoritative sources increased one unit, the probability of the presence of national interest or public interest frames increased more than 20%. As far as the public interest frames are concerned, as displayed in Table 41 concerning itself with the OLS regression analysis, compared to the news coverage fed by the local sources within the country, news coverage fed by the sources from antagonistic countries were more likely to predict more salience of public interest (β = 0.3; $p < .01$). In the same vein, the logistic regression analysis on the public interest frames, as can be seen in Table 43, also identified the relationships between the locality of sources and the public interest frames (β = 0.86; $p < .05$), while all other exogenous variables were controlled. More specifically, in comparison with the news coverage only using its own sources within the country, those using sources from antagonistic countries tended to be 2.36 times more likely to present public interest frames. A similar trend was also witnessed in the effects of the locality of sources on the salience of national interest in newspapers with more effect size in the OLS regression model (Table 40: β = 0.68; $p < .001$) and in the logistic regression model (Table 43: β = 0.68; OR = 5.05; $p < .001$). Regarding the effects of newspapers on the salience of the public interest and national interest in newspapers, when other

explaining variables were controlled, for the former, GT was significantly less likely to present the same than the reference category of the newspapers, i.e., NYT (Table 40: $\beta = -0.29$; $p < 0.01$), whereas the Chinese newspapers were slightly but significantly less likely than the U.S. newspapers, in general, in presenting the public interest (Table 41: $\beta = -0.19$; $p < 0.01$). The logistic regression analysis demonstrated in Tables 42 and 43 reveal an almost identical story in explaining the relationship between the newspapers and the very existence of the public frames, with the influence of other factors held constant. GT compared to NYT as the baseline, were 47% less likely to present the public frames ($\beta = -0.64$; $p < .05$), and the concerned Chinese newspapers were 34% less likely to present the public frames ($\beta = -0.41$; $p < .01$). As for the effects of newspapers on the national interest frames, fewer statistically significant discrepancies were noticed. While both the OLS regression analysis and logistic regression analysis demonstrated no significant discrepancies between the U.S. and Chinese newspapers in explaining the salience or the presence of the national interest in their news coverage, a far cry from the case in the effects of the newspapers on the national interest frames. The OLS regression model as depicted in Table 4.1 demonstrates that WSJ ($\beta = 0.25$; $p < .05$), and China Daily ($\beta = 0.25$; $p < .05$), were more likely than NYT in the salience of the national interest, with other newspapers failing to present significant salience of the national interest in their news reporting.

5.13 Valence Frames

To test the hypotheses regarding valence frames and its relationships with other intrinsic and extrinsic variables, this section intends to provide empirical evidence to confirm or reject the hypotheses.

5.13.1 Valence Frames across the 5 Newspapers

	positively valenced		negatively valenced		neutrally valenced		N/A		Total	
WSJ	19	28.79%	40	60.61%	6	9.09%	1	1.52%	66	100.00%
China Daily	34	45.95%	36	48.65%	3	4.05%	1	1.35%	74	100.00%
GT	36	48.65%	31	41.89%	5	6.76%	2	2.70%	74	100.00%
WP	6	15.00%	27	67.50%	7	17.50%	-	-	40	100.00%
NYT	4	13.33%	23	76.67%	2	6.67%	1	3.33%	30	100.00%
Total	99	34.86%	157	55.28%	23	8.10%	5	1.76%	284	100.00%

Table 44

Valence Frames across 5 Newspapers
Note. Chi-squared (12, *N* = 284) = 30.519, *p* = 0. 0023, smaller than 0.05, significant

	negatively valenced		positively valenced			neutrally valenced	N/A		Total	
US newspaper	90	66.18%	29	21.32%	15	11.03%	2	1.47%	136	100.00%
Chinese newspapers	67	45.27%	70	47.30%	8	5.41%	3	2.03%	148	100.00%
Total	157	55.28%	99	34.86%	23	8.10%	5	1.76%	284	100.00%

Table 45

Valence Frames: U.S. vis-à-vis Chinese Newspapers
Note. Chi-squared (3, *N* = 284) = 22.212, *p* = 0. 000, smaller than 0.05, significant

Valence Frames across 5 Newspapers

Figure 19

Valence Frames across 5 Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (12, N = 284) = 30.519, p = 0. 0023, smaller than 0.05, significant

As demonstrated in the Table 45 and Figure 21, there were statistically significant differences in valence frames among the five newspapers in question. Among the randomly selected 284 articles from the five newspapers, both GT and CD demonstrated a high level of positively valenced frames with regard to the trade war, with 48.65% and 45.95% respectively, with the former slightly higher than the latter. In contrast, the three U.S. newspapers, WSJ, WP, and NYT demonstrated low presence of positively-valenced frames, with 28.79%, 15% and 13.33% respectively. An intranational analysis demonstrates that both the more business focused WSJ and

more commercialized tabloid-like GT take precedence in the percentage of positively valenced frames of the trade war among the U.S. and Chinese newspapers respectively, whereas a cross-national analysis revealed that the official press, CD still featured a higher presence of the positively valenced frames than that of their three U.S. counterparts. It is worth noting NYT, referred to as the official press of the establishment likened to the status ascribed to People's Daily or Pravda (SC Hudson, 1995) has the lowest percentage of the positively valenced frames among the all, with merely 13.33%. As far as the negatively valenced frames are concerned, U.S newspapers showed an overwhelming trend in the presence of negatively valenced frames than their two Chinese counterparts, with the NYT taking the lead with an astounding rate 76.67%, followed by more conservative WP (67.50%), and more conservative leaning but business focused WSJ (60.61%). Regarding the neutrally valenced frames, GT (6.76%) surpassed CD (4.05%), in stark contrast with the prevalence of the neutrally valenced frames present in U.S. newspapers, with the more conservative WP maintained the dominant position (17.50%), followed by WSJ (9.09%) and NYT (6.76%). The hypothesis that GT and WSJ tended to present a higher visibility of positively and neutrally valenced frames, but a lower visibility of negatively valenced frames among Chinese and U.S. newspapers can be partially confirmed, except for the case in WP, having demonstrated a higher percentage of neutrally valenced frames than WSJ. Furthermore, A cross-national examination reveals that while the two Chinese newspaper tended to present a higher visibility of positively valenced frames, the three U.S. newspapers in general tended to present higher visibility of negatively valenced frames and neutrally valenced frames, with WP (17.50%) and WSJ (9.09%) taking a great lead among the all five newspapers.

5.13.2 Valence Frames: Editorials vis-à-vis Information Pieces

Valence Frames: Editorials vis-à-vis Information Pieces

	Information Pieces		Editorials		Total	
Negatively Valenced	101	64.74%	55	35.26%	156	100.00%
Positively Valenced	72	72.73%	27	27.27%	99	100.00%
Neutrally Valenced	17	73.91%	6	26.09%	23	100.00%
N/A	5	100.00%	-	-	5	100.00%
Total	195	68.90%	88	31.10%	283	100.00%

Table 46

Valence Frames across 5 Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (3, $N = 284$) = 4.461, $p = 0.2158$, greater than 0.05, not significant.

The news and news summaries, along with all the less salient news articles have been recoded into the information pieces, whereas the commentaries, features, columns, and editorials, along with other more salient news articles have been recoded as editorials in their generic sense. Among the 284 randomly selected newspapers, it has been discovered that there were no significant differences between the information pieces and editorials, in the valence frames. Therefore, the hypothesis that the editorials and information pieces on Sino-U.S. trade war boasted significant differences in valence frames has been rejected. The discovery lend support to the imperativeness of making further inquiries into the discrepancies in generic, thematic, and episodic frames to inform the research on the framing practices by journalists on their coverage of the trade war.

Chapter 6 A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Elite Newspapers and Ideological Discourse Packages Along the Timeline of the Trade War

6.1 A Paradigm Shift

As remarked previously, the editorials and opinion pieces, such as the commentaries and columns in the newspapers, are apparently more salient than the information pieces, such as the news articles. From the constructivism standpoint, the media not only plays a crucial role in the deliberative democracy, but also influences the development of the political competition, public sphere, and the process in which the general public judges the political progress in the political system. Since the monumental trade war, China has been presumed as an enemy of the U.S. Even though according to Esmark (2003), the lofty ideal of achieving thoroughly nonpolitical and unprejudiced media has always been a normative theoretical construct than the reality, the impact of political rationality and logic of action on the media is still a highly controversial issue that touches the core of the current U.S. media-political relationship in diversified ways, particularly when Trump relies heavily on the social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, and refers to the traditional media, characterized by West (2001) as objective, interpretive, and fragmented, as fake news. Based on his discourse analysis of NYT editorials from 1990 to 2000, Lee (2002) identified three ideological packages, viz., containment, engagement, and globalization, as the variants of the ideology of peaceful evolution, representing "established pluralism", a plurality of viewpoints within the established policy contour and the official circle, which domesticates foreign realities in the course of constructing orientalist discourse, and promotes diversity within unity as

the routine in the institutionalized structure and practice in the elite press (p.1).

However, the Foreign Secretary Pompeo's new foreign policies, deviating from "trust but verify" to "distrust and verify" during the heyday of the trade war, were characterized by the total rejection of late U.S. president, Nixon's appeasement policies toward China. This calls into question whether the power structure is still "a primary definer of reality and media a secondary definer" (Lee, 2002, p. 345). In the past, the negative media coverage of the internal discord, policy failures, scandals, and elite dissent have served as precedents, but never surpassed Hallin's (1986) "sphere of legitimated controversy," in which even though media are emboldened to challenge the policy framework and report institutional conflicts, democracy and capitalism are the pillars of Americanism and are never contested. Lee's (2002) "established pluralism" paradigm argued that media is the little helpmate of the government, convergent in terms of the goal while divergent with regard to the methods (p.1). However, the discourse analysis of the sampled editorials, opinions, along with commentaries, can demonstrate a new paradigm of politicization, anti-Trumpism, and partisanship. In other words, the framing analysis stirs up doubts about whether the polarization of the public opinion and the partisanship of the news media can potentially lead to the deviation of the professionalism and the re-emergence of the partisan media in the 19th century.

In this chapter, based on the results from Chapter 5, the dominant (master) and less dominant frames (emplotting) frames have been identified before a succession of diachronic analyses on the 8 frames along the timeline of the trade war, punctuated by critical events. Moreover, the evolution of 4 major frames and 4

emplotting was also examined respectively to examine if the journalists from the 3 U.S. newspapers used the strategies such as the oppositional and alternative frames in their reporting on the trade war as part of their impression management. Last but not least, discourse analysis was conducted on one editorial on trade war and Trumpism from NYT to examine the power relations and identity construction of journalists as part of an epistemological inquiry. In Chapter 7, similar diachronic analytical strategies were also used to dissect the evolution of major and emplotting frames of GT and CT as efforts to make more meaningful and commensurable both intra-national and cross-national analyses on the framing practices by the five newspapers.

6.2 A Detailed Overview of the Trade War Debate in the three U.S. Elite Newspapers

In this study, the opinion and editorial article sample in the three U.S. elite newspapers in question comprised 192 articles selected from a randomly sampled pool of 1189 articles in multifaceted genres, including commentaries, interviews, news summaries, editorials, news articles, and information pieces. The size of the Chinese opinion sample was twice its U.S. equivalent, the foremost indication that the trade war was more propelled into the public sphere in China with mostly conglomerate traditional media, in comparison with their U.S. counterparts. A closer inspection of the different types of articles reveals that the trade war continued for a period of more than two years until a temporary truce, as represented in the agreement signed in the first phase. This is because the opinions articles, including editorials, opinion articles, commentaries, and so forth, accounted for a greater proportion of the articles, as demonstrated in the following figure and Table 47-48

and Figure 21-22. Evidently, from the sampled pool of articles in the U.S., the numbers of articles from the WSJ and the WP were 80 and 68, respectively, almost twice in comparison to the NYT, i.e., only 44, implying that the controversy entailed in the trade war was primarily lent impetus by the conservative-leaning newspapers, in contrast to the left leaning. It should be noted that in both the WSJ and the WP there is a high percentage of the more salient opinion articles comprised with features, columns and editorials, particularly in the business-focused WSJ and more conservative WP. The high prevalence of the opinion articles in these two newspapers indicates that the news agency not only reported stories, but also provided avenues for multitudinous perspectives on the trade war to serve the purpose of being interpretive, objective, and fragmented (West, 2001). Without any further analysis on the positive and negative aspects of the news and information regarding how the news stories and opinion pieces are framed, described in the following chapters and Chapter 5 on the statistical significance of the differences in primary and secondary framing among the five newspapers and between the newspapers in China and their U.S. counterparts, it may be futile to attempt to validate the arguments by Ginneken (1998) that the world news is the politics of loud and whispering voices based on the interpretive frameworks and definitions produced by the center, not the periphery, and assertion by Lee (2002) that journalists tend to peg "such stories to Washington's sweeping agenda" or follow "beltway concern" (p. 346) exclusively as in the case of editorials on Times. A significant proportion and the sheer volume of the opinion articles among different types of a randomly sampled pool of the U.S. newspaper articles on the trade war connote a substantial debate and controversy on the trade war and the issues central or peripheral to it. It is not surprising that the WSJ

boasted a high percentage of opinion articles, since it has long been enjoying its reputation as a business-focused newspaper. It warrants an endeavor of further analysis to comprehend the underlying reasons as to why the NYT has the lowest percentage of opinion articles, even though it has been regarded as the most revered elite newspapers by most readers. Except for the polemical views by Chomsky (1990) that the NYT was derided as the official press-only, producing the illusion of pluralism and setting the boundary for the ideology of parochial state-corporate complex and the argument by Schudsonrill (1995) comparing it to Pravda or People's Daily, the NYT has achieved a mythical status of a prestigious newspaper or the Fifth Estate (Pool, 1952), and has become the frame of reference for the established institution (Cohen, 1963), and mostly provides platforms for intellectual discourse for the consumption by the elites (Lee, 2002). Therefore, the lesser prominence of the NYT, which has prided itself on its function of being the newspaper of record (Merrill, 1968) and certified the reality in a serious manner (Gitlin, 1980), with regard to the trade war discourse has led to its failure to live up to the expectations in terms of the percentage of the opinion articles.

	WSJ		WP		NYT		Total	
1. News	61	52.59%	33	28.45%	22	18.97%	116	100.00%
2. Feature/column	12	46.15%	12	46.15%	2	7.69%	26	100.00%
3. Editorial	6	19.35%	15	48.39%	10	32.26%	31	100.00%
4. News summary	1	5.26%	8	42.11%	10	52.63%	19	100.00%
Total	80	41.67%	68	35.42%	44	22.92%	192	100.00%

Table 47
Number of Articles Sampled by Article Types and News Outlets from U.S. Press
Note. Chi-Squared (16, $N = 192$) = 169.435, $p = .0000$. p is smaller than 0.05, significant

Figure 20

Bar Charts Displaying the Percentage and Number of Articles Sampled by Article
Types and the U.S. News Outlets in the U.S. Media

Note. Chi-Squared (16, *N* = 192) = 169.435, *p* = .0000. p is smaller than 0.05, significant

Chronology of U.S news

Figure 21

Chronological Evolution by Number of Articles Selected in Three U.S. outlets (In the Horizontal axis, Numbers refers to Four Phases of Trade war)

Note. Chi-Squared (6, N = 7289) = 1239.323, p = .0000. p is smaller than 0.05, significant

First phase, P1, from July 6, 2018 to November 30, 2018

Second phase, P2, from December 1, 2018 to June 28, 2019

Third phase, P3, from June 29, 2019 to January 14, 2020

Fourth phase, P4, from January 15, 2020 to May 12, 2020

As evident from Table 48 and Figure 22, during the first phase starting from July 6, 2018, the onset of the trade war, as far as the WSJ is concerned, there were only 29 reports (3.87%) including opinion pieces, news/information articles, commentaries, and columns along with features. The coverage of the trade war was not salient during the first phase for the WSJ, a business-focused newspaper. However, the second and third phases witnessed a hike in the number of reports,

making the issue more salient. In sharp contrast, the WP boasted the highest number

and percentage of reports related to the trade war in the 2nd and 3rd phase. The low

salience in the first phase of the trade war on the different aspects demonstrates that

the business and financial elites displayed minimal interest in the trade war at the

onset of the trade war. However, their interest surged as the trade war progressed.

However, the number and percentage declined gradually during the second and third

phases. The fourth phase witnessed the least number of reports, merely 12 (2.34%),

the least salient among all the four news outlets. Interestingly, though the reports in

the NYT were fewer than the other two newspapers, the change in the number and

percentage of reports on the trade war witnessed the least fluctuations along the

trajectory of the trade war. It can be seen that even in the fourth phase of the trade

war, there were still 171 news reports (33.33%) dedicated to it. The statistical data

displays that the trade war was equally salient in all the four phases, punctuated by

significant landmark events of the trade war with China and the U.S. trade punitive

measures and tariff exemptions alternately.

Newspapers	P1		P2		P3		P4		Total	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
NYT	272	29.79%	252	27.60%	218	23.88%	171	18.73%	913	100.00%
WP	448	38.96%	394	34.26%	296	25.74%	12	1.04%	1,150	100.00%
WSJ	29	1.94%	139	9.30%	996	66.67%	330	22.09%	1,494	100.00%
Total	749	21.06%	785	22.07%	1,510	42.45%	513	14.42%	3,557	100.00%

Table 48

Chronology of the U.S. News: Chronological Evolution by Number of Articles Selected in Three U.S. outlets (In the Horizontal axis, Numbers Refers to Four Phases of Trade War)

Note. Chi-Squared (6, $N = 7289$) = 1239.323, $p = .0000$. p is smaller than 0.05, significant

First phase, P1, from July 6, 2018 to November 30, 2018

Second phase, P2, from December 1, 2018 to June 28, 2019

Third phase, P3, from June 29, 2019 to January 14, 2020

Fourth phase, P4, from January 15, 2020 to May 12, 2020

In the chronology analysis, all the articles including an expansive range of genres have been selected, in contrast to the randomly sampled pool of 1189 articles. The chronology of the articles in the three U.S. outlets can be demonstrated, reflecting the articles published in the four phases in the three aforementioned news outlets, revealing the different trends in the number of articles published on the trade war, indicating not just the pluralism of the established news institutions, but also their different trajectories as the trade war progressed and how the number of such articles including the more salient opinion pieces and less salient information and news articles changed with the monumental events during the trade war. The four phases or chronological semesters are punctuated by the landmark events. More

specifically, the first phase started when the U.S. placed 25% of duties on nearly 34 billion USD of imports from China, including cars, hard disks, and aircraft parts. China retaliated by imposing a 25% tariff on 545 goods originating from the U.S. worth 34 billion USD, including agricultural products, automobiles, and aquatic products. The first and second phases are punctuated by the landmark events when China's President Xi Jinping and his U.S. counterpart, Trump agreed to a ceasefire at the G20 summit in Argentina on December 1, 2018, with the U.S. suspending a tariff from 10% to 25% on 200 billion USD worth Chinese goods supposed to come into force on January 1, 2019. The second and third phases are punctuated when the two leaders announced the truce at the G20 summit in Japan on June 29, 2019. The third and fourth phases of the trade war are punctuated by the 1st phase deal announced on January 13rd, 2020. The fourth phase ended on May 12, 2020, when China announced a second batch of the trade war tariff exemptions on U.S. products.

6.2 Typology of the Primary, Secondary, Master, and Emplotting Frames Under Review

Overall, the political, conflict, economic, and consequence frames, overwhelmingly drove the debate on the trade war in all the five newspapers in question, with other frames even with significant differences between the Chinese and English language news outlets and/or among five major newspapers in question, becoming the emplotting frames, including the primary frames such as the technology, national interest, public interest, human rights, morality, responsibility, and accountability/responsibility attribution frames, along with their secondary frames, such as the power reliance frames under the auspices of political frames.

Even though some of these frames, such as technology frames, particularly their secondary frame, forced the transfer of the technology frames, along with national frames, with no significant differences among the various news outlets and public interest frames, they also deserve further scrutiny as a closer examination of these articles demonstrates that a majority of these frames also serve as master frames as opposed to mere emplotting frames. For instance, the percentage and the number of morality, responsibility, racism, and the attribution of responsibility frames are only marginal, in stark contrast to the sheer volume of the dominant five frames. Therefore, in this chapter, the five dominant master frames, along with the four less dominant ones, are under a closer inspection individually along the timeline, i.e., in a temporal fashion, among all the three U.S. newspapers in an effort to comprehend the bigger picture at no expense of understanding the nuances of how these frames evolved over time.

	NYT		WSJ		WP	
Political Frames	155	20.28%	60	25.21%	80	44.69%
Conflict Frames	299	78.68%	187	79.90%	150	83.23%
Economic Frames	303	79.53%	188	74.64%	129	71.27%
Consequence Frames	638	83.72%	426	85.37%	294	80.99%

Table 49
A Comparative Tabulation of Four Master Frames

Figure 22

Framing Ratio in terms of percentage of content frames in the sampled U.S. news outlet (800 news articles in total)

	NYT		WSJ		WP	
Technology Frames	96	25.20%	62	26.05%	41	22.78%
National Interest Frames	191	50.26%	128	53.79%	77	43.02%
Public Interest Frame	119	31.23%	76	31.97%	53	20.61%
Power Reliance Frames (secondary)	81	73.91% (14.99%)	46	76.67% (19.32%)	65	81.25% (18.51%)

Table 50

A Comparative Tabulation of Four Less Dominant but Not Marginal Frames

Figure 23

Framing Ratio in terms of percentage of less dominant content frames in the sampled U.S news outlet (800 news articles in total)

The tabulated comparison and contrast of the presence of political, conflict, economic, and consequence frames, either episodic or thematic have been demonstrated. As mentioned in the previous chapters, particularly, Chapter 4 on the conceptualization of the framing theory and framing analysis, according to Lyengar (1991), episodic framing relates to the presentation and characterization of issues by means of either a specific event that functions as an anecdotal illustration of an issue broadly contextualized, or a person whose human face could be put on the issue or affected. A closer examination of all such articles demonstrates that a majority of the frames employed in the articles are thematic frames, whereby the presence of episodic frames is only marginal, therefore, less salient. Among all the master frames, conflict, economic, and consequence frames dominated all the three U.S. newspapers, whereby political frames were the least dominant master frames. More specifically, the NYT, the more progressive and liberal newspaper, was generically dominated by

the conflict, consequence, and economic frames, focusing on the potential threats of

the trade war to the economy, livelihood of the people, and the stock and future

markets. It is worth mentioning that the political frames were the least salient among

all the three news outlets, accounting for merely 20.28% of all the articles. The lack

of the political frames in the three news outlets, particularly the NYT, is the first

indication that the debate on the trade war depoliticized, calling into question the

claims by NYT regarding the analysis on the elite discourse by its editorials on China

that it provided "site and forum for elite discourse" and produced policy and

intellectual discourse for elite consumption (Lee, 2002, p. 345). There are rancorous

discords over the Chinese policy, despite the fact that only legitimate voices from

establishment group were admitted, with the marginalized or the oppositional voices

from other less prominent or establishment voices neglected, and most prominently,

the journalists from the editorials and columns exclusively, focused on the "Greenbelt

Concern" fed by the elite discourse (Lee, 2002, p. 346). The salience of the other

three frames, manifested with their high but similar percentage, despite minor

variations, corroborates the claim by Lee (2000) on elite discourse that despite the

freedom of news selection and the presence of established pluralism with the

resentful voices on the policies, the alternative policies proposed by the journalists

was reduced to the "intramural debate in the corridor of power" (p. 346). However,

the more conservative WP made the political frames more salient than the NYT, a

more liberal media outlet, and the WSJ, a more economy- or business-focused media

outlet. The overt differences in the number and percentage of the political frames

further highlight the discussion in the other chapters on the causality of the types and

sources of the newspapers as quantified by the presence of quotes and the locality of

sources, the core concepts in question, and also indicate the overall depoliticization of the trade war. The prominence of the other three frames with moderate variations versus the less dominant political frames indicates that the public sphere on the trade war in the U.S. was not subject to politicization in an extremely antagonistic manner, and therefore, the discourse in the news, editorials, commentaries, and columns appear to be rancorous discords on ideological and political levels, with a high proportion of references to the critics berating Trump's policies toward China and concurrently reproaching China for its inconceivably malicious behavior. However, the presentation of the master frames, along with the less dominant or emplotting frames by the three U.S. news outlets in question, only provides a snapshot of the story articulated in the U.S. public sphere throughout the negotiations, bargaining, tariff exemptions and impositions, along with the malicious insult trading. In order to provide a more nuanced yet a more exhaustive characterization of the evolution of the discussion on the trade war in the U.S. public sphere, as represented in the three news outlets, a diachronic framing analysis is called for. In the following sections, the framing analysis will be conducted with four continuous semesters or periods segregated by landmark events as turning points. Such a comprehensive analysis can reveal the manner in which the master and less dominant frames moved along and shifted with time, focusing on their interactions with a myriad of equally controversial, if not less important, social events in between.

The least dominant frames relating to the trade war among all the frames in question, i.e., the national interest frames, while their percentage is much greater than that of the public interest frames among all the three U.S. newspapers. It shall be

noted that the WP featured the lowest percentage of national interest and public interest frames, among all three newspapers, with merely 43.02% and 20.61%, respectively. Apparently, greater salience was given to the national interest than public interest in the three newspapers, though both of them, particularly the latter, were given lesser salience. However, the issue of whether and how the attention and salience granted to public and national interest fluctuated warrant further discussion in the next section over the entirety of the trade war and in comparison with the results from the two Chinese newspapers in question, for the purpose of enriching the theory established on national and public interest. Over the entirety of the trade war, a strong salience of technology frames has been observed in the Chinese media when the disputes over Chinese telecommunication giant ZTE and Huawei simmered with the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, the former C.F.O. of Huawei, in sharp contrast to the low percentage of technology frames in the three U.S. newspapers, with the WP featuring the lowest percentage of technology frames, as opposed to a high percentage of master frames featured in the WP. Power reliance frames, the secondary frames, were the lowest in number among all the four less dominant frames, ascribing to the low percentage of its primary frames, i.e., the political frames. Even though the power reliance frames only accounted for a smaller percentage of a total of 800 articles of the U.S. news outlets, they had a higher percentage of political frames, with 73.91%, 76.67%, and 81.25% on the NYT, the WSJ, and the WP, respectively. Therefore, the power reliance frames can also be deemed as very prominent.

6.3 An Inquiry into the Chronology of Master and Emplotting Frames on the Trade War Timeline

Based on the key events described in Chapter 2, the trade war can be divided into four phases, with each semester approximately 5 to 6 months, as demonstrated in Table 51.

Phase One (P1)	July 6, 2018 – Nov30, 2018
Phase Two (P2)	December 1, 2018 – June 28, 2019
Phase Three (P3)	June 29, 2019 –January 14, 2020
Phase Four (P4)	January 15, 2020 – May 12, 2020

Table 51
Trade War Timeline/Chronology

The NYT	P1	P2	P3	P4
Political Frames	17/37.78%	27/39.13%	41/24.26%	23/29.49%
Conflict Frames	56/71.79%	57/82.71%	132/78.57%	56/82.21%
Economic Frames	37/82.21%	52/75.46%	144/85.21%	55/70.51%
Consequence Frames	73/89.68%	137/83.33%	284/5195.56%	110/71.43%
Technology Frames	12/26.67%	25/39.13%	25/20.71%	13/16.67%
National Interest Frames	25/55.56%	41/60.29%	81/47.93%	32/41.03%
Public Interest Frames	19/42.22%	22/31.88%	55/32.54%	15/19.23%
Power Reliance Frame (Secondary)	13/76.46% (28.89%)	16/59.26% (23.19%)	32/78.05% (18.93%)	19/82.61% (24.36%)

Table 52
NYT Frames over Timeline

WP	P1	P2	P3	P4
Political Frames	25/27.31%	28/48.28%	24/51.06%	2/66.67%
Conflict Frames	55/82.09%	49/83.05%	40/85.11%	2/66.67%
Economic Frames	48/71.64%	43/71.67%	31/65.96%	2/66.67%
Consequence Frames	113/81.88%	108/83.78%	66/76.74%	3/75%
Technology Frames	21/16.42%	21/35.59%	8/17.02%	1/33.33%
National Interest Frames	25/37.88%	30/50.85%	29/40.43%	1/33.33%
Public Interest Frames	21/31.34%	15/25.86%	16/34.04%	1/33.33%
Power Reliance Frame (Secondary)	21/84% (22.94%)	19/67.86% (32.76%)	22/91.67% (46.80%)	2/100% (66.67%)

Table 53

WP Frames over the Trade War Timeline

WSJ	P1	P2	P3	P4
Political Frames	25/37.31%	28/48.28%	24/51.06%	2/66.67%
Conflict Frames	55/82.09%	49/83.05%	40/85.11%	1/33.33%
Economic Frames	46/68.66%	43/71.67%	36/76.60%	2/66.67%
Consequence Frames	113/81.88%	108/83.72%	66/76.74%	3/75%
Technology Frames	11/16.42%	21/35.59%	8/17.02%	1/33.33%
National Interest Frames	25/37.88%	30/50.85%	19/40.43%	1/33.33%
Public Interest Frames	21/31.34%	15/25.86%	16/34.04%	1/33.33%
Power Reliance Frame (Secondary)	21/84% (31.34%)	19/67.86% (32.76%)	22/91.67% (46.81%)	2/100% (66.67%)

Table 54
WSJ Frames over the Trade War Timeline

Figure 24

NYT Major Frame Timeline: The evolution of the four major frames of the NYT over time by semester of political, economic, conflict, and consequence frames in NYT only.

Note. The horizontal axis indicates the four consecutive periods, and the vertical axis indicates the number of the articles with the presence of the aforementioned major frames.

Figure 25
Less Dominant Frame Timeline for the NYT: the evolution of four emplotting frames of the NYT over time by semester of technology, national interest, public interest, and power reliance frames in the NYT.
Note. The horizontal axis indicates the four consecutive periods, and the vertical axis indicates the number of the articles with the presence of the aforementioned less dominant frames.

Among the four major frames, the consequence frames remained the most

dominant throughout the trade war, whereby political frames were the least dominant.

It is also worth noting that the number of articles of consequence frames experienced

a drastic increase in the first three phases, with its peak observed during the third

phase, but in the 4th phase drastically decreased to approximately the same level as

that in the first phase. Both the economic and conflict frames, starting from the

second place and third place, respectively, witnessed an analogous trend of steady

increase until they reached a peak in the third phase followed by a sudden decline in

the fourth phase to the number of 55 and 56, respectively, a number considerably

larger than the political frames. With regard to the less dominant frames, throughout

the trade war cycle, the national interest frames remained the most dominant among the four, starting from merely 25, followed by a drastic increase to its peak at 81 in the third phase and a sharp increase in the 4th phase. A similar trend was observed in the public interest and power reliance frames, both of which started from the second place and third place, respectively, reaching their peaks in the third phase, followed by a dramatic decrease in the fourth phase. It is also worth noting that the number of power reliance frames surpassed that of the public interest frames eventually. The only exception hereby was the trend concerning the number of technology frames, with an abrupt increase from the first phase to the second phase, but a gradual decrease from the second phase on to the very end of the trade war timeline. In a nutshell, as far as the NYT is concerned, the consequence frames were given the maximum salience throughout the trade war timeline. The other three frames, the conflict, economic, and national interest frames, were all given lesser salience. The discussion on the trade war did not enter the public sphere at the beginning itself, when the U.S. placed 25% duties on goods imported from China, but after a period of convoluted retaliatory measures the two countries took against each other. Except for the political frames, which experienced the least variations, all the four major frames experienced dramatic increases, indicating that the coverage of the consequence of the trade war, economic repercussions, conflicts, national interest, and public interest prevailed in the case of the three major frames, particularly, after the two landmark events that denoted the onset of the second and third phases, when the leaders of the two countries agreed on the ceasefire and truce. The spike can be attributed to the escalation of the trade war during these two periods. However, counter intuitively, despite the fact that during the second and third phases, the U.S. had imposed a

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sanction on Huawei on national security grounds. As of May 15, 2019, Huawei was announced as an addition to its entity list preventing the U.S. companies from making transactions with the company, along with a succession of containment policies and measures followed, the number of the technology frames during the second and third phases underwent a gradual decrease, even with a momentary increase in the second phase, even though the trend corresponds to the decrease in technology frames of the other two major U.S. outlets, where the technology frames were under-emphasized and progressively disappeared on the horizon of the public opinions over time. Interestingly, without any exception, from the December 13, 2019, when China and the U.S. agreed to the first phase deal, despite innumerable tumultuous events lingering, both the coverage of the trade war and the number of all the frames dwindled dramatically to a level much lower than that of the frames when they started off on July 6, 2018.

Figure 26
WP Major Frame Timeline: The evolution of four major frames of WP over time by semester of political frames, economic frames, conflict frames, and consequence frames in WP only
Note. The horizontal axis indicates the four consecutive periods, and the vertical axis indicates the number of the articles with the presence of the aforementioned major frames.

Figure 27
WP Less Dominant Frame Timeline: The evolution of four emplotting frames of WP over time by semester of technology frames, national interest frame, public interest frames, and power reliance frames in WP only
Note. The horizontal axis indicates the four consecutive periods, and the vertical axis indicates the number of the articles with the presence of the aforementioned less dominant frames.

Among all the newspapers in question, in an exploration into the major frames of the WP throughout the trade war, similar to that in the NYT, the consequence frames, remained the most visible, even though the turning point was the second phase, a representation of the ceasefire of both sides on December 1, 2018. However, the visibility of the consequence frames in the narrative about the trade war and trade deals dipped dramatically, although the salience of the consequence of the trade war remained dominantly visible. The number of the other three major frames, much lower than the consequence frames, started to decrease gradually with the third phase as the turning point, and when the first phase deal was announced, the number dipped suddenly to a marginal figure. During the same period, the visibility of the conflict

frames, economic frames, and political frames ranked from the second place to fourth

place， maintaining the middle ground. The national interest frames, started from 25,

a level similar to that of the political frames. From the very beginning itself, when the

retaliatory measures were taken by both the sides, the coverage of both the national

interest and political factors came into emergence. However, after the occurrence of

the second landmark event, the ceasefire of the trade war, on December 1st, 2018,

their delineated coverage progressively reduced to a minimal level in the end. Until

the lapse of the 2nd phase, there existed a broad balance in light of visibility in terms

of technology issues and public interest. However, from the onset of the temporary

ceasefire agreement on G20 summit in Argentina, the visibility of the former declined

progressively until it reached a marginal level, whereby the latter experienced a

transitory increase, followed by an exponential decrease in its visibility. The public

interest frames, with persistently the least salience, experienced a transient increase,

overtaking the power reliance frames, the secondary frames under the umbrella of

political frames during the second phase, and tailed off after the signing of the first

phase trade deal, eventually becoming negligible. It is noticeable that compared to the

NYT, the various frames representing the coverage of the WP, are broadly more

balanced. Regardless how dominant certain aspects of the coverage appear in the very

beginning, the salience of all the aspects experienced a decrease, despite certain

ephemeral spikes, and subsequently dropped to a marginal existence, partially

attributable to the number and percentage of articles relating to the trade war, since

the completion of the first phase deal. In summary, there was little salience given to

the political aspects associated with the trade war during its entire timeline, contrary to the traditional arguments in the existing literature.

Figure 28
WSJ Master Frames Timeline
Note. The horizontal axis indicates the four consecutive periods, and the vertical axis indicates the number of the articles with the presence of the aforementioned major frames.

WSJ Less Dominant Frame Timeline

Figure 29

WSJ Less Dominant Frame Timeline: The evolution of four emplotting frames of WSJ over time by semester of technology frames, national interest frame, public interest frames, and power reliance frames in WSJ only.

Note. The horizontal axis indicates the four consecutive periods, and the vertical axis indicates the number of the articles with the presence of the aforementioned less dominant frames.

In a similar fashion as the NYT and the WP, on the WSJ, the consequence frame prevailed as the most leading frame in the first three phases of the trade war, declining exponentially to a negligible level in the fourth phase. A similar trend can be witnessed in the other three master frames, though with a smaller visibility. Conflict, economic, and political frames declined gradually by leaps and bounds in their number, from being ranked at the second place to the fourth place, before the visibility of the three frames tailed off in the fourth phase, starting from the first phase trade deal, corresponding to the decrease in the salience of the trade war in the WSJ. The pattern of the four major frames of the WSJ over the four phases of the trade war timeline has a striking resemblance to that of the WP. A far cry from the NYT, where most of the major frames became increasingly more salient as the trade war progressed until the fourth phase of the trade war, with the number of reports on

the trade war increasing exponentially, most of frames on the more conservative WSJ

and WP became less salient, even with the coverage of the trade war during its

second and third phases increasing dramatically. The depoliticization of the trade war

and trade deal in the context of U.S. was a shocking episode, given the conventional

abundance of the politicization of their reports, evidenced by the inundation of news

reports fed by the sources from establishment institutions and the discourse of the

elite media, such as the NYT, regarding China's absorption of Hong Kong, which

revolved around the expression of the U.S. guardian's responsibility to defend

democracy and liberty against communist's abuse, followed by the employment of

the metaphor of Trojan horse, coming to the conclusion that the capitalist enclave

would subvert China from within (Lee et al., 2001). The ideological packages from

the NYT and the WSJ were very similar this sense (Lee, 2002). However, the framing

analysis above reveals the varying degrees of politicization among the three major

U.S. news outlets in question and how articles were framed politically. As stated

earlier, the reality is the primary definer, whereas the discourse is the secondary

definer (Lee, 2002). However, starting from the first phase, when there was an

increasing amount of coverage of the trade war, all the frames, particularly the

political frames, experienced a decline of varying degree. The decline of the overall

coverage of the trade war and the political frames can be partly attributed to the

increasing attention to the salience given to the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly

since the onset of the fourth phase. However, except for the NYT, where some of the

issues, whether thematic or episodic, were given salience in the first phase, both the

WSJ and the WP experienced a decline in most of the frames in question starting

from the landmark events on the timeline denoting the onset of the second and third

phase. The insights garnered from the framing analysis are that throughout the trade war, even with massive fluctuations over the four phases punctuated by the announcement of the retaliatory measures against the other side, or the promulgation of transient ceasefire or temporary agreement, albeit with more trade-offs of more severe punitive, malicious, or retaliatory actions against each other, the national interest was given more salience, particularly during the first three phases of the timeline, compared with that of the public interest. Even with the political aspects of the trade war granted unexpectedly low salience, the national interest evidently surpassed the public interest in the salience and visibility of the coverage of the trade war. The coverage of the trade war in the WSJ implies the dominance of the national interest over the public interest. While the national interest frames experienced a gradual increase during the first phase, the salience or the visibility given to them decreased upon being overtaken by the power reliance frames, the secondary frames under the auspices of the political frames, since the commencement of the third phase. Nevertheless, throughout the trade war, the national interest overrode the public interest except for the fourth phase, when the attention shifted toward the pandemic. Moreover, the salience granted to the technological aspects of the trade war was the least in all three newspapers in question, even though during the first phase of the trade war, the accusation of forced technology transfer or technology theft by the Trump administration against the Chinese Communist regime remained a heated and controversial topic on the public sphere represented by the tweets by Trump, the U.S. government, and fed by the sources related to the U.S. government. Another contentious issue was the accusation by the Chinese government agencies on social media, berating the measures taken by the U.S. government and discourses

made by U.S. on the role played by the latter in its attempt to be engaged in a peaceful evolution of the Chinese Communist regime, or on their efforts as part of an orchestrated conspiracy theory to thwart the rise of China. The arrest of Meng Wanzhou, for her alleged violation of the U.S. sanctions against Iran and fraud against the banking industry and the coverage of the sanctions against another Chinese telecommunication giant, ZTE, supposedly led to controversy in the public sphere, demonstrated by innumerable tweets and Facebook posts apparently tied in with the aforementioned conspiracy theories. However, based on the chronology of the trade war coverage as demonstrated in this chapter with a series of line plots delineating the trend of evolution of the coverage of technology, the alleged technology theft, or forced technology transfer, the salience of technological aspects of the story appeared to have failed not only to match the rancorous discourses on social media from both the U.S. and China, but also to match the visibility of the four master frames, along with those of the national interest and public interest, particularly during the second and third phases of the trade war timeline. Arguably, the journalists in their efforts to contribute to the public sphere, were more inclined to give salience to certain issues at the expenses of other issues, even though those which were provided less salience were predominant in public sphere. Therefore, the sources that fed their coverage and the ideological packages they pushed into the public sphere are the most deciding factors in determining the visibility of various dimensions of the trade war.

The argument is predicated on the comparison of a wide array of frames, thematic or episodic, in totality in all the three major U.S. news outlets in question and on a more nuanced framing analysis along the timeline. The argument can be

further corroborated and augmented by the imbalanced distribution after the juxtaposition of the salience of the various hypothesized frames along with the controversial topics demonstrated by the tweets, Facebook posts, and other social media platforms, as in the case of the unjustifiably fewer technology frames and the inadequate visibility of the alleged forced technology transfer. Another determinant in journalistic practices of giving certain salience to certain issues at the expense of the others is the role institutions they worked for, which help account for the great differences in framing practices even if they receive similar training.

6.4 Discourse Analysis of the Editorials on the Trade War

6.4.1 Editorials versus News Reporting

Within their contemporary community in the U.S., the journalists are bound by and subject to rigorous professional standards, along with the influence, censorship, self-censorship from the agencies and government, ideology, and the sources feeding their reports, editorials, commentaries for framing and re-framing practices. With a firm acknowledgment of the discursive material nature, illustrated by Carpentier (2019), there still exits a strong need to concentrate on the construction of the journalism identity and power relation through a more microscopic lens of the momentous event of the trade war, in which all aspects, as analyzed in this chapter and the previous one, gained visibility on the elite discourse of the three major U.S. news outlets in question. The previous section that revolved on the framing analysis demonstrated that the sampled reports are generally and counterintuitively

depoliticized. The discourse analysis may enrich the theory on the politicization of the reports on the trade war from a unique perspective.

6.4.2 Identity Construction in the U.S. Elite Journalism

As will be illustrated in this section with concrete empirical evidence, the messages or the impressions by the journalists from the NYT and the WSJ were provided to the audience in a less salient manner, by framing practices or priming. However, the discourse theory was utilized to understand how journalists established a trustworthy identity in providing salient information. Journalism was caught between the competing imperatives of freedom of the press and the laws of the market. Hallin (1992) also stated that the attitudes of journalists toward their practice on daily basis in the face of high-modernist journalism was also caught between a lack of sense of doubt or contradiction and self-confidence. However, during the following decades, the self-image of the journalists of the U.S. elite media of wholeness and seamlessness had been contaminated in the face of threats in the age of digital media, self-media, and so forth. The purpose of this section is to discuss how the journalists of the U.S. elite media negotiated between the construction of their political or professional journalistic identities along with the dwindling trust of audiences under the backdrop of threats in the new era to the integral identities intended to be maintained by journalists, a decade following the arguments made by Hallin (1986) and Zelizer (1993). In this chapter, since the editorials are intended to demonstrate the views of the editorial board and journalists in a more salient manner, the dissections of few major articles punctuating the timelines as defined and

characterized in the previous chapters by editorial board members of the NYT and the

WSJ in the discourse-theoretical perspective are made on the basis of the building

blocks of mainstream professional journalistic identities or the nodal points as

described by Carpentier (2019). Facing the aforementioned threats, the chapter

describes how the different nodal points, dimensions, or building blocks of different

identities of journalistic identities can be maintained in the efforts by journalists of

these elite print media to reaffirm their identity as the truth-tellers of the society

(McNair, 1998), and in their practices of writing opinion sections or editorials that

serve as the triangulation of the results of the research on development of their

identities in the perspective of news reporting and their framing practices or the

saturation of the theories regarding the construction of their professional or political

identities. This analysis on the editorials under the auspices of discursive-theoretical

methodologies also provides detailed insights into the underdeveloped turn within the

journalism studies to identify the collective identities with their rigidities and

fluidities in their shaping the field as a whole (Carpentier, 2019). Considering the

broadness of this field, this chapter primarily explores the practices by the media

professionals under the discursive and theoretical microscopic lens, with the coping

strategies or mechanisms to maintain and contest the "truth claims" (Carpentier,

2009, p. 141).

6.4.3 Discursive Perspective on Editorials

Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/26/opinion/trump-tariffs-trade-war-farmers.html
See Appendix 3

   This section attempts to analyze this editorial from the perspective of power

rhetoric. The so-called rhetoric power in this discourse analysis refers to the art of claiming the power or right, or the journalists' self-proclaimed authority they hold onto. These strategies have played a significant role in human communication activities, but unfortunately have not received adequate attention by communication scholars. To reinstate and maintain the trust and professional authority, journalists are required to take certain necessary steps. There is a wealth of literature devoted to the journalists' claim to their role in terms of professionalism by Tuchman (1978), who also elucidated the self-confirmation skills by journalists in the face of intimidating situations. This section establishes a discourse-theoretical perspective on journalism. The rationale for conducting framing analysis on the above-mentioned article among the randomly selected editorials is that it entails a multitude of frames, including the four master frames that have been given maximum salience among all the other frames. The frames employed include the political frames, as in the case of the delineation of the potential job loss as a consequence, juxtaposed with the highly censured the claim by Trump that the trade war led to restoration of manufacturing jobs, in an effort to appease the naysayers and critics of his policies and measures, but at the same time incited his base, and the economic frames, along with conflict frames, with references to the "little squabble with China" and "wreaking global havoc". Another reason that account for the salience of the frames belonging to the trade war in this self-contained editorial is its inclusion of the less dominant frames whose visibility and presence tend to be less common as depicted and analyzed in the previous section. The national interest, as illustrated by Trump's claim of fighting for his supporters against competitors and globalists home, shed in a negative anti-Trumpism light, coexists with the public interest, exemplified by the reference to

repealing of the Obama Care and the voters in the Rust Belt towns, the innumerable controversial statements by Trump on inflicted high prices on the manufacturers and suffering on the farmers, and most importantly, the allusion to a certain authoritative source in supporting the claim that the sacrifices are negligible in comparison to the prices as a result of the casualties due to the overseas operations of the U.S. troops in the history. Besides, the power reliance frames are also prevalent in this article, displayed in a wide range of sources constituted by the quotes made from people from the Congress, White House, Trump, and even JFK, each lending support to the narrative in this editorial. The lack of the sources from elsewhere further validate the claim made by Lee (2002) that the elite discourse serves as the little helper of the U.S. government, even with established pluralism, fed by sources from "Beltway concerns," marginalizing the whispering voices. The only missing frame under analysis is the technological aspect of the narrative, typical in articles related to the trade war, corresponding to the declining trend of the articles employing technology frames and alluding to the forced technology transfer and technology theft, since the onset of the second phase of the timeline. The purpose of this section on discourse analysis on the above-mentioned editorial or commentary is to elucidate the power relations for precisely interpreting the meaning of the identity and ideology in the production of the news reports by news professionals, journalists, and news agencies, in their interaction with the reality, and understanding further how they served as the secondary definer in a more nuanced manner, by moving up the ladder of abstraction of the constructs and concepts to bridge the gap between the macro-level theories that examine the different levels of forces shaping the production of news and the micro-level theories from a more cognitive and psychological perspective.

6.4.4 Power Relations in the Discursive and Theoretical Perspective

This section attempts to show that the power or claim to professional authority or position, is not only the cardinal message of this narrative, but also a principal rhetorical weapon of the journalist who wrote the aforementioned article. In essence, the power or right is not on Trump's side. He is rather subject to a number of accusations against him on compromising the public interests of the citizens of the U.S. and has no legitimate power to declare his rights. Despite Trump's claim to patriotism, his executive authority is regulated and repressed by the law, especially the abuse of power involving political figures. Recently, the development of certain events has made Trump face more difficulties in the face of pressures both domestic and abroad. The journalist in charge of this editorial had collected huge evidence in her efforts to accuse Trump of breaching public duties and compromising public interests under the pretext of patriotism and national interests. During this period, Trump also experienced the pressure of a possible impeachment from the Congress for his alleged Ukraine. It can be said that the speech was an indication that Trump finally bowed to the power of all parties (social pressure, moral pressure, public opinion, law, etc.), but he would like to admit his mistakes sincerely to get the support of the U.S. citizens. It may also be presumed that he would play the national pride card to frame the trade war.

But the problem is that, whether he wants to confess or to defend, Trump ought to skillfully declare some of his rights. Trump made noticeable efforts to

declare the presidential power and the benefits of the trade war in terms of protecting the rights of the U.S. citizens. The central issue to be discussed in this section is not whether Trump should declare his power or right on this occasion, but whether the manner of power or right declaration adopted by him can help him acquire the sympathy of the U.S. citizens to the greatest extent. Analyzing and reviewing the rhetoric strategy of power or right in the editorial in question can help understanding the paramount significance of power rhetoric in communication or rhetoric activities in dissuading audience into believing the claims by Trump regarding the trade war, albeit his supreme powers.

In modern society, power is customarily manifested as rights guaranteed by the law (sometimes as responsibilities, obligations, etc.), so this section will often compare power and rights, not only the authority that Trump claimed in restoring the pride of the Americans, but also the manner in which the journalists in their dissuasion reaffirm their professional authorities, which are also the embodiment of their powers. Two new concepts: power communication and power rhetoric, along with the impression management constitute the theoretical foundation of this analysis. In the following section, the said concepts are explained first to justify how the journalists reinstated their professional authorities in elite newspapers in the face of liquidity journalism with the passing of high modernism or similar threats, from a discourse-theoretical perspective.

6.4.5 Two Underlying Presumptions under Power Relations

There are two underlying presumption in the chapter. First, power or right consciousness is critical in the contemporary democratic society, wherein everyone is completely aware of their powers and interests. Second, a particularly important sense of power or interest of contemporary people is the sense of the right to speak freely. Since the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the right of free speech has been continuously written in the constitutions of all contemporary democracies. In such countries, as long as the speaker is not the one who is strictly prohibited by the law to "speak and move", and the speaker's words do not violate the rights of others. In the editorial being discussed, even if there are simple statements against Trump's claims, the writer is already exercising her voice to reaffirm her authority. Though she has no rights to ask for the other party's consent, she has the right to ask the other party to respect her opinion. She is going to declare not just the rights or forces that a citizen should have, but also some power of social licensing, that is, the power of knowledge. In the contemporary society which believes in science and "knowledge is power", scientific knowledge itself is a kind of power. The power or interest messages in other people's words do not necessarily deserve attention, but in some communication activities, such as editorials, court debates, and political speeches, power and interest messages are often the focal point of our attention, as much as in our research on the authoritative power of journalists from the discourse-theoretical perspective. If power communication or power message communication play a chief role in human communication, so do power rhetoric and the strategies journalists claim to reaffirm their power relation in managing their impression. Even with the power to communicate, they need to be equipped with the power rhetoric to claim the

authority as representations of their professionalism. Communication requires skills and strategies, especially when it comes to sensitive power issues. The so-called power rhetoric refers to the skills and strategies of declaring power and benefits in the process of communication. The author believes there are three principal strategies of power rhetoric: (1) appraising the situation tactfully and choosing the most appropriate way of power declaration; (2) establishing a reliable power fulcrum in strategy and organizing a stable power united front. There are various ways to declare power or interest. The voice of power is often not the voice of those who are forced to obey, let alone the voice of those who are loud. The strongest power or benefit revealer makes good utilization of the most natural and acceptable ways to declare his or her power and benefit, which makes people feel that he or she is not striving for power or benefit, but for what he or she should have. Foucault (1980) cogently remarked "the success of power is directly proportional to whether it can successfully cover up its own means" (p. 75). Can a brazen power be accepted by people? (3) Indeed, the message of power should not be so obscure that the audience cannot understand its meaning.

When choosing the best way of publicity, power, and benefit, presenters often need to coordinate various power relationships, such as the relationship between the presenter and the audience, between the presenter who claims to power and the power objects, between the presenter and his or her potential allies, between the propagandist and the society (the status and role of the propagandist in the society), and that between the power or interest to be declared by the propagandist and the other existing powers or interests in the society (such as the relationship between the

privacy right and the power of social supervision in the sentence "this is my privacy"), etc. A good journalist knows how to balance the different aspects of power while delivering his or her voice most effectively during persuasion or dissuasion.

In terms of strategy, power or right advocates need to seek the support of external power and need to establish a power fulcrum in the social power network. For instance, Trump was quoted as declaring his claims on protecting national pride. This was to establish a fulcrum of executive power, rebutted by the author of the article who argued otherwise, in her efforts to claim her voice or professional authority in this power relation.

In the power network of a society, the greater the power or advantage, the more suitable it is to be the fulcrum of power. Every society during each period is expected to be partial to certain powers and benefits. Developed countries emphasize the equal rights of people, while backward countries emphasize the rights to eat. During the financial crisis, the injured countries pay special attention to the power of financial and economic management. In such countries, the voice of financial and economic talents is louder than other voices and are given the priority to participate in the formulation of national plans. If the power or benefit advocate can attach himself or herself to the power or benefit in such a high position, his or her declaration will have a high position.

When this article was first published in mid 2019, the impeachment proceedings of the U.S. Congress were just beginning and the public power struggle between the two major parties was vigorously going on for a while. This chapter does

not want to answer the queries regarding the legitimacy of the trade war and whether Trump can survive the impeachment. The purpose of this chapter is to rather explore a new way of rhetorical commenting by analyzing the rhetoric of power. The author believes that the view of power rhetoric provides everyone with a novel and meaningful perspective to examine the motivations and strategies of speakers. In comparison with the other rhetorical views, power rhetorical views put the speaker in a more active position. From the perspective of power rhetoric, there is passive speaker, in this case, Trump's voice on national pride and national interests. However, in this case, the journalist did not undertake a defensive position, but instead assumed more active roles.

At the same time, the view of power rhetoric puts the speaker under a more complex and delicate situation. He or she should not only skillfully and effectively declare his or her power and interest, but also balance and take care of various power relations, which are not only complex, but also changing. It can be said that the current outbreak of financial crisis in any country related to the interests of the U.S., and the challenge to the U.S. by any war maker who is not aware of current affairs abroad, may instantaneously affect the comparison of various powers in the U.S. Therefore, the speaker must also try to estimate the plausible changes in power relations. Indeed, it is impossible for the writer to predict every change accurately. Therefore, the speaker must also have the ability to adjust his or her strategy, such as reorganizing his or her united front or allude to other opinions by experts after the emergence of a new power relationship. A single editorial by the NYT editorial board is not enough to elucidate the success or failure of the rhetoric of power. A more in-

depth analysis is warranted in the following section from a discourse-theoretical perspective.

6.4.6 Discourse and Ideology

No matter how many other attributes the said editorial has, most readers will think that it expresses a negative opinion on Trump's trade war policy. For readers of the elite liberal newspaper in the U.S., given its liberal views, this is not surprising at all. Indeed, there are various other editorials (see details in the annex) in different time frames. Most of them and the less salient news reporting have different frameworks from different perspectives (see the Chapter 5 - 7 on framing analysis for details), criticizing the Trump administration's trade war related and other policies. The NYT is endowed with liberal characteristics, commonly known as ideologies. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the ideology, particularly the way in which an ideology is expressed and reproduced in discourse highlights, the power relationship and the characteristics of journalists' professional authorities. According to Van Dijk (2010), the foremost attribute to observe in the concept of ideology is how it is applied to the idea or policy of characterizing the other in a universal way in most of our daily discourses: we have truth, but they have ideology. Interestingly, when an ideology expresses the polarization between the inner and outer groups, us and them, such a derogatory use of the concept of questioning may be ideological in itself. A well-known historical example is that in the traditional anti-Communist rhetoric, communism was widely limited to an ideology. The people who used this

rhetoric defended capitalism and the liberal market artificially and were unlikely to regard their thoughts as ideologies.

This chapter presents a theory of ideology and its systematic analysis, which goes beyond the informal customary use of the term and does not necessarily imply a negative evaluation of various ideologies or those who share them. Under specific social, political, and historical conditions, any group may develop its own ideology to defend its interests and ensure the loyal, united, and interactive cooperation of its members, especially when it involves other social groups or stages. It may be argued that ideology, as we define it, is not only used to dominate or suppress others, but also to resist or fight against such domination, as we know of racism and anti-racism, or gender discrimination and female attention to driving patterns. The same rights can be abused and also be used to resist such abuse, depending on the sociopolitical situation. According to Van Dijk (2008), classical liberalism was once an ideology advocating individual freedom and inspiring people to resist feudalism, but today it is rather insisted by those who oppose the freedom of people with different race or nationality. Likewise, the free market for which Trump waged the trade war in the political interest of the U.S., is against the intervention of the government into the free market, a belief by social democrats or socialists.

Therefore, from the informal definition, ideology is a fundamental ideological system shared by the members of a social group that affects their interpretation of social practices and situations and controls their discourse as well as other social practices. Thus, in order to persuasively elaborate and publicize their anti-Republican

perspective and support immigration and worker welfare, based on their liberalism consciousness, the NYT piece uses rhetoric, such as hyperbole, failed, shocking, appalling, unrestrained, and symbolic words, such as "spiral rise" and "stimulus", to attack the Republican Party and the current government led by Trump. Therefore, this editorial opposes Trump's trade war and the neoliberalism economy supported by the trade war and the principles of minimal government interference, as well as the possibility of damaging the public interests, along with other potential dangers as a result of the trade war and other policies introduced by Trump. Thus, Trump's rhetoric of national interests is denigrated as a narrative that potentially damages the public interests and national interests of Americans, which is considered by the editorial board as damaging the ultimate interests of Americans.

From an informal observation of this example, we can draw a preliminary conclusion, although further conclusions warrant more detailed discourse theoretical analysis. A stand against the trade war can be achieved not only by ideology that it is harmful to public interests, but also by other ideologies and by rhetoric. Concurrently, this position against a certain government can be expressed by the ideology of other positions, even if it endangers national interests and national pride to oppose his position. Such ideology is precisely expressed through public discourse, such as editorials, and is convincingly disseminated by readers and emulated in daily life. In addition to defining ideologies, this chapter further demonstrates how these ideologies are expressed by different journalists in the texts and conversations in social and political contexts. The ideology and identity construction of the journalists and the NYT sometimes have agreement and sometimes contradiction. From an ideology-based discourse analysis, it is evident that the identity of journalists and the

relationship of rights are maintained and challenged. However, as remarked by Van Dijk (2008), such a discourse is based on the implicated ideology, which may influence social practices such as oppression and discrimination. He further emphasized its limitation in interpreting the ideology, as the discourse of ideology may also be restrained by other qualifications irrelevant to ideology, such as the current objectives, knowledge, and contexts. And the ideology of the participants of the discourse is merely a single dimension of the ideology. In this case, the journalists, as explained by Van Dijk (2008), possess traits such as identity, the career activities such as collecting and reporting news, and serving the objectives of informing the general public and watchdogs for the society, along with social norms such as professionalism and objectivity, as well as their relations with other social groups (source of information, readership, government, enterprises, and so forth), and the power relations in the society. However, Van Dijk (2008) pointed out that the ideology conveyed is the collective self-image of the journalists or editorial boards, and the way they express themselves actively and last but not least, its interest and relationship with other social groups including the power, struggle and competition, but it should deviate from the collective self-image or ideology. The assertion is consistent with the impression management by journalists who are to impose the collective self-images or the ideologies on the readership, a part of their identity construction.

Chapter 7 A Comparative Perspective of the Frames Employed in the Concerned Chinese News Outlets

7.1 The Evolution of the Antagonistic Trade War Debate in the Chinese Public Sphere: An Overview of the Trade War Debate in the Two Chinese Media Outlets

In this study, the sampled pool of articles in Chinese context comprised 727 media articles where the trade war was referenced, and all these articles were excerpted from the two media outlets, China Daily (CD) and the Global Times (GT), both having multiple platforms, typical of media convergence, as the media articles can be read via the print newspapers, published primarily in the English language in different versions, namely China Daily Hong Kong, China Daily Africa, and so forth, Weibo (Chinese Micro-blogging service), Twitter (despite most tweets posted by the two major Chinese news outlets being subject to censorship, labeled as the Chinese government affiliates, and inaccessible to most people in China, whereby their U.S. counterparts being labeled as the foreign missionaries), and a wide array of news aggregate portals and platforms, such as Toutiao (headline news), with an overwhelming dominance in the news feed, along with the official YouTube channels. Unlike their U.S. counterparts, as can be seen in the randomly selected pool, the number of articles related to the trade war was equally distributed among the two major news outlets. There were 316 news articles in GT (27%), whereas 311 in China Daily (26%). In addition, compared to their U.S. counterparts, the two Chinese news outlets had a greater proportion of more salient news reports, including editorials, commentaries, features, illustrated in Table 55. More specifically, a

combination of editorials and features/columns accounted for over 50% of the total

reports in both GT and China Daily, and their sheer number of the reports compared

to the three U.S. outlets are indicative of the paramount importance and salience

given to the trade war in the Chinese context and how it evolved into a matter of

contestation.

Typology of News	GT		China Daily	
Information Pieces	208	28.18%	196	26.56%
Editorials	72	31.86%	63	27.88%
Features/Columns	30	19.87%	50	33.11%
Others	3	42.86%	1	14.29%
News Summary	2	3.17%	1	1.59%
Total	315	26.58%	311	26.24%

Table 55
Typology of News in GT and China Daily Sampled by Article Types

Figure 30

Chronological Evolution by the Number of Articles Selected in the Two Chinese outlets (In the Horizontal Axis, the Numbers refer to the Four Phases of the Trade War Progress)

P1 From July 6, 2018 to November 30, 2018

P2 From December 1, 2018 to June 28, 2019

P3 From June 29, 2019 to January 14, 2020

P4 From January 15, 2020 to May 12, 2020

The chronology of the randomly selected articles in GT, except for the large size, reveals a pattern identical to that of the three U.S. outlets in question. The trade war received minimal coverage during the first period, from July 6, 2018 to November 30, 2018, with only 77 reports focusing on or peripherally related to the issue, merely accounting for 24.92% of the total reports. When the Trump administration first announced the imposition of tariff on certain commodities originating from China, the issue of the trade war was put on the agenda as the master frames or the emplotting frames of other U.S.-China conflicts. However, the number and percentage of the salient reports, including editorials, commentaries, and

columns, were much larger than the three U.S. outlets during the first phase. It can be concluded that the trade war was very salient during the entire period of the trade war, from the very onset of the chronology and the trade war and related issues were the master frames and the main topics for analysis, in contrast to the three U.S. outlets, where there were greater numbers of emplotting frames related to the same. From the second to the third phase, the number of reports with trade war as the principal topic increased dramatically from 77 to 117, accounting for more than one-third of the total news reports. In the third phase of the trade war, when the two countries were trading punitive measures with strong media presence and salience, the number of reports on the trade war declined slightly from 117 during the second phase to 106 in the third phase. The same trend was also observed among the more salient reports, as the number of editorials, features, columns, and commentaries also declined proportionately but the trade war maintained its dominance and salience. During the fourth phase, owing to the attention drifting toward the pandemic and the declaration of the first phase deal despite ephemeral relapses, the attention was paid to and salience was granted to the trade war.

Interestingly, the chief editor of GT, Hu Xijin, from the very beginning of the trade war, on his own Twitter and Toutiao accounts, along with the columns and features on GT, both in Chinese and English, on its print version and public domain version and WeChat and Weibo accounts, was overly outspoken on the issues pertaining to the trade war, even though these more salient reports may not be exclusively dedicated to the trade war. Even though the Twitter account is inaccessible to Chinese account, but the presence of the content related to the trade

war either from his own account on WeChat, Weibo, and Toutiao, or those more official ones from the platforms associated with GT, Xinhua news agency, and People's Daily, created a huge buzz on the public opinion in China, and his Twitter account, and the short clips and commentaries relayed, and posts by other Twitter accounts labeled as those affiliated with the Chinese governments and posted by YouTube also swayed on the public opinion among the Chinese population worldwide. Some of the video clips posted went viral on various platforms. Interestingly, Hu Xijin also had certain tweets and sound bites either in English language or in Chinese with English subtitles, intended at the western audience with its own media logic, which interacted with those from the spokespersons of China's Ministry of Foreign affairs and received mixed feedback from the critics and exponents. His YouTube and WeChat accounts promoting such messages, along with Youku channels (The Chinese counterpart of YouTube) feeding edited sound bites and short clips, have been branded as Hukan, a video talk show, with him as a pun to stand for his family name and an antithesis and half-joking way of promoting his the media logic of his own and that of GT regarding the trade war, juxtaposed with supposedly more serious channels belonging to GT and other Chinese official media outlets, generally attributed the trade war and the conflicts between the two countries to the efforts made by the U.S. to thwart the China's efforts to overthrow the U.S. economic, political, and technological hegemony as in the case of "One Belt, One Road," the whimsical moves made by Trump administration, or the efforts made by the deep state of the U.S. to thwart the peaceful rise of China and China's endeavors in a transition toward the global industrial transfer by transferring the labor intensive industries to other third world countries, by paralleling this media logic with the far-

fetching bubble burst of Japan and the ensuing Plaza Accord made by the U.S. and Japan decades ago. According to Hassid and Repnikova (2015), contrary to the western paradigm following a more liberal tradition, where the relationship between the traditional and new media, with the emergence of the ICT and social media, are generally characterized as being adversarial or competitive, a non-western model or paradigm should come into play in the Chinese context. They further argued, based on a wide range of case studies on Weibo and WeChat, more private social media channels the latter being a more private social media channel, that there exist symbiotic relationships between the traditional media and the internet platforms in a more nuanced way in a party-state system being able to resist censorship and expand the boundaries of a more permissible reporting, concurrently promoting commercial competitiveness (Hassid & Repnikova, 2015), as in the case of a wide range of media platforms disseminating the propaganda by Hu Xijin advocating nationalism with its own media logic. Likewise, Wang (2018) accentuated the new media landscape of journalism, contextualized and foregrounded by the party-state guidance on media policies on media convergence, with the internet becoming an integral part of the news production routine of Chinese media professionals.

The number of reports on the trade war, along with the number of more salient reports on the trade war increased, partly attributable to the attention paid to the arrest of the Huawei executive, Meng Wanzhou, detained in Vancouver pending extradition hearing, as corroborated by the countless editorials, commentaries, and features, with the trade war being the master frames emplotting the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, or vice versa, and the reference to the upheaval in Hong Kong during the

same time, with the media logic ascribing the unrest to the repercussions of the aforementioned ideological packages, namely the Sino-U.S. conflicts in an all-rounded way, including the technological and Intellectual Property Rights disputes, to overthrow the peaceful rise of China in its endeavors with regard to the transition in its industrial structure, with "One Belt, One Road," and the capital and soft power output in African countries as the initiatives, the peaceful evolution of the regime in China, the ensuing China's challenge to the U.S. hegemony, and so forth. Particularly, in some of the more salient news reports on the trade war in GT, the news reports revolved around the upheaval in Hong Kong, the sanctions on Huawei, and the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, entangled with the technology war that began on August 18, 2017, when USTR initiated an investigation into certain acts, policies, and practices of the Chinese government relating to the technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation, well before the onset of the trade war according to the timeline, and the cultural conflicts before the two countries or the clashes of the civilizations still exist, as remarked by some international relation experts (Huntington, 1996), with the trade war being foregrounded or backgrounded in the news reports, regardless of there being more salient editorials and columns or less salient information pieces.

Except for the first phase, the number of the sampled articles foregrounding or backgrounding the trade war was considerably smaller than that of the sampled articles in GT, throughout the concerned period. Surprisingly, starting from a staggering number of 132 reports on the trade war, the number declined markedly to 69 in the second phase, followed by a slight boost to 78, with 106 articles in the third

phase, and ultimately decreased to a marginal level of 12 articles in the fourth phase. The differences with respect to the trend between the two Chinese news outlets over the timeline barely reveal the nuances of the focus and salience of their news reports. Thus, for a better description, a chronological framing analysis is conducted in this chapter, comparing and contrasting the findings retrieved from the concerned three U.S. elite news outlets. It is also worth noting that from the first phase through the fourth phase, China Daily, as compared to GT, had more editorials, commentaries, and columns, among all news types, and therefore it can be argued that the former was not less salient in reporting the trade war, compared to the latter. The studies concerning the official sources in an authoritarian state and the framing analysis conducted on their less salient information pieces and more salient editorials are profoundly meaningful, as a discourse analysis on the posts by bloggers regarding a violent conflict in Kazakhstan, a post-Soviet authoritarian state, can promote the hegemonic discourse via online platforms. As the findings demonstrate that the independent bloggers, supposedly contest the hegemonic discourse imposed and promoted by the regime, from time to time, reproduce online the media logic of the regime, demonstrating that the dominance of the hegemony of the official sources despite widespread employment of social media, with the development of the ICT technologies (Lewis, 2016) and media convergence on multiple platforms with the similar logic and discourse as displayed in the two Chinese media outlets in this study. However, the differences between the two major Chinese outlets will be revealed in a more nuanced way via a more elaborate framing analysis subsequently in this chapter.

Figure 31
Chronological Evolution of the Number and Percentage of Articles Selected in the Two Chinese News Outlets.

	GT		China Daily	
P1	77	24.92%	132	45.36%
P2	117	37.86%	69	23.71%
P3	106	34.30%	78	26.80%
P4	9	2.91%	12	4.12%
Total	309	100%	291	100%

Table 56
Chronological Evolution of the Number and Percentage of Articles Selected in the Two Chinese News Outlets.

GT	P1		P2		P3		P4	
1. News	51	24.88%	80	39.02%	73	35.61%	1	0.49%
3. Editorial	16	23.53%	26	38.24%	21	30.88%	5	7.35%
2. Feature/Column	8	26.67%	9	30%	10	33.33%	3	10%
5. Others	1	33.33%	1	33.33%	1	33.33%	-	-
4. News Summary	1	50%	1	50%	-	-	-	-

Table 57
The Chronology of GT News Reports

China Daily	News	2. Editorial	3. Features/Column	4. Others	4. News Summaries
P1	91	28	12	1	-
P2	42	12	15	-	
P3	51	13	13	-	1
P4	3	4	5	-	-

Table 58
The Chronology of the Number of News Reports Articles in China Daily

Figure 32
Chronological Evolution of the Number of Articles Sampled in GT

Figure 33
Chronological Evolution of the Number of Articles Sampled in China Daily

7.2 Framing Analysis of the Two Chinese News Outlets

7.2.1 Political Frames in GT and CD

As demonstrated in Chapter 5, similar to the concerned three elite U.S. newspapers, the political and ideological and economic frames, along with the national interest frames were very predominant in their presence in the two Chinese news outlets, much more than the power reliance frames, the secondary frames under the umbrella of the political and ideological, conflict, technology, public interest, and consequence frames. Besides, the rest of the frames, including morality, responsible, and racism frames had marginal presence among all the frames. Even though there were no discernible differences between the three Chinese and two English-language newspapers, generally speaking, in GT, the political and ideological frames came straight through the more commercialized GT with more presence in its multiple digital platforms, as opposed to the mainstream China Daily. In this sense, the framing of the trade war on the two Chinese newspapers had certain specificity vis-à-vis their U.S. counterparts. This alone indicates the different dynamic of the Chinese media, contextualized by the emerging electronic market in the U.S. counterparts, the latter being a more liberal media system with strong journalistic professionalism, moderate pluralism inclining toward majoritarianism, strong political neutrality or objectivity, and rational-legal authority, typical of most liberal media systems (Gasparyan, 2018; Hallin & Mancini, 2004). In this framing analysis, evidently, there is a strong presence of politicization on the two Chinese news outlets, in comparison to their U.S. counterparts. Regarding the power reliance frames, a strong presence was observed in GT, with a great number of articles, both salient and less salient,

containing quotes from governmental or institutional authorities. The number and the percentage of the articles containing the power reliance frames in the Chinese newspapers, in general, were greater than those in China Daily, whereby the three U.S. newspapers had mixed results. The following table and figure demonstrate the number and percentage of the typology of the power reliance frames, namely where the quotes elicited from the authorities come from, it is not counter-intuitive that the U.S. and Chinese newspapers featured a higher percentage of the sources from authorities, including government spokespersons, government and agencies, and members of political parties, as can be seen from the following parties, with no exceptions. A comparative analysis of the political frames in GT and China Daily demonstrates more salience of political frames in GT than China daily in terms of both number and percentage. On the one hand, GT surpassed China Daily considerably in most of the power reliance frames, including Chinese government sources, sources originating from Chinese Communist Party or its members, sources close to the Chinese government, agencies, and institutions, and more apparently, the spokesperson for the Chinese government. On the other hand, while the number of the power reliance frames relating to the Chinese sources were significantly lower than that relating to the U.S. sources, GT outweighed China Daily slightly in terms of the power reliance frames with regard to the quotes elicited from the U.S. government sources and those from the political parties from U.S., but was slightly overtaken by China Daily in the two sub-frames of the power reliance frames, namely the sources close to the U.S. government and its spokespersons, even though the number of these two sub-frames was marginal in both newspapers. The findings corroborate the politicization of the more commercialized and internet- or ICT-

embracing GT than China Daily considering the significance of the number and

percentage of the political frames and a majority of the power reliance frames.

Nevertheless, as will be discussed subsequently in this chapter by an analysis on the

number and percentage of the existing frames, even though the literature on Chinese

media has demonstrated the party-market corporatism and clientelism in the Chinese

news outlets (Lee et al., 2007), there still exists a differentiated extent of salience

given to different issues.

Political Frames on GT and China Daily				
	GT		China Daily	
No Presence	199	48.18%	214	51.82%
Very Few	45	47.37%	50	52.63%
Many	39	69.64%	17	30.36%
Several	31	50.82%	30	49.18%

Figure 34
Political Frames in GT and CD
Note. Chi-squared (3, $N = 626$) = 9.453, $p = .0238$, smaller than 0.05, significant

Power Reliance Frames	U.S. Government Sources		Chinese Government Sources		Chinese Communist Party or Members of Chinese Communist Party		Sources Close to Chinese Government and Agency		Members of the Political Parties in the U.S.		Chinese Government Spokesperson(s)		Sources Close to the U.S. Government and Agencies		U.S. Government Spokesperson(s)		Total	
WP	39	30.71%	14	11.02%	9	7.09%	9	7.09%	27	21.26%	4	3.15%	15	11.81%	10	7.87%	127	100%
WSJ	32	29.63%	24	22.22%	12	11.11%	7	6.48%	13	12.04%	9	8.33%	8	7.41%	3	2.78%	108	100%
GT	24	15.29%	39	24.84%	26	16.56%	31	19.75%	6	3.82%	25	15.92%	5	3.18%	1	0.64%	157	100%
NYT	23	34.33%	17	25.37%	6	8.96%	3	4.48%	2	2.99%	3	4.48%	9	13.43%	4	5.97%	67	100%
China Daily	20	21.28%	31	32.98%	12	12.77%	10	10.64%	4	4.26%	6	6.38%	8	8.51%	3	3.19%	94	100%
Total	138	24.95%	125	22.60%	65	11.75%	60	10.85%	52	9.40%	47	8.50%	45	8.14%	21	3.80%	553	100%

Table 59
Power Reliance Frames of Five Newspapers in This Study
Note. Chi-squared (28, $N = 138$) = 114.44, $p = 0$, smaller than 0.05, significant

7.2.2 Economic Frames in the Concerned Two Chinese Newspapers

As demonstrated in Chapter 5, more salience and visibility were conferred to the economic issues in the concerned Chinese newspapers than their U.S. counterparts, with statistical significance, even with mixed results with no statistically significant results across the five newspapers in tabulation, as shown in the tabulations in Chapter 5. However, as demonstrated in the following table and graph regarding the economic frames, there was more statistically significant salience in the economic issues relating to the trade war in China Daily than in GT. Nevertheless, there was more visibility of the economic frames in China Daily than in GT, with statistical significance and the salience given to the economic issues in the two Chinese news outlets, significantly greater than that in the three U.S. newspapers. The politicization of the trade war in the Chinese context is not surprising, given the nationalist agenda set by GT and China Daily. However, it cannot be assumed that

from the onset of the trade war, all the associated issues were debated in the same way and pointed toward the similar direction. Furthermore, it is premature to argue that there was dominance in terms of the presence of politicization through GT vis-à-vis China Daily, along with its U.S. counterparts throughout the four phases discussed in this study, for the reason that the antagonistic politicization of the trade war developed in the early stages itself, as displayed by a succession of punitive measures and retaliatory actions exerted by the two countries. Without the framing analysis on the political issues and the power reliance frames punctuated by the set timeline, it would be very difficult to determine whether in GT and China Daily, over the time, the contestation over the trade war can normalize further, with more salience granted to the conflicts, technologies, national and public interest and so forth, at the expense of the presence of the political dimensions.

Economic Frames	GT	China Daily	Total

1. Many	103	43.28%	135	56.72%	238	100%
2. Very Few	76	53.52%	66	46.48%	142	100%
3. Several	58	50.43%	57	49.57%	115	100%
4. No presence	79	59.85%	53	40.15%%	132	100%
Total	316	50.40%	311	49.60%	627	100%

Table 60

Economic Frames of GT and CD

Note. Chi-squared (3, $N = 627$) = 10.097, p= .0178, smaller than 0.05, significant

Economic Frames

Figure 35

Bar Charts Regarding the Economic Frames: CD vis-à-vis GT

Note. Chi-squared (3, *N* = 627) = 10.097, *p* = .0178, smaller than 0.05, significant

Economic frames	Many		Very Few		No Presence		Several		Total	
Chinese newspapers	238	37.96%	142	22.65%	132	21.05%	115	18.34%	627	100%
U.S. newspapers	202	35.94%	133	23.67%	130	23.13%	97	17.26%	562	100%
Total	440	37.01%	275	23.13%	262	22.04%	212	17.83%	1,189	100%

Table 61

Economic Frames: Chinese vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (12, N = 1,189) =22.849, p = .0294, smaller than 0.05, significant

Newspaper	Political and Ideological Frames	Power Reliance Frames (Secondary Political Frames)	Economic Frames	Conflict Frames	Public Frames	National Frames	Technology Frames	Consequence Frames
GT	115 (36.62%)	87 (27.7%)	258 (81.65%)	263 (83.23%)	60 (19.05%)	163 (41.58%)	72 (22.78%)	213 (68%)
China daily	97 (31.19%)	61 (19.62%)	204 (81.26%)	255 (82.26%)	78 (15.16%)	157 (40.48%)	84 (27.23%)	205 (65.92%)

Table 62

Framing Ratio in Terms of Number and Percentage of Frames in the Sampled Chinese News Outlets

Figure 36

Framing Ratio in Terms of Percentage of Frames in the Sampled Chinese News Outlets

Along with the consequence frames, the economic and conflict frames boasted great presence in both China Daily and GT. Both economic issues and conflicts or antagonistic dimensions of the trade war witnessed the greatest visibility among the others. Even Chapter 5 reported significant differences between the Chinese and English-language newspapers in terms of the conflict or antagonistic frames, but no statistical difference between GT and China Daily. Undeniably, the conflict and antagonistic frames were the most dominant. The two Chinese newspapers appear to be slightly more visible than the three U.S news outlets in terms of conflict/antagonistic frames. It can be concluded that the economic and the conflict/antagonistic frames witnessed maximum salience among all in the two Chinese Newspapers, with the conflict/ antagonistic frames being slightly more salient than in their U.S. counterparts. Moreover, as far as GT and China Daily are concerned, the political and ideological frames and national interest frames

maintained the middle grounds, with the percentage of the power reliance frames accounting for a higher percentage of the existing political and ideological frames than the percentage of the power reliance frames present in the political frames in the articles in the three U.S. newspapers. As can be seen in the following sections on the consequence frames and the framing analysis of the cross-sectional study of the consequence frames in Chapter 5, the Chinese newspapers, in general, had a slight advantage over their U.S. counterparts in the presence of the consequence frames, giving moderately greater salience to the consequences attributable to the trade war. The remaining three frames in question witnessed the least visibility. The public frames were more visible in China Daily than GT, even though a cross-referencing analysis demonstrates a disadvantage over their U.S. counterparts with regard to the public interest frames, in stark contrast to the national interest frames with the cross-referencing analysis and presentation of the data, as displayed below, showcase that GT saw a considerable advantage over China Daily in light of the national interest frames, especially the mention of the national interest and its association with the trade war. All in all, the prevalence in the presence of the antagonistic /conflict, consequence, and political frames, accompanied by the power reliance and national interest frames, as shown in GT, vis-à-vis China Daily, at the expense of other frames such as the technology frames, where the three U.S. outlets, and China Daily witnessed an advantage over GT, and the counter frame of the public interest frame, where the three U.S. outlets saw considerable advantages over GT, and both GT and China Daily had extremely low visibility compared to their presence and salience of the national interest frames, all emphasized greater politicization of the nationalism, yet more commercialized GT, in comparison to China Daily, and the U.S. media

outlets, despite any substantial differences in the number and percentage of the economic frames.

7.2.3 Technology and Its Secondary Frames: GT vis-à-vis China Daily

The heyday of the trade war was marked with the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, Huawei's executive, leading to innumerable reports in the public opinion in China, with propaganda setting agenda for more antagonistic and nationalistic discourses. It comes as a surprise when the findings of this study demonstrate that there was a lower presence of the technology frames in the GT and China Daily, compared to their U.S. counterparts, as will be discussed in the following sections. China Daily featured a higher number and percentage of the primary technology frames and their secondary frames, technology theft and forced technology transfer than GT, even though the latter boasted advantage in the presence of other frames, providing empirical evidence indicating a higher level of politicization of GT, even though the results lack statistical significance. However, the findings regarding the secondary technology frames appear to be statistically significant. While the Chinese newspapers were considerably less salient than their U.S. counterparts regarding the coverage of the technology theft and forced technology transfer, China Daily was more salient than GT. Moreover, China Daily and GT were appreciably more salient in the way the trade war was characterized as China's technological advances and innovation by the Chinese government or its corporate entities (e.g., China 2025), than the concerned U.S. newspapers, whereas the U.S. dominance in innovation and technology in reporting the trade was only slightly more salient in the U.S.

newspapers than GT and China Daily with the former being slightly more salient than the latter. A reverse trend was observed in the way technology-related issues were characterized as technological disputes, including forced technology transfer, technology theft by China or its corporate entities, and technology spy. The U.S. newspapers were more salient than GT and China Daily, with the former slightly more salient than the latter in terms of the percentage. In other words, the concerned U.S. newspapers had more visibility with regard to the technology theft and the frames of the U.S. dominance being threatened by the rising power of China with smaller margins than their Chinese counterparts, while the two Chinese news outlets were more salient in the discourse on the China's dominance in technology and innovation, with notably more margins in the proportion of their articles regarding technology. The results pinpoint the ideological packages of nationalism and politicization with which Chinese corporatism media were characterized, further corroborating the claim regarding the two Chinese print media with a remarkable focus on the internet and social media that the two Chinese media outlets extensively promoted nationalism compared to their U.S. counterparts. In comparison with China Daily and the three U.S. news outlets, GT was more visible in exporting ideological and political packages, as demonstrated in its ascendancy in the other aforementioned major frames.

Conflict/Antagonist Frames	GT		China Daily		Total	
Very Few	95	51.63%	89	48.37%	184	100%
Many	93	49.47%	95	50.53%	188	100%
Several	75	51.37%	71	48.63%	146	100%
No Presence	53	49.07%	55	50.93%	108	100%
Total	316	50.48%	310	49.52%	626	100%

Table 63

Conflict or Antagonist Frames: GT vis-à-vis CD

Note. Chi-squared (3, N = 316) = 0.306, significance = .9589, greater than 0.05, not significant

Conflict Frames	Very few		Many		Several		Presence		Total	
Chinese newspapers	184	29.39%	188	30.03%	146	23.32%	108	17.25%	626	!00%
U.S. newspapers	170	30.36%	165	29.46%	114	20.36%	111	19.82%	560	100%
Total	354	29.85%	353	29.76%	260	21.92%	219	18.47%	1,186	100%

Table 64

Conflict or Antagonistic Frames: Chinese vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (12, N = 1,186) = 24.317, significance = .0184, smaller than 0.05, significant.

Technology Frames	No presence		Few		Many		Several		Total	
GT	244	77.22%	38	12.03%	20	6.33%	14	4.43%	316	100%
China Daily	226	72.67%	43	13.83%	23	7.40%	19	6.11%	311	100%
Total	470	74.96%	81	12.92%	43	6.86%	33	5.26%	627	100%

Table 65

Technology Frames: GT vis-à-vis CD

Note. Chi-squared test (3, N = 627) = 1.925, p = .5881, greater than 0.05, not significant.

	Technology Frames									
	1. Technology dispute (forced technology transfer, technology theft by China or its corporate entities, technology spy, and etc.)		2. China's technology advances and innovation by Chinese government or its corporate entities (e.g., China 2025)		3. US dominance in technology and innovation (being threatened or dominance)		4. Others:		Total	
WSJ	36	48%	15	20%	17	22.67%	7	9.33%	75	100%
WP	31	58.49%	10	18.87%	10	18.87%	2	3.77%	53	100%
China Daily	27	26.73%	50	49.50%	16	15.84%	8	7.92%	101	100%
GT	27	30.34%	40	44.94%	19	21.35%	3	3.37%	89	100%
NYT	20	45.45%	8	18.18%	15	34.09%	1	2.27%	44	100%
Total	141	38.95%	123	33.98%	77	21.27%	21	5.80%	362	100%

Table 66

Secondary Technology Frames 1 Across All Five Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (4, *N* = 362) = 32.864, *p* = 0, smaller than 0.05, significant.

Figure 37

Secondary Technology Frames 1 Across All Five Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (4, *N* = 362) = 32.864, *p* = 0, smaller than 0.05, significant.

Technology theft or forced technology transfer	4. No presence		3. Very Few		2. Several		1. Many		Total	
GT	30	71.43%	9	21.43%	2	4.76%	1	2.38%	42	100%
China Daily	27	64.29%	11	26.19%	4	9.52%	-	-	42	100%
WSJ	13	30.95%	20	47.62%	7	16.67%	2	4.76%	42	100%
WP	9	28.13%	14	43.75%	5	15.63%	4	12.50%	32	100%
NYT	7	31.82%	9	40.91%	4	18.18%	2	9.09%	22	100%
Total	86	47.78%	63	35%	22	12.22%	9	5%	180	100%

Table 67

Secondary Technology Frames

Note. Chi-squared (12, *N* = 86) = 30.334, *p* = .0025, smaller than 0.05, significant.

7.2.4 Framing Analysis on the Counter Frames: Public Interest Frames Vis-à-vis National Interest Frames

Public Interest Frames	No presence		Few		Many		Several		Total	
Chinese newspapers	487	77.92%	64	10.24%	38	6.08%	36	5.76%	625	100%
US newspapers	388	69.29%	65	11.61%	59	10.54%	48	8.57%	560	100%
Total	875	73.84%	129	10.89%	97	8.19%	84	7.09%	1,185	100%

Table 68
Public Interest Frames during the Trade War: Chinese Newspapers vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers
Note. Chi-squared (3, *N* = 1,185) = 13.946, *p* = .0329, smaller than 0.003, significant.

National Interest Frames	No presence		Few		Many		Several		Total	
Chinese newspapers	307	48.96%	127	20.26%	114	18.18%	79	12.60%	627	100%
US newspaper	291	52.06%	115	20.57%	85	15.21%	68	12.16%	559	100%
Total	598	50.42%	242	20.40%	199	16.78%	147	12.39%	1,186	100%

Table 69
National Interest Frames: Chinese Newspapers vis-à-vis U.S. Newspapers
Note. Chi-squared (3, *N* = 1,186) = 2.181, *p* =.0329, smaller than.5358, not significant.

	4. No presence		3. Few		1. Many		2. Several		Total	
China Daily	154	49.52%	61	19.61%	62	19.94%	34	10.93%	311	100%
GT	153	48.42%	66	20.89%	52	16.46%	45	14.24%	316	100%
WSJ	110	46.22%	53	22.27%	43	18.07%	32	13.45%	238	100%
WP	102	56.98%	31	17.32%	26	14.53%	20	11.17%	179	100%
NYT	79	55.63%	31	21.83%	16	11.27%	16	11.27%	142	100%
Total	598	50.42%	242	20.40%	199	16.78%	147	12.39%	1,186	100%

Table 70
National Interest Frames: Five Newspapers
Note. Chi-squared (12, *N* = 1186) = 12.146, *p* = .4348, not significant

Public Interest Frames on Five News Outlets	No presence		Few		Many		Several		Total	
GT	255	80.95%	33	10.48%	10	3.17%	17	5.40%	315	100%
China Daily	232	74.84%	31	10%	28	9.03%	19	6.13%	310	100%
WSJ	162	68.07%	31	13.03%	25	10.50%	20	8.40%	238	100%
WP	126	70.39%	18	10.06%	19	10.61%	16	8.94%	179	100%
NYT	100	69.93%	16	11.19%	15	10.49%	12	8.39%	143	100%
Total	875	73.84%	129	10.89%	97	8.19%	84	7.09%	1,185	100%

Table 71

Public Interest Frame Across the Five Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (12, *N* = 1,185) = 222.433, *p* = .0329, smaller than 0.05, significant.

	The National Interests of the U.S. are Compromised		The National Interests of China are Compromised		The National Interests of China are Advanced.		The National Interests of the U.S. are Advanced.		Total	
GT	86	38.05%	71	31.42%	55	24.34%	14	6.19%	226	100%
China Daily	83	38.25%	81	37.33%	38	17.51%	15	6.91%	217	100%
WSJ	76	46.06%	55	33.33%	13	7.88%	21	12.73%	165	100%
WP	59	61.46%	28	29.17%	1	1.04%	8	8.33%	96	100%
NYT	48	57.14%	24	28.57%	3	3.57%	9	10.71%	84	100%
Total	352	44.67%	259	32.87%	110	13.96%	67	8.50%	788	100%

Table 72

Secondary National Interest Frame All Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (788, *N* = 1186) = 63.358, *p* = 0, smaller than 0.05, significant

Figure 38

Secondary National Interest Frame All Newspapers

Note. Chi-squared (788, N = 1186) = 63.358, significance = 0, smaller than 0.05, significant

	Public Interests of the U.S. are Compromised.		Public Interests of China are Compromised.		Public Interests of the U.S. are Advanced.		Public Interests of China are Advanced		Total	
China Daily	45	45.45%	35	35.35%	7	7.07%	12	12.12%	99	100%
WSJ	44	46.32%	18	18.95%	22	23.16%	11	11.58%	95	100%
WP	43	65.15%	11	16.67%	10	15.15%	2	3.03%	66	100%
GT	35	43.21%	27	33.33%	5	6.17%	14	17.28%	81	100%
NYT	31	56.36%	14	25.45%	7	12.73%	3	5.45%	55	100%
Total	198	50%	105	26.52%	51	12.88%	42	10.61%	396	100%

Table 73

Secondary Public Interest Frame in All Five *Newspapers: Causal Chains Between Trade War and Public Interest*

Note. Chi-squared (12, N = 396) = 38.85, significance = .003, smaller than .003, significant.

Figure 39
Secondary Public Interest Frame: All Five Newspapers
Note. Chi-squared (12, $N = 396$) = 38.85, significance = .003, smaller than .003, significant

Framing analysis on the public interest reveals that the public interest frames were significantly more salient in the concerned U.S. newspapers than the Chinese newspapers. However, there were no statistically significant differences between them in terms of the national interest frames. It can be concluded herein based on the empirical evidence from the framing analysis that whereas the U.S. newspapers were more visible and salient in terms of the public interest, there were no such significant differences in the national interest. Another takeaway from these findings on the counter frames is that in all the five newspapers in question, national interest prevailed over public interest with regard to their coverage of the trade war, indicating that the media in both the countries gave precedence to the national interest over public interest throughout that period, with GT far inferior to China Daily in their coverage of the public interest. A deeper examination of the secondary counter frames, the public interest frames vis-à-vis national interest frames illuminates the

comparison between GT and China Daily, triangulated with the results from the other three U.S. outlets. The tabulation of GT and China Daily demonstrates there are no statistically significant differences of the directives of the public interest, even though there was conspicuously stronger presence of the public interest of China in GT than China Daily, pinpointing to the higher extent of politicization with which GT was characterized.

Based on the framing analysis on the secondary public interest, all the newspapers displayed strong visibility in the impairment of the U.S. public interest, even though the three U.S. newspapers were slightly more superior than GT and China Daily in the presence of the destruction of the public interest of the U.S. However, GT and China Daily were far superior to their U.S. counterparts with regard to the presence of the impairment of the China's public interest. Moreover, the three U.S. newspapers were markedly more concerned about the promotion of the U.S. public interest than their Chinese counterparts, whereby the latter were generally more concerned about the advancement of China's public interest.

Generally speaking, all these newspapers were skewed toward the coverage of the impairment of the public interest of both the countries than the advancement of public interest, with the newspapers more concerned about the public interest or the well-being of their own countries, which is not counter-institutional. Nevertheless, an insight into the public interest frames over the entire period also elucidates that the two Chinese newspapers were strongly gravitated toward the coverage of the impairment of U.S. public interest as a result of the trade war, considerably greater

than the coverage of the impairment of the public interest of China, disproportionate to the case of the three U.S. newspapers, where these newspapers encountered considerably more visibility in the destruction to the public interest in its own country than that in the coverage of the compromised public interest in the country of animosity as a consequence of the trade war. Regarding the interest in the coverage of the advanced public interest, a disparate trend was witnessed in GT and China Daily. There was noticeably more coverage of the advanced public interest of China in both GT and China Daily than the promoted public interest of the U.S. The fact that GT conferred precedence to the advanced public interest of China over the rest of the newspapers and more salience to the compromised public interest of the U.S. than the impaired public interest of China, both GT and China Daily provided further empirical evidence to their high extent of politicization and their propaganda of China's rise and its soft power. It comes as no surprise that the national interest had resemblance with the public interest in terms of percentage of secondary national interest frames, except for the sheer number of the national interest frames. In the contexts of the national interest frames, both GT and China Daily witnessed a higher visibility of the compromised national interest of the U.S., than other secondary frames, even if their percentage of articles with compromised national interest of the U.S. was slightly smaller than the news articles discussing the compromised public interest. Other than that, GT exhibited a higher salience of the advanced national interest of China as a result of the trade war, disproportionate to the salience of the advanced national interest of the antagonistic country (in the case of GT, the national interest of the U.S., and in the case of the U.S. newspapers, the national interest of China), in its news coverage, than China Daily and the three U.S. news outlets. The

disproportionately high salience to the advanced national interest of China to varying

extent, as shown in GT and China Daily, is a typical representation of the propaganda

by media characterized by party-market corporatism and clientelism, moderated by

emerging ICT technology and the varying degree of commercialization.

7.3 The Micro-Diachronic Dimension of News Discourse Schema in the Two Chinese News Outlets

For news communication within the same language, attention was paid to the

macro-diachronic dimension of news discourse, because within the same language,

linguistic symbols which predicate the communication of information are the

consensus made by the predisposed interlocutors. Therefore, the researchers of news

discourse in a given language generally tend to shift the textual presentation of the

linguistic symbols toward the diachronic development of the meaning of content.

Therefore, such research is also often referred to as "content analysis.'' However, for

multilingual, transnational, and trans-cultural news communication, more attention is

paid to the micro-synchronous dimension of discourse, i.e., the form dimension or

language symbols, because international communication transcends not merely the

consensus of the interlocutors, but also the language symbols that predicate the

former. Regarding the dual dimensions, namely the macro-diachronic and the micro-

synchronous news discourses, the concept of "news schemata" (Dijk, 1988) has not

been fully developed. Dijk (1988) recognized the synchronous nature of discourse

and proposed that the content analysis of the news discourse involves the

deconstruction of its linguistic formal representations. Combined with the perspective

of linguistics, this thesis intends to analyze how the most significant micro-diachronic

measurements of news discourse themes, herein, the thematic and episodic frames, and information sources, are implemented under the microscopic lens of the discourse structure and propositional syntax. However, Dijk (1988) further acknowledged that the discourse transcends the diachronic nature of text symbols. Therefore, subsequently, the paradigm of the conceptual framework shifted from the analysis on the individual pieces of news from a microscopic perspective to the discussion of diachronic process in which the news schemata shape the widely acknowledged social meanings.

This chapter also examines the political and ideological, power reliance, economic, national interest, public interest, technology, and conflict frames on a timeline punctuated by the momentous events into four phases in both GT and China Daily. Under the diachronic view, the news "discourse schema" is mainly defined as content analysis in the field. In this study, a single news report was regarded as the unit of analysis to explore their social meanings on a macro level. Statistical tools and methods were employed after assigning meanings and values to each article before the generalizations were made for giving a generic statement on the overall trend and directives of the discourse in the diachronic process. Such kind of content analysis research emerged in Europe and the U.S., with multitudinous influential outcomes emerging after the 1990s (Rojecki, 2008; Rusciano, 1997), with further development in recent years. The discourse schemata are a synthesis of Van Dijk's (1988) linguistic construct of news schemata. There are two dimensions of news discourse schemata: micro and macro. The macro dimension focuses on the diachronic news discourse, which studies the discourse over time, the supera discourse, and content.

The micro dimension focuses on the synchronic news discourse, which studies the form and structure of news discourse. The micro-diachronic discourse schema is measured by the themes and the sources. The theme can be readily measured by being further deconstructed into the topics or presentation of the people reported. For instance, values can be assigned to summarize the content characteristics of each news report: "Military" reports can be assigned the value "1," "Economy" as "2," "Society" as "3," and so on. The discourse that reports the "negative image" of a specific person can be assigned "1," "neutral image" as "2," "positive image," as "3," etc. After the researcher has coded all sample texts at the same scale, different statistical techniques can be used to refine the diachronic features of the discourse in the macro dimension. Theme can also be deconstructed into "high-frequency vocabulary" by extracting the iconic interpretation of a report theme by the media through the high-frequency words appearing in the discourse over time. Alternatively, the theme can be further deconstructed into "genre," "subject," "reporting tendency," "gender," and other low-level indicators. Such research is quite widespread in the recent years. For example, Rusciano (2008) and Rojecki (1997) once used 133 related editorials/comments published in the New York Times and the Washington Post before the U.S. sent troops to Iraq to study the news coverage in a macro-diachronic dimension. By combing the report discourse across time, it was found that the information themes conveyed to the public by the news discourse during that period were: (1) The moral judgment by the U.S. on "evil" countries; (2) Claiming the ascendancy of the U.S. in the world while denying the prospect of cooperation with the United Nations. The analysis in this research provides the empirical evidence that news reports gave rise to the public opinion for the American soldiers to go to Iraq

(Rojecki, 2008). This chapter is primarily focused on the diachronic analysis on the

thematic and episodic frames from a macro perspective. Information sources are other

pivotal indicators for the study of the macro dimensions and have been elaborated

herein in a more detailed manner. They predicate the subject content and the

authenticity and the deconstruction of meaning. They can be further deconstructed

into indicators or dimensions, such as the "presence" and "independence" of the

observers/reporters of the news coverage, and in case of this study, the degree of the

authority of the information sources as the core concepts. With the assignment of

categorical or numerical values to the constructs and sub-constructs as

aforementioned, and the described statistical analysis, the reliability of the source of

the utterance and discourse in the diachronic process can be quantified. Taking

Rojecki's (2008) research as an example, in a similar manner the current study

intended to measure the authority of the sources in the news coverage on the trade

war. The researchers categorized the sources using the sources of the opinions

embedded in the news coverage as indicators: Out of 133 reports, 29% were from

anonymous or unidentified commentators, 44% from regular columnists, 9% from

scholars or academicians, 8% from think tank experts, 2% from government officials,

and 3% and 4% from journalists and foreign sources, respectively. With quantitative

analysis on the topics/themes and information sources of the news, researchers can

explore the diachronic, macro, and content dimensions of the news discourse. These

three measurements, the theme packages, and information sources covered the

diachronic trend of meaning of the news discourse, from a perspective that made it

challenging to attain the same goal from the micro linguistic perspective, and

concurrently ensuring the authenticity of the meaning. In addition, the news discourse

schemata also include other measurements under the macro dimension, such as news report location salience, news salience, title font, the pages covered by the news reports, the format to examine the news discourse. These measurements or indicators are mediated visual indicators, as opposed to linguistic symbols. Since in this study, most of the data under content and framing analyses were retrieved from the Internet via data mining, the visual information is beyond the purview of this research.

Thematic Frames	GT				China Daily			
	Timeline of GT				Timeline of China Daily			
	P1	P2	P3	P4	P1	P2	P3	P4
Political	16 /4.48%	42 /7.15%	41/9.64%	6 /13.63%	36 /5.68%	22 /6.20%	22 /5.74%	9 /19.56%
Power Reliance	20 /5.60%	32 /5.45%	28 /6.58%	3 /6.81%	22 /3.47%	10 /2.82%	12 /3.13%	0 /0%
Economic	60 /16.81%	90 /15.33%	75 /17.64%	7 /15.9%	109 /17.19%	55 /15.49%	72 /18.80%	6 /13.04%
National Interest	38 /10.64%	61 /10.39%	58 /13.65%	4 /9.09%	59 /9.31%	40 /11.27%	44 /11.49%	6 /13.04%
Public Interest	14 /3.92%	21 /3.57%	22 /5.18%	9 /20.45%	39 /6.15%	19 /5.35%	14 /3.66%	5 /10.87%
Technology	17 /4.76%	31/5.28%	21 /4.94%	3 /6.82%	6 /0.95%	8 /2.25%	1 /0.26%	0 /0%
Conflict	69 /19.33%	113 /19.25%	76 /17.88%	8 /18.18%	110 /17.35%	64 /18.03%	64 /16.71%	8 /17.39%
Consequence	123/34.45%	207/35.26%	154 /36.23%	4 /9.09%	253/39.91%	137/38.59%	155/40.47%	12/26.09%
Total	357/100%	587/100%	425/100%	44/100%	634/100%	355/100%	383/100%	46/100%

Table 74

Chronological Evolution of Thematic Frames on GT vis-à-vis CD

P1 From July 6, 2018 to November 30, 2018

P2 From December 1, 2018 to June 28, 2019

P3 From June 29, 2019 to January 14, 2020

P4 From January 15, 2020 to May 12, 2020

Thematic Frames of the Two Chinese Newspapers	P1	P2	P3	P4
Political	52/5.25%	64/6.72%	63/7.33%	15/16.67%
Power Reliance	42/4.23%	42/4.41%	40/4.66%	3/3.33%
Economic	169/17.05%	145/15.23%	147/17.11%	13/14.44%

National Interest	97/9.79%	101/10.61%	102/11.87%	10/11.11%
Public Interest	53/5.35%	40/4.20%	36/4.19%	14/15.56%
Technology	23/2.32%	39/4.10	22/2.56%	3/3.33%
Conflict	179/18.06%	177/18.59%	140/16.30%	16/17.78%
Consequence	376/37.94%	344/36.13%	309/35.97%	16/17.78%
Total	991/100%	952/100%	859/100%	90/100%

Table 75

Framing Ratio Over Time of the Eight Frames in the Two Chinese Media Outlets

Figure 40
Framing Ratio Over Time of the Eight Frames in the Two Chinese Media Outlets

A glimpse into the chronological evolution of thematic frames on GT vis-à-vis CD demonstrates that despite fluctuation, the antagonistic/conflict, economic, national, and consequence frames were the most dominant during the first three phases of the trade war timeline, in a manner similar to the trend in the salience of the dominant frames on the three U.S. newspapers. Evidently, GT enjoyed higher visibility in the technology frames in all the four phases compared to China Daily, particularly, during the second phase, with the number and percentage peaked with 31 reports, before dropping to 21 during the third phase, partly attributable to the imposition of tariffs and sanction by the U.S. administration against the Huawei and ZTE and the emergence of discussants on Chinese social media involving the arrest of Meng Wanzhou. Meanwhile, the technology frames in China Daily remained

marginal, despite the buzz on the social media. The table also further reveals the nuances of the frames as it delineates the evolution of the frames in their interaction with the major social events and the buzz on the social media during the various phases, as even though in the case of the national interest, conflict, and public interest frames, both GT and China Daily demonstrated identical visibility in terms of the number of reports throughout the four phases, the two newspapers demonstrated a diachronic evolution over the four phases. Therefore, without a closer examination of the development of the major frames and the less salient frames over time, it is extremely difficult to detect the nuances in the differences between the two newspapers in their interplay with the social events and the discourse in the public sphere. As can be seen from the diachronic framing analysis of the Chinese newspapers, while the consequence frames remained the most dominant, despite a declining trend over time, all the less dominant frames, including the political, power reliance, and technology frames, along with the public interest frames remained at the low level of visibility, even with the transient spikes during the second and third phases. It is worth noting that the national interest frames remained stable, ranking the fourth throughout the four phases, except for an abrupt dip in the fourth phase, whereby the news articles regarding the public interest in the Chinese newspapers experienced a steady decrease from merely around 50 to a negligible level in fourth phase. Even though the fourth phase recorded the least number of frames owing to the waning of the interest the two newspapers had in the issue of the trade war along with the clinching of the first phase deal between the two countries and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, this bar chart displays the percentage of different frames, as opposed to the number, so that the evolution of the major and emplotting

frames can be compared on the same scale and equal footing. Clearly, most of the aforementioned frames remained at the same level with minor variations in terms of percentage, except for the political, consequence, and public interest frames. There was a descent in the political frames over the time. Regarding the public interest frames, even though the first three phases witnessed no change in the percentage of the total number of the content frames, the fourth phase experienced a noteworthy increase in its percentage, partly because the number of other frames dropped to a marginal level. As far as the consequence frames, which indicate the political and economic consequences related to the trade war, are concerned, they started off with the highest percentage of the total number of content frames, before dwindling slightly during the second and third phases, followed by a significant drop to a level merely at 16, but still accounted for a significant percentage among all the other frames during the fourth phase of the trade war. To conclude, noticeably, the public interest, consequences of the trade war, and the political issues became fairly more visible in the fourth phase than the first three phases, though they were not the most salient from the onset of the trade war, and even when the attention was drifting away after the clinching of the first phase trade deal.

Figure 41
Framing Ratio by Period in Terms of Percentage of the Content Frames in the Sampled Chinese News Outlets

7.4 CD vis-à-vis GT During the Four Phases

The Chinese public sphere was very quiet on the trade war until both sides started to impose trade barriers starting from July 6, 2018, after which there was a rapid change in the way the trade war was discussed in the Chinese media and public sphere, as characterized by the news coverage of the trade war. From the onset of the trade war, the Chinese media's attention to the same peaked during its first two phases, with various content frames peaking during either the first phase or the second phase on the two distinctive Chinese newspapers, despite the seemingly party-state feature of corporatism and nationalism to varying state, as stated earlier. More specifically, during the first phase, among the eight content frames demonstrating the statistical differences, interestingly, China Daily, supposedly a less commercial newspaper, displayed a slightly higher visibility of the political frames than GT, while the latter had the high visibility and reliance on the secondary political and power reliance frames. In other words, GT in the first phase of the trade war itself,

experienced a high level of salience and reliance on a wide selection of authoritative sources to substantiate their claims regarding the trade war regardless of its power relations on a microscopic level or for persuasion. It is also worth noting that even though during the fourth phase, the percentage of the political frames in China Daily reached the peak, appreciably more than that of political frames on GT. Notwithstanding the fact that the salience of all frames dwindled corresponding to the number of the articles and the content frames dropped by leaps and bounds during the last phase, the percentage and the number of political frames during the fourth phase of the trade war dropped to a minimal level.

Regarding the visibility of economic issues, from the beginning of the trade war, the salience of the economic issues pertaining to the trade war maintained resilience without any conspicuous decline during the second and third phases, except for the fourth phase, where the proportion of economic visibility declined slightly. The same trend can also be seen in the salience of the conflict frames, where there was surprisingly strong identical salience over time in both GT and China Daily, from the very beginning through the fourth phase, when the coverage of the trade war declined. The evolution of the consequence frames, namely the visibility of the consequences, either political or economic, as a result of the trade war, was the most prominent among all, peaking during the third phase, before an abrupt descent in the fourth phase, corresponding to the general declining trend of the coverage of the trade war. Without the exceptions, albeit ups and downs, there was higher visibility of the consequence frames in China Daily than GT, throughout the four phases of the trade war recorded in this study. There exist inverse relationships between the consequence

and conflict frames in the two Chinese newspapers across all the four phases even though they both witnessed a considerable visibility in all the phases and were not as much the counter frames as the national interest frames vis-à-vis public interest frames. During the first phase of the trade war before the ceasefire agreement was clinched, GT had higher salience in the national interest in terms of percentage than China Daily, whereas an inverse trend was witnessed in the public interest, where a lower visibility of the public interest was seen in the coverage of the trade war in GT than China Daily. A similar inverse trend was experienced in the second and third phases of the trade war, where the national interest frames, prevailed emplotting marginal presence of public interest in their coverage of both newspapers. Until the fourth phase came along, the similar inverse trend ceased to exist. However, since the coverage reduced because of the first phase deal, the low number of articles recorded might not be absolutely representative in its explicability. Last but not least, over the four phases of the trade war, there was a stronger salience of technology in GT in comparison to China Daily, foregrounding the technological advances and innovations in China and defying the threats posed by the U.S. to the rise of China to facilitate the peaceful evolution of the regime, as evident in the figures delineating the secondary technology frames.

Figure 42

Framing Ratio in Terms of Percentage of the Content Frames in GT vis-à-vis China Daily during the First Phase

Figure 43

Framing Ratio in Terms of Percentage of the Content Frames in GT vis-à-vis China Daily during the Second Phase

Figure 44

Framing Ratio in Terms of Percentage of the Content frames in GT vis-à-vis China Daily During the Third Phase

Figure 45

Framing Ratio in Terms of Percentage of the Content frames in GT vis-à-vis China Daily During the Fourth Phase

Figure 46

Framing Ratio over Time of the Leading Frames in GT

Figure 47

Framing Ratio over Time of the Leading Frames in China Daily

Figure 48
Framing Ratio over Time of the Other Frames in GT

The above figures delineate the trend of the master and emplotting frames on both GT and China Daily over the four phases with regard to their number. The master frames and the less dominant/emplotting frames were analyzed separately in order to gain a deeper insight into their nuanced differences. While the consequence frames were consistently the most dominant frames along the timeline in the diachronic framing analysis, maintaining the highest degree of salience because of its advantage in the number of articles. The analysis also further corroborates the GT's advantage of national interest and conflict frames over China Daily in terms of the number of articles containing these two frames, further lending empirical support to the aforementioned remarks. The analysis of the number of other frames/emplotting frames is also very telling, as two distinct trends were observed for China Daily and GT with regard to the political, power reliance, public interest, and technology frames. As far as GT is concerned, all these frames except the technology frames, had

a marginal presence in terms of numbers and experienced a considerable increase during the second and third phases, followed by a sudden drop in number in the fourth phase, commensurate with the decline in the coverage of trade war in the fourth phase. The salience of technology peaked during the second phase, before the inevitable drop in the fourth phase, partly due to the increasing visibility or the disputes between the two countries regarding Huawei and ZTE, in conjunction with the escalation of punitive measures against each other and the malicious remarks by the authorities of the two countries on the public sphere and media. For China Daily, the visibility of the four emplotting frames quantifiable by the number of articles with coverage on trade war, starting at a higher level, displayed an overall declining trend, despite certain sporadic increases. It is noticeable that China Daily had advantages over GT to a varying extent in the first phase in terms of their visibility of the political and power reliance frames in their news coverage of the trade war. However, when the trade war fully blossomed, GT prevailed in its salience in the three emplotting frames and maintained its dominance over China Daily in the existence of technology frames. The comparative framing analysis provides further empirical evidence accentuating higher level of politicization and nationalism of GT, when triangulated with the previous findings, and concurrently explicable in an extremely nuanced fashion. It should be noted that the visibility of the public interest, though much less than t the national interest in both newspapers, encountered a substantial advantage in China Daily during its initial stage, but due to its declining trajectory, lost its edge to GT, from the second phase, when the trade war reached its heyday, as characterized by increasing retaliations.

Figure 49
Framing Ratio over Time of the Other Frames in China Daily

7.4 The Politicization of the TTP and Diachronic Trends in the Chinese Public Sphere

The two concerned Chinese news outlets have historically been the most politicized. The technological disputes emerging out of the trade war or emplotting the trade war are the most obvious episode, but by no means the only one. The Chinese public sphere witnessed the nationalism and antagonistic politicization as represented by the prevalence of the national interest, conflict, and consequence frames over its U.S. counterpart. The two Chinese newspapers debating on the trade war from the first phase illustrate the extremely contentious nature of the coverage on the trade war. However, even though both the newspapers shared certain degree of resemblance in their dominance of the master antagonistic, economic, national

interest, and consequence frames, as typical of the state-party corporatism, in their interactions with the pubic opinions and the vicissitudes in the occurrences during the trade war and remained the most emphasized until the negotiations after the first phase deal, the two newspapers delineated the trade war as demonstrated in the diachronic framing analysis in distinctive ways. While GT started off with lesser coverage of the major frames, the number boosted drastically, corresponding to the increasing number of major events along the timeline and remained the most salient ; On the other hand, China Daily, starting with a staggering number of articles delineated with the same major frames, witnessed an overall declining trend. The distinctions in the presence of the frames highlighted the nuances in the reporting from the two Chinese government-affiliated news agencies. Progressively, as shown in the trend of emplotting frames, there was a higher level of the politicization as characterized by Chinese newspapers compared to the U.S. counterparts. More specifically, GT presented a higher level of politicization compared to China Daily. As far as the salience given to counter frames: national interest frames vis-à-vis public interest frames is concerned, the public interest frames present in the coverage in China Daily declined since the second phase, whereas GT witnessed not only an ascendancy of the public interest frames, since the second phase, but also a prevalence of the technology frames over China Daily, indicative of the predilection of the GT to be more nationalistically and politically reactive to the discourse from the public opinions, in this case, a succession of disputes revolving around the technology wars as can be seen on Chinese social media. This, along with the distinctive patterns of less dominant political and power reliance frames compared to others, but much more prevailing than the three U.S. newspapers, lent further support

to the claim on the Chinese newspapers', particularly, GT's inclinations for politicization, animosity, and nationalism at the expense of the public interest. Given the recent antagonistic politicization, it can be argued that as far as the two Chinese government-affiliated news agencies are concerned, based on a comprehensive framing analysis, a general pattern of similarities with distinctiveness along the timeline indicates the different types of nationalism, animosity, and politicization as characterized by the two newspapers and represents the struggle and the deviation from a more heterogeneous China-contextualized professionalism and the struggles the Chinese professionals face in the changing landscape of media, particularly, under the backdrop of the political and ideological turn toward Maoism with stronger reliance on more orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideological tenants. Mysicka et al. (2017), in their efforts to plausibly expand the boundaries of self-censorship and institutionalized censorship, define the types of propaganda of nationalism and politicization that can become normalized in the future, depending on the commercial competitiveness and the changing landscape in Chinese politics and public opinions in the future.

Chapter 8 Summary of Major Findings and Hypothesis Testing

8.1 A Comparative Perspective: Unity in Diversity

This study aims to analyze how three U.S. news outlets and two Chinese media outlets, in different if not entirely distinctive ways, frame the Sino-U.S. trade war which involve a series of critical events, renewing the relevance of seminal studies while shedding light on the important role media plays as a "platform of discourse, a definer of reality, and a site of contestation (Lee & Li, p1)." The study also provides a point of departure for conceptual development and methodological research design (Lee & Li, 2017). In this research, the major event, the trade war, departs from the mere narratives of power struggle as demonstrated in the discourse analysis on a representative news piece from the WSJ to grand narratives connoting and signifying the struggles over national interest vis-à-vis public interest resulting from the trade war. Such struggles include conflicts, political issues, economic impacts, and so forth. The research also examines how critical events define and punctuate the different phases of the trade war and interact with the media, which serves as the "a media definer" (Lee & Li, 2017, p.1). The research also intends to identify two core concepts in relation to both generic and episodic frames and the locality of sources feeding the news coverage of the trade war, namely, the sources within the geographical boundaries of the country vis-à-vis the sources beyond those geographical bounds, and the political power relying on the sources measuring the number of quotes cited from authorities in news reports. The study strives to

examine the causality between these two core constructs and the seven major frames identified in the coverage of the trade war.

This chapter aims to provide a recap of the answers to the research questions and hypotheses this dissertation intends to address, with relevant implications and considerations for the invigoration and examination of the viability of the concepts entailed, along with limitations, future study possibilities, and contributions. In Chapters 6 and 7, a comparative analysis was conducted on the identified major frames in a diachronic process intending to step out of the conventionally static functionalism and structuralist definition of media events, toward the embedding of the media event or critical event (in this case, the trade war) in a more dynamic process of Gramscian hegemony, as guided by one of Lee and Li's (2007) considerations for the future directives in the study of media events, as in the cases of the Tiananmen Square Massacre and the Berlin Wall Falling, with these media events forming collective memory (Li & Lee, 2013; Lee et al., 2011). Under this diachronic analysis, as guided by Williams' analytical framework (1977), this research elaborates on how different newspapers, dominant ideologies, or dominant structures as measured by the salience of major frames over the timeline of the trade war can redefine themselves through the process of renewing, defending, and revising by means of absorbing alternative ideologies in this case, giving more salience to conflict frames as opposed to political and ideological frames for a transient period, while weakening oppositional ideologies, in this case, national interest frames vis-à-vis public interest frames, namely, transforming and forming emergent or residual structures. During certain periods of the diachronic process, these emergent or

residual structures are found more from being backgrounded to foregrounded by the dominant structures embedded in different media logic, cultural imperialism, Gramscian hegemony, American ideological hegemony, or nationalism as in the case of tabloid-like and more commercialized GT with its greater presence of agnostic or conflict frames to stir up nationalist sentiments among the Chinese public, as alternative or emergent structures, if not entirely oppositional structures, than its broadsheet equivalent – China Daily. Further discussion and summary, under a microscopic lens, can help grasp not only the discrepancies and similarities of the elite newspapers in their coverage of the trade war in the two countries with distinctive media systems, but also the nuances in their promotion of ideologies, as demonstrated in the salience of their dominant structures, among the newspapers of the same countries. In the case of the two Chinese newspapers in this dissertation, the framing analysis under the conceptual framework is conducive to the perception of the nuances of how the dominant structures and ideologies are promoted during the different stages with different strategies of using alternative or oppositional ideologies, either as a result of their tactful maneuvering of commercialization while refraining from crossing the red line set by the Chinese authorities, or as a reflection of their efforts to further push the limits of censorship with the advent of the ICT technologies. Last but not least, the cross-cultural framing analysis between the two countries attempts to contribute to a body of marginal de-westernization studies initiated by Curran and Park (2004), such as those works by Thussu (2000; 2011; 2017) and Wang (2011), even though these seemingly marginal but seminal works tend to "intersect various modes of knowledge" (Lee, 2015, p.202), to avoid either a western-cum-global model symbolizing the imperialism of the universal, and likewise

the globalized model with American-writ-large and "parochialism of the particular"

writ universal to achieve what Lerner called "some principle of unity in diversity"

(Lerner, 1958, p. 77; Lee, 2015). The comparative framing analysis in this study on

the news coverage of the trade war among the five newspapers, both intranational and

cross-nationally, becomes more meaningful when certain U.S. newspapers under the

framing analysis demonstrate a trend of involution compared to their two U.S.

counterparts, and the two Chinese newspapers, when the analyses shift from more

local contexts in the U.S. to achieve more meaningful interactions with the Chinese

context or the global context. The intranational analysis on the two Chinese

newspapers and three U.S. newspapers, respectively, breeds more specificity before

moving to "the more general through critical assessment, modification, and

absorption of the relevant literature" (Lee, 2015). In this case, a comparative cross-

national framing analysis was used before generalizing the cross-national and cross-

cultural implications in this chapter, as in the case of the comparison of the media

systems of 18 countries by Hallin and Mancini (2004; 2012) given that the specificity

and generality are dialectics to each other. In other words, the understanding

ourselves predicates the comprehension of others before the onset of any

contextualized meaningful cultural dialogue and transformation of acquaintance with

certain topics due to the privileges ascribed to a certain status and a more systematic

knowledge of the topics by researchers who are required to transverse between the

two modes of knowledge while themselves shifting from outsiders to insiders through

systematic inquiry and cultivation (Lee, 2015).

8.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses Testing

In this research, the following research questions have been generated on the basis of the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 4. This section addresses the research questions based on the empirical evidence from Chapter 5 through 7, and then discusses theoretical implications along with the contributions.

8.2.1 Research Question 1: Interpretations and Reflections

Research Question 1: What are the discrepancies among the five newspapers in their employment of sources?

Based on significant results discovered between the five newspapers and between the Chinese and American newspapers, it appears that the hypothesis is supported by the study findings (Table 40-43). More specifically, to understand the nuances and subtleties, the U.S. newspapers (492. 50.88%) in general tended to quote three or more sources than the two Chinese newspapers (475, 49.12%), to feed their news coverage on the trade war. In sharp contrast, the Chinese newspapers (38, 58.46%) in general tended to have more articles without sources than their U.S. counterparts (27, 41.54%). Interestingly, the two Chinese (115, 73.25%) newspapers demonstrated precedence in the articles quoting one or two sources in contrast with the three U.S. newspapers (42, 26.75%). It concludes based on the results garnered from the comparative but more generalized analyses that the American newspapers tended to quote more sources in their journalistic practices to provide evidence to support their arguments and claims, in contrast to their Chinese counterparts, a

reflection of the distinctive single dimension of the journalistic professionalism and reporting style; however, the Chinese journalistic practices have been under the sway of the U.S. traditions of professionalism while constantly pushing boundaries via the advent of ICT technologies. This argument can be further corroborated by the same trend, as shown in Table 3, displaying the same trend in the precedence of the U.S. newspapers by percentage in quoting sources in their news reports on the trade war than their Chinese counterparts. Moreover, it is noticeable that there is not too much of a difference in quoting sources between China Daily and GT, whereas the WP tended to quote the most sources to back up its claims, followed by the WSJ and the NYT.

To further grasp the two dimensions in the discrepancies in the sources, it is of necessity to make inquiries into the discrepancies in the two core constructs, viz. the localities of the sources and power reliance of the sources. The discrepancies in the localities of the sources are demonstrated in the Table 6-8, where the construct of locality of sources was further recoded into the following three categories on the basis of the distance of the sources: own sources (sources from the newspapers' own correspondents and those, either official or less official, from within the boundaries of the countries, sources from antagonistic countries, and other sources including those from countries other than the U.S. and China. The analyses in the table 6-8 demonstrate the involution tendency of U.S. newspapers, in contrast with Chinese newspapers, because the American newspapers, in general, tended to quote sources from the U.S., as opposed to those from China and other western countries, whereas opposite tendencies were witnessed when the two Chinese newspapers tended to

quote considerably more sources in the U.S., which is the antagonist in the trade war, and in western countries other than the Chinese newspapers' own sources, even though the trade war, in essence, affected the public and national interest of both countries. The involution tendency is the most evident in the case of the WP, with 71.43% of its sources being from their own correspondents and other official and non-official ones within the U.S., followed by the WSJ and the NYT, which stood at 56.05% and 49.22%. Therefore, it is concluded that while American newspapers appear to be more professional than their Chinese counterparts in quoting or employing more from authoritative and less official sources to back up their claims, the discrepancies in locality displayed the ascendancy of professionalism of the U.S. press merely on their surface values by pinpointing their involution tendencies, characterizing their source retrieval and employment. As far as the two Chinese newspapers are concerned, a more balanced distribution of source locality was witnessed. In addition, a more nuanced discrepancy in source locality can be equally telling. China Daily was superior to GT in terms of the percentage of its own sources, but GT was slightly higher than China Daily in terms of sources from the U.S. However, it is also worth noting that GT tended to quote sources from other western countries than China Daily. In sum, GT, a tabloid-like newspaper, was more skewed toward involution than China Daily, under an intranational analysis, in line with its more nationalistic stance that GT revealed in the following discussions on other research questions. Another dimension of the sources and the power reliance of the sources, namely the frequency of quotes from authoritative and government sources, pinpoints the precedence of the U.S. newspapers in general, together with the stronger presence of political, ideological, and conflict frames, over the two Chinese

newspapers. This pinpoints the higher level of politicization of the U.S. newspapers

on not only the input but also the output of the news-making process. Meanwhile, in

the three U.S. newspapers, the salience of the two politically related hard frames was

proportionate to the strong presence of the quotes cited from authorities and

government, lending to the argument that WP is the most politicized newspaper in its

news-making process, followed by the NYT and the WSJ, under this analytical

framework. Likewise, using the same analytical framework to determine the

politicization in the news-making process, an intra-national analysis based on these

determinants demonstrated GT's superiority over CD's.

8.2.2 Research Question 2: Interpretations and Reflections

Research Question 2*:* What were the relationships between the sources and

major frames used in the stories in the American press about the Sino-U.S. trade war

and Chinese newspapers in question?

This section aims to elaborate the impacts of the two core dimensions of the

construct of the news source, the locality of the sources, and power reliance of the

sources exerted on the master frames identified in Chapter 5. Both hypotheses have

been supported by the study findings. . Further research could involve an ad hoc

analysis measuring the same determinants under the same conceptual framework, in

two different data sets concerning the U.S. and China, to make further inquiries into

the discrepancies. However, it has been observed that there exists a causality

between the locality of news sources and the remainder of the master frames identifiable in Chapter 5.

Hypothesis 2a: The locality of news sources exerted significant effects on the major frames identified in the news coverage of the trade war.

The locality of the news sources refers to the geographical distance of the sources, which generically were methodologically categorized into three sub-types after recoding the more nuanced construct for optimal operationalization and ultimate conceptualization and theorization. Contrary to the findings regarding another dimension of the construct, where the causality between the presence of political and ideological frames and the power reliance of the sources were salient, there were no significant results observed regarding the relationships between the locality of the sources and the political frames, indicating that the geographical distances of the sources that were retrieved to feed news coverage on major events were neither positively nor negatively correlated with the salience of the political and ideological issues, which further confirms the mutual exclusiveness of the two constructs due to their effects on the salience of the political and ideological issues. An OLS analysis showcased that the articles containing sources from antagonistic countries tended to be more likely to present more salience of conflicts. Likewise, the logistic regression results further revealed that, compared to the articles embedded with their own sources, either from their own correspondents and those from government and established institutions, and less official institutions and individuals within the geographical boundaries of the country, those news articles, containing sources from

antagonistic countries, and others are 692% and 624% more likely to present the salience of the conflicts in their coverage of the trade war. Likewise, both OLS and logistic analyses pinpointed a trend in the presentation of more salience in economic issues, characterizing those articles from American and Chinese newspapers: these newspapers contained sources from antagonistic countries and those from other countries, particularly in western countries other than the U.S. (and China), that are 794% and 339% more likely to focus on economic concerns, respectively, than those articles, which fail to contain these two types of sources to feed their news coverage. Technology frames also witnessed a similar trend of positive causalities within the dimensions of the sources, as demonstrated by the OLS and logistic analyses. More specifically, according to the model using logistic regression, the articles containing sources from the antagonistic countries and countries other than the U.S. and China are 536% and 636% more likely to focus on the technology issues in their news reports, respectively, while other variables such as newspapers/ ownership of the newspapers, countries of the newspapers, and another dimension of sources, namely the locality of the news sources, were held constant. Regarding the pair of counter-frames, national and public interest frames, the results garnered from the OLS, and logistic regression analysis showed that only the antagonistic sources accounted for the presence and chance of the national interest and public interest frames. Particularly, when the news coverage included sources belonging to the antagonistic countries, they were 136% and 405% more likely to present the issues of public interest and national interest in their salience, respectively, compared to ones using sources from other localities. In other words, all these newspapers, when discussing the national interest and public interest at stake, both of which were central to the

discourse of the trade war, tended to resort to the sources from the antagonistic party in the trade war, either China or the U.S., as opposed to resorting to the sources within their courtiers or from other countries peripherally impacted by the Sino-U.S. trade war. The same tendencies can also be seen in the consequence frames, as those which use sources from the antagonistic countries were 376% more likely to give precedence to the consequences of the trade war, compared to those articles containing merely the sources within their own countries where the newspapers were based. The finding provides several insights. First and foremost, it is not statistically evident that the newspapers using sources from antagonistic and other countries were more inclined to focus on political and ideological issues. Alternatively, these newspapers had the tendency to employ a medley of both domestic and overseas sources in their efforts to politicize the trade war. Also, in their endeavors to focus on issues of national interest, public interest, conflicts, consequences, or even technology theft, the newspapers' preference for citing sources beyond their geographical boundaries or even other foreign countries, potentially catastrophically inflicted by the trade war, can be taken as efforts to seek legitimacy to support their claims from sources geographically outside for persuasion purposes. Finally, those articles and newspapers that tended to resort to geographically distant sources for citation were more likely to present a multitude of frames, in stark contrast with the fact that the news articles tended to use both geographically distant and less distant sources to present the political frames.

Hypothesis 2b*:* Political power reliance of news sources significantly affected the major frames salient in the news coverage of the trade war.

The findings regarding the research question 1 found that the proportionality between the power reliance of source and the political and ideological frames, which led to the politicization of U.S. newspapers, was further corroborated by the OLS and logistic models. The OLS model found that the newspapers containing the higher power reliance of their sources are more likely to contain political and ideological frames. Likewise, as demonstrated by the logistic models, the other factors were held constant. The power reliance of the sources also affected the other hard frames. There are mixed results regarding its effects on the economic frames. There are findings that the news articles containing a higher level of power reliance in their sources are around 30% more likely to contain technology frames, leading to the possible claim that the inclusion of technology issues in the articles is highly politically motivated. The only counter frames in question, the positive causality between the hard counter-frames, namely the national interest frames and the public interest frames, and the power frames were discovered in the OLS models. Likewise, as shown in the two logistic models, while the other factors were accounted for, the news articles cited more from authorities were 20%-22% more likely to contain public interest frames, and they were 25% to 27% more likely to contain national interest frames. Indeed, there were mixed and inconclusive results regarding the causality between the construct and presence of the economic frames. Furthermore, no statistically significant results indicating the causalities between the construct and conflict frames and consequence frames have been observed. Considering the sheer

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number of political frames, national frames, and the public interest frame, these

analyses pinpointed the associations of one dimension of the individual level factors,

source retrieval, with the salience of political issues in a more generic sense.

8.2.3 Research Question 3: Interpretations and Reflections

Research Question 3: Were there significant differences in valence frames

toward the trade war on the business focus of the WSJ and the more commercialized

tabloid-like GT in general?

The research question is based on the discovery from hypotheses 3a and 3b:

According to the study findings, statistically significant differences in terms of

valence frames among the five newspapers have been observed.

Hypothesis 3a: News stories comprising both more salient editorials and

commentaries and less salient information pieces on tabloid-like and more

commercialized newspaper GT tend to present significantly less negative or more

neutral valence frames than China Daily, a Chinese broadsheet newspaper.

Based on the previously presented results from the data analysis, hypothesis

3a is supported by the study findings. More specifically, based on Table 44 and 45, a

comparative cross-national analysis on the valence frames among the five newspapers

revealed that GT had the highest percentage of positively valenced frames (48.65%),

but only slightly higher than China Daily (45.95%), whereas the three U.S. newspapers showed a considerably lower presence of the positively valenced frames, with the WSJ (28.79%) slightly higher than the NYT (13.33%) and the WP (15%). As far as the neutrally valenced frames are concerned, GT (6.76%) is slightly higher than China Daily (4.05%), both of which are lower than the three American newspapers except for the NYT. However, even though both GT and the WSJ have demonstrated a similar trend in the presentation of the negatively valenced frames and neutrally valenced frames, the fact that there existed a distinctive paradigm should not be neglected. A closer examination of the editorials and information pieces on GT revealed an increasing number of nationalists and populist discourses on lauding and foregrounding the innovation of Chinese technology against the odds of economic and political downturns, the supremacy of the Chinese political system, along with its resilient economic mechanism, while the societal, economic, and political consequences were backgrounded. Therefore, the claim can be made based on the empirical evidence garnered from a combination of framing analysis, discourse analysis, and content analysis that GT boasted a higher presence of positively and negatively valenced frames for its more discernible and salient trends of politicization, nationalism, and populism, downplaying the negative consequences entailed and backgrounding the conflicts and tensions while foregrounding the technological and national strengths and advances.

Hypothesis 3b: News stories on the trade war from the WSJ present valence frames significantly more neutral and less negative in contrast to those in stories from non-business newspapers in question, namely the NYT and the WP.

According to the research findings, no statistical differences among the five newspapers have been observed. However, it would be safe to say that this hypothesis is generally confirmed, as it has been found that the WSJ, a more business-focused newspaper, demonstrated a predominantly higher percentage of positively valenced frames compared to the NYT and the WP. In the meantime, the salience of neutrally valenced frames in the WP took second place among the three U.S. newspapers (9.09%), with the WP being first (17.5%).

A cross-national comparison of the valence frames also provides empirical evidence on the discrepancies in the valence frames. To be more specific, it has also been discovered that the WP in contrast to the other two U.S. newspapers is less negatively-valenced. Moreover, another discovery from the hypotheses testing is that while the three U.S. newspapers are generally less positively valenced than their two Chinese counterparts, the two Chinese newspapers were generally more negatively valenced. Regarding the neutrally valenced frames, the three U.S newspapers, particularly the WP (17.50%), took the lead in their salience compared to the two Chinese newspapers. The empirical evidence provides the triangulation of the role of the countries of the newspapers, a societal-level factor, having played in the news making and framing practices by the journalists in their news coverage of the trade war, but the homogeneity of the valence frames among the newspapers of the same origin, in this case, the U.S. and China, fail to provide empirical evidence for the claim regarding the discrepancies in valence frames among the five newspapers, calling for the inclusion of the newspapers, or the ownership into the models in Chapter 5.

8.2.4 Research Question 4: Interpretations and Reflections

Research Question 4: What were the discrepancies in the master and emplotting frames (generic, thematic, and episodic frames) in stories in the U.S. and Chinese press on the Sino-U.S. trade war in general?

Hypothesis 4a: The three elite U.S. newspapers and the two Chinese news outlets tended to present news stories on the trade war in significantly different master and emplotting frames (generic, thematic, and episodic).

This hypothesis can be validated as a wide range of chi-squared tests were used to demonstrate not only that there are statistically significant differences among the five newspapers in political frames, economic frames, conflict frames, human rights frames, consequence frames, and secondary technology frames, including the frames of technology theft and forced technology transfer and the frames of types of technology disputes. Moreover, statistically significant differences between Chinese newspapers and U.S. newspapers in power reliance frames, conflict frames, consequence frames, and technology frames have been also observed. However, the morality frames, racism frames, responsible capitalism frames, and accountability/attribution of responsibility frames failed to see statistically significant differences among the five newspapers, with marginal existence, even though there has been a wide range of research devoted to the study of these frames. A wide range of comprehensive diachronic analyses on these frames further identified and

distinguished the master and emplotting frames based on their presence and salience along the timeline.

Hypothesis 4b: In terms of the generic, thematic, and episodic frames, news stories in the tabloid newspaper GT and the more business-focused WSJ tend to present significantly more soft frames and fewer hard frames than China Daily, a Chinese broadsheet newspaper, and three broadsheet U.S. newspapers, respectively.

Rosendale and Longcore (2015) conducted a content analysis on news reports on three nationally televised evening news programs to further inform the classification of hard news vis-à-vis soft news. Nevertheless, when it comes to the major events of such great importance as the Sino-U.S. trade war, the classification of the news as mere hard news vis-à-vis soft news appears to be overgeneralized and over-simplistic. Therefore, this study has proposed the employment of hard frames vis-à-vis soft frames to better grasp the nuances of the news reporting on the trade war. Regarding the WSJ, this hypothesis should be not rejected based on the OLS and logistics models in Chapter 5, which demonstrated the causalities between the countries of the newspapers, society-level factors, or the newspapers measuring the ownership of the newspapers, and an array of master frames, along with a wide range of chi-squared tests having been conducted. This provides further triangulation of the hypothesis on the role of the ownership of the newspapers and the country (origin) of the newspapers in influencing the major generic and thematic frames identified in Chapter 6 and 7, respectively. The models presented in Chapter 5 documented the

effects of these two factors in determining the master frames, while the other two factors measuring the two dimensions of the sources were held constant.

As far as the political frames are concerned, compared to the baseline, the NYT and the WSJ are statistically significantly less likely to present political and ideological frames. The same trend can also be seen in the logistic regression, which indicated that the WSJ, compared to the NYT, is 55% less likely to present political frames in line with the findings retrieved from the Chi-squared analysis presented in the earlier sections to confirm the precedence of the WSJ in its role to predict fewer hard frames, in this case, political and ideological frames. Also, the countries of the newspapers, the U.S. vis-à-vis China, failed to stand out in both OLS and logistic regression, along with the Chi-squared tests as significant determinants in predicting political frames. In the meantime, according to the regression model in Chapter 5, the ownership /newspapers and the country/origin (U.S. vis-à-vis China) variables were not significant determinants in predicting conflict frames, harder types of frames, along with the three frames, viz. economic frames, technology frames, and consequence frames, all of which boasted the great presence of the five newspapers.

The counter-frames in the form of the national interest frames vis-à-vis the public interest frames, both of which are harder frames, demonstrated significant results regarding their stronger presence compared to the other two U.S. newspapers, which are elaborated on in the next section. The hypotheses regarding the counter-frames are also further corroborated by the Chi-squared tests having shown the

precedence given to the WP and the NYT over the WSJ in both the national interest and public interest frames.

The findings from the OLS and logistic regression tests only partially confirmed the hypothesis, as only the political frames, national interest frames, and public interest frames can be determined by the two determinants, providing grounds for the nuances in the effects of newspaper ownership and the origin/country of the newspapers on the frames. The remainders included in the models presented in Chapter 5 are also harder frames compared to the racism frames, responsible capitalism frames, if not less important than the political and ideological frames, national interest frames, and public interest frames, all without exception failed to display their being significantly determined by the two factors, as demonstrated by the regression models. However, the results of chi-squared test discussed in Chapter 5 demonstrated the opposite results, namely a significant predominance of the conflict frames in the WSJ compared to the NYT and the WP, despite the small number of conflict frames compared to that of the political frames, contrary to what has been hypothesized regarding the WSJ for its lower dominance than the NYT and the WSJ on the hard frames.

Regarding the less dominant frames and soft frames identified in Chapters 6 and 7, power reliance frames and responsible capitalism frames. According to the Chi-squared tests, failed to show significant results regarding the role newspapers played in making predictions regarding the discrepancies in the presence of the power reliance frames. Human rights frames, morality frames, and attribution of

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accountability frames saw significant results regarding the discrepancies among the five newspapers, but not the stronger presence of these frames on the WSJ compared to the other two U.S. newspapers in question.

Thus, we can draw the conclusion that the WSJ showed a greater presence of hard frames in the case of political and ideological frames, national interest frames, and public interest frames, considering their greater presence by percentage and their sheer greater number, but not in the case of the economic frames, consequence frames, and conflict frames, all of which rendered the opposite results but with comparatively marginal presence. In the meantime, the WSJ failed to show the stronger presence of the soft frames for the following reasons: their marginal existence in either number or percentage, compared with the hard and dominant frames having been identified, the insignificant results regarding the discrepancies among the five newspapers, and the WSJ's weaker presence of these frames.

The hypothesis on the GT was rejected based on the strong evidence connoting otherwise. Due to its 47% lower likelihood of presenting public interest frames based on the logistic regression analysis and its significant and lower presence of public interest frames. Furthermore, compared to China Daily, GT has also shown significantly stronger salience in harder frames such as political and ideological frames, conflict frames, and consequence frames, but not in softer frames such as human rights frames, technology frames, or economic frames. Given that there were no significant differences in political and ideological frames and economic frames, between the Chinese and U.S. newspapers, based on the rejection of the hypothesis

on GT, the postulation can be made that GT demonstrated a higher level of nationalism and politicization compared to China Daily as efforts to make intra-national inquiries of the news-making process.

Hypothesis 4c: In terms of the generic, thematic, and episodic frames, news stories in the tabloid-like newspaper GT and the more business-focused WSJ tend to present significantly less national interest frames and more public interest frames than China Daily, a Chinese broadsheet newspaper, and three broadsheet U.S. newspapers, respectively.

The hypothesis is validated in the case of the WSJ only, but not GT. Alternatively, the WSJ saw less salience in the national interest and more salience in the public interest. There was precedence of U.S. newspapers in the salience of national interest over Chinese newspapers in general, and the predominance of the two Chinese newspapers over the three U.S. newspapers in the public interest frames, a reflection of the nationalism tendency characterized in the Chinese press and the role that the U.S. press plays in helping the establishment. Moreover, an intranational analysis revealed GT's ascendancy over CD in the national interest, but a reverse trend was witnessed in the public interest. More specifically, it has been found that the other factors such as the two constructs of the sources are held constant. GT was 47% less likely to give salience to the public interest. The WSJ, among the three U.S. newspapers, showed the most presence in the public frames, whereas the WP displayed the least. A more nuanced analysis on the secondary national and public interest frames is equally informative. All three U.S. newspapers with WP taking

precedence, followed by the NYT and the WSJ, were disproportionately preoccupied with the national interest of the U.S. being compromised, and generally had a disproportionately lower presence regarding the national interest of China being compromised and advanced, in stark contrast to the high salience given to China's national interest being advanced and compromised in GT and CD. A similar trend can also be seen in the analysis of the secondary public interest frames present in the five newspapers. This pinpointed the parochialism and American-grit of the U.S. press in reporting the major events concerning the national and public interest beyond the geographical boundaries of the U.S., further corroborating the involution of the tendencies in their journalistic practices, with minor variations among the five newspapers, showcasing the tendency of the pluralistic involution. In contrast, the two Chinese newspapers were characterized by homogeneity in the secondary national interest and public interest frames, which can be partially attributable to "party-market corporatism" (Lee, 1999), but the one-size-fits-all terms might appear to be slightly over-generalized to account for the nuances present in the homogeneity of the secondary national and public interest frames in the delineation of the national and public interest being advanced and compromised. The disproportionately greater salience of the national interest of the U.S. being compromised and the public interest being compromised, particularly the former, along with the greater proportion of news coverage on China's national and public interest being advanced can be seen as further deviations of journalistic professionalism toward propaganda and promotion of nationalism basing itself on the news coverage on technology advances or the superiority of China, demonstrating increasingly more common practices of "turning

funerals into weddings", which is a buzz expression describing propaganda by

Chinese authorities.

Figure 50
National Interest Frames vis-à-vis Public Interest Frames: Dual Roles vs. Monoroles

8.2.5 Research Question 5: Interpretations and Reflections

   Research Question 5: How did frame-building of the Sino-US trade war

process develop over the timeline punctuated by critical events? In other words, how

the master and emplotting frames (generic, thematic, and episodic) evolve overtime?

Hypothesis 5a: Various news agencies and organizations tended to adopt different major and emplotting news frames over the timeline, both intra-nationally, and cross-nationally, in a diachronic and dynamic process.

The findings of noticeable and statistically significant differences in all framing analysis from both Chapters 6 and 7 revealed that this hypothesis is supported by the study findings. The commonality of the diachronic process of the three U.S. newspapers is that they share the same master and emplotting frames, having been identified based on the numbers and percentage of the randomly selected sample. Political frames, conflict frames, economic frames, and consequence frames were identified as master frames for further analyses in Chapter 6 along the timeline, punctuated by critical events into four phases. Meanwhile, regarding the three U.S newspapers, four less dominant or emplotting frames have also been identified, which were technology frames, a pair of counter-frames, national interest frames vis-à-vis public interest frames, and power reliance frames. However, a closer examination of both master and emplotting frames trend illustrated not only significant discrepancies in their framing practices in both master and emplotting frames categories but also noticeable trends for using alternative and oppositional frames as characterized in the news coverage of the three U.S. media, which were elaborated in the testing of hypothesis 5b.

Brownlee and Bean (2012), having synthesized various recent studies on journalism in U.S. context overtime on the basis of the random sampling of a large journalist pool in most types of media, pinpoints the homogeneous features U.S.

journalists shared under this tumultuous age, particularly with the advent of ICT technologies. In light of political views, American journalists identifying themselves as "pretty far to the left'' and "a little to the left" have been found to be more liberal than the general U.S. population with the tendency to identify themselves as "pretty right to the left" and "a little to the right" (p.350). The diachronic panel studies and census also identified the increasing but underrepresented trend of female and minority populations of full-time journalists working in U.S. media. This study (Brownlee & Bean, 2012) also synthesized various panel studies to examine other personal factors influencing journalistic practice, including job satisfaction, tasks, career commitment, and income. Job satisfaction has been discovered as being stable across the years, and journalists working for news services and those working for a radio station were among those with the highest job satisfaction with rates of 90% and 91%, respectively. According to the same study, job satisfaction can be perceived through the following three dimensions: structures of the organizations, "organization goals, priorities and conditions" (p.354), and working environment and individual characteristics. It has also been highlighted by panel studies having been synthesized career commitment is also correlated with job satisfaction, values of the organization, illustrated by whether the organizations "value quality over profits" (p.345), and income was mainly characterized by not only gender gap but also generation gap, and under the influence of other demographics of journalists working for the news institutions, such as organization sizes, educational levels, experience, and supervisory roles. All these constructs mentioned earlier have been very instrumental to the ontological and epistemological inquiries within the U.S. journalists' framing practices, job satisfaction, salaries, career commitment, working environment,

organizational structure, and values. In this study, these are generalized into broader

and overarching factors of news organizations or the country of the newspapers for

better operationalization purposes and parsimony of the models to achieve a higher

level of abstraction and interpretive paradigms. The two constructs most relevant to

the study on the U.S. elite press practices were professionalism autonomy, a shift in

journalistic roles, and ethical lapses. If this homogeneity of demographics and

personal factors were unable to provide justifications for the discrepancies, a closer

examination of these three constructs and more nuanced but contextualized inquiries

become increasingly more meaningful and relevant. Another panel study conducted

by Beam et al. (2009) highlighted the erosion in professionalism freedom or

autonomy and identified the reasons that led to the professionalism erosion and

ethical lapses based on the interviews conducted with 400 journalists. Beam et

al.(2009) discovered that there were increasing restraints imposed on the journalists

in their autonomy and freedom in recent years, as a result of commercial constraints

ranging from insufficient resources for gathering news and pressure from advertisers

to meet the business goals. These were exacerbated under the contexts of a recent

economic downturn after generations of profitability of the news organizations

(Brownlee & Beam, 2012), the limitations resulting from conventions, procedures,

and policies from the news institutions were working for, imposed by managers,

editors, and supervisor, agents from outside, such as governments' refusal to disclose

certain information, and constraints imposed by surprisingly even their

professionalism such as ethical concerns. These restraints also correspond to the

societal, institutional, and individual hierarchical effects on news making and

journalistic practices (Shoemaker et al., 2020, Shoemaker & Reese 1996, 2004).

Beam et al.'s (2009) survey results also revealed the declining ethical standards in many cases, among all of which, there was an increasing tendency toward the justifications for the practice recreation and even dramatization of stories relevant to news making process. Another panel study conducted in 2002 (Weaver et al., 2007) highlighted the shift in the perception of journalistic roles. They found that journalists tended to shift their attention in recent years to analysis and interpretation of more complex issues, being adversarial of government, making efforts to develop culture and intellectual interest among the public, and most importantly, the skepticism toward events of national importance, engendering growing interest in and focus on the local news at the loss of international news. The institutional and editorial limits imposed to the journalists at the institutional levels have also been further confirmed and highlighted by one correspondent, currently working for WSJ, who stated:

I would interpret the US strategies more in a short-term perspective. They aim to alter the trade deficits that were generated from a decades-long practice of international market division and interest exchange, or rather some kinds of agreement between a conventional great power and a rising giant. When the trade war started, such tactics brought those under the table to the surface and caused pains in a short space of time. But I don't expect them to fundamentally change each other's relative positions and most of China's deep-rooted system and their organizations, such as SOEs…. Believe(ing) the trade war is just an early part of the trend, or a background, that gave more reasons to the nationalism. And what happened following the trade war created more direct risks to the globalization…

(I was) trained by different education and journalism systems (the so-called "Communist" Chinese, more-US-style Hong Kong, and liberal/progressive European), my ideas regarding these problems are mixed, and sometimes fight against each other. I try to understand the issues under a broader and long-termed context, but a daily news piece, or even a feature, usually won't be able to outline the full picture of my thinking. (I) would say the news show mostly the editorial's values and give very limited space for reporter's own ideas, which is very different from an opinion piece. Journalists shall stand with the values of the media institutions that they work for. It is a mutual selection and identification started from the recruitment, and only with this premise can they better perform their jobs in the long run. Then, the variety would show on journalists' works as they have different knowledge, opinions, preferences and beliefs, and thus, presenting a "balance of different voices" in their own way, though they usually won't be easily affected by other outside sources. (…) (As) for global news outlets, their values could be very diverse when doing reporting, and gradually flatten or centralized going through the editing and publishing process.

I don't really feel identified with my employer's discourse, and there is little chance to have your own values stand out from the final published work. But this is much less obvious in business and corporation news compared with general and political service, though everything is becoming more and more political.

Feel that in many newsrooms, certain agendas or judgment are still formed before doing (news) reporting, and (I can) see a clearer trend that the narratives of different media organizations would go towards two extremes. Under such circumstances, reporters won't have much space to interpret the discrepancies or deviations, but mostly rely on the choice of language and details to "tune" the story, leaving hints for readers to pick up.

In his interview, the journalist referred to the adversarial nature of journalistic roles by stating their tendency of being not easily swayed by outside sources and presenting a balance of different voices in their ways. He also acknowledged the limits imposed on their professional autonomy and freedom at the institutional level, as " (journalists') values could be very diverse when doing reporting, and gradually flatten or centralized going through the editing and publishing process" and "(j)journalists shall stand with the values of the media institutions that they work for.'' "It (was) a mutual selection and identification started from the recruitment, and only with this premise they can better perform their jobs in the long run.'' He also emphasized the strategies and tactics of circumventing self-censorship, while working for a more political news agency. Considering the homogeneity among journalists as evidenced in the panel study conducted by Brownlee & Bean (2012), the diachronic discrepancies in both master and emplotting frames among the three U.S. newspapers can mostly be attributed to the institutional and societal influence. The interview also revealed that even with the more diverse backgrounds, belief, and values characterizing the journalists working at the same institutions, the diversity of values could be flattened or even centralized after going through the editing and publishing services, if recreation and dramatizing as discovered by Weaver et al. (2007) is too fetching, the overwhelming influence exerted at the institutional levels can never be ruled out. This process, as revealed by the interview, was also further corroborated by the panel study (Weaver et al., 2007). The study showed that, compared to the figure in the 2002 survey, a larger number of journalists have been engaged in overtime editing for others' work as part of the trend of the multi-tasking with the advent of

ICT technology. It is also worth noting when asked about the national and public interest of the U.S. at stakes during the trade war under a larger context, the journalists' answers displayed a tendency of more on the technicality levels at the expense of examination and reflection on the major event as important as the trade war under a larger global context, further lending support to the more localization and involution trend this study claimed. A second interview with a journalist provides further support for this argument, as demonstrated by the seemingly more myopic views toward the trade war and the increasing institutional obstacles to professional autonomy and freedom. He has been working as a journalist for an international desk for decades. As a more senior journalist compared to the first interviewee, he had a supervisory role, having more leeway in terms of professional autonomy. However, the daily routine second candidate was still under tremendous institutional and societal constraints, and his take on Sino-U.S. trade war was less narrow than the first interviewees but still from looking at the bigger pictures of a trade war in light of its underlying meanings. In other words, he, as a senior correspondent, did not appear to move further steps away from the homogeneity. When it came to trade war, the interviewed journalist argued:

I assume "trade war" is being used as shorthand for the overall antagonistic attitude(s) toward China. Inevitably, with western countries not wanting to be dependent on China, supply chains will shift but this doesn't mean the end of globalization. If supply chains shift from China to India, for instance, there is still globalization, but China will lose out. Again, "trade war" in its literal sense doesn't necessarily lead to decoupling, but there is a desire on the part of some US officials to move in that direction, though it is unlikely to happen. There are too many linkages between the US and China, and it is highly unlikely that the world's two largest economies will have no economic linkages. I don't understand the "China Exceptionalism" part of the question. As for peaceful evolution, Washington's China policy over the last 40 years was precisely to bring about peaceful evolution. I think the US has abandoned this idea, and the "trade war" as such certainly isn't designed to bring about this.

My attitude(s) towards China has evolved over the last 40 years as a result of personal observation, experience, and the events you cite. I believe, as is the case with everyone, that what I write to some extent reflects my attitude. It is difficult to say specifically how the changed attitude affects my writing. I hope it means that I am now able to bring a more mature approach to the events that I report and comment on. Since there was no "trade war" before 2018, I cannot say that my reporting on the trade war has changed. Looking back, I think that I used to write, hoping that my words may influence China's actions. Now, I no longer adopt that stance and tend, as a result, to be more negative in commenting on China. (…) How do you strike a balance the opinions, logic, and

stance of the others with your own in your news reporting? I don't report the news anymore. I merely comment. I tr(ied) to bring insight into a situation. The question of balancing the views of others doesn't really enter into it.

Regarding the two Chinese newspapers in a succession of diachronic analyses, the following four frames have been identified: the master frames viz. economic frames, national interest frames, conflict frames, and consequences based on their frequencies. In the meantime, the following four emplotting frames have also been identified: political frame, power reliance frames, public interest frames, and technology frames. The categorization of master and emplotting on the two Chinese newspapers was slightly different from the typology of the two types of frames among the three English newspapers. They are mostly based on the following criteria: the frequency and framing ratio of these frames along the timeline, for optimal operationalization, even though national interest frames and public interest frames were assigned to master frames and emplotting frames, respectively, as opposed to the case of analyses on the frames present on the three U.S. newspapers. A multitude of analyses on the presence of the framing ratio of the frames in question revealed the superiority of GT over CD in all the master and emplotting frames. These include political and ideological frames, power reliance frames, economic frames, conflict frames, public frames, national frames, and consequence frames, except for technology frames, in which case, a reverse trend of the emplotting technology frames demonstrating its slight edge in its presence on China Daily than that on GT. However, a second glimpse into the diachronic framing process revealed that even though most of the frames of GT, including the political frames, consequence frames, conflict frames, also referred to as antagonistic frames, political frames, and power reliance frames, started at a very low level in phase 1 of the timeline. All experienced

a hike in the second or/and third phase of the timeline, while GT's economic frames and public interest frame did not show any considerable increase and its technology frames experienced a transient spike but maintained at a very low level in phase 2. In contrast, the presence of most frames, on China Daily except for technology frames which throughout the entire period, underwent somewhat a similar trend of starting at a considerably higher level than that of GT, all experienced steady decrease. The comparison and contrast pinpointed to the antagonistic politicization and nationalism of the GT, particularly during the trade war's second and third phases, due to the higher presence of mostly politically related or antagonistic frames, along with reference to the consequences of the trade war than those on CD. This is a discovery that would otherwise not be found if a comprehensive and more nuanced analysis of diachronic framing was not conducted. The claim can be further corroborated by the low presence of technology frames, national interest frames, public interest frames, and last but not least, on GT, with an only short-lived inconspicuous rise in mere one phase on the timeline of the trade war, even if it is very difficult to detach the Sino-US trade war from these aforementioned issues. Moreover, the analysis on the salience of secondary national and public interest frames on all five newspapers revealed the nationalist populism having characterized GT and CD, particularly the former, due to GT's considerably greater salience having been given to the advanced national and public interest of China, with their almost tantamount level of salience given to the compromised national and public interest of the U.S. as their U.S. counterparts, and, moreover, the same level of extensive coverage on the negative societal and economic influences on the livelihood of U.S population and U.S. economy with barely any employment of episodic frames, whereas pessimism toward

the escalation of the trade war was more predominant among the three U.S. newspapers, particularly permeating the second and third phases of the ever escalating trade war, even though the employment of episodic frames were much rarer than that from the three U.S. newspapers which also tend to feature an extensive range of interpretive investigative news reports on more local and domestic issues such as poverty, inequality. Further lending support to tendencies of U.S. press and their journalists increasing predilections toward more local news but more complex issues and fading interest in international affairs.

Hypothesis 5b: In terms of generic, thematic, and episodic frames, along the timeline of the trade war, the newspapers tended to give salience to the alternative and oppositional frames to renew, defend, and revise the dominant and master frames.

This hypothesis is validated with qualifications only on the WSJ and the WP but failed to be validated in the case of the two Chinese newspapers and NYT. There was a similar if not homogeneous trend in the development of the generic, thematic, and episodic frames, despite variance in a number of framing ratios, along the timeline of the trade war, as in the cases of both GT and CD, even though their patterns were entirely distinct from each other. Therefore, this hypothesis is rejected in the cases of the two Chinese newspapers, considering that their frame development pattern fails to reveal the use of alternative and oppositional frames by the two news agencies and their journalists. More nuances were witnessed in the delineation of the patterns demonstrated in the diachronic framing analysis. The homogeneous trend in

framing can also be seen in the NYT, in which case, the four emplotting frames follow a similar, if not entirely homogeneous, pattern as its four previously identified master frames, indicating the dearth of the subtler tactics of using alternative and oppositional frames by their journalists in their tactical efforts get around censorship, institutional constraints, and further push the boundaries further beyond the institutionally imposed, commercially pressure, and most importantly, socially shaped reins. As in the case of the WP, along with the progress of the trade war, national interest frames and power reliance frames, two emplotting and less dominant frames, starting from the second phase till the end of the third phase, serve as the alternative frames for two more politicized master frames, consequence frames, and conflict frames, possibly to reinforce and renew the tendency of politicization. However, as in the case of WSJ, a less politicized and business-focused newspaper, starting from scratch, the two master frames, the consequence frames, and conflict frames underwent steady decline until the third phase. Meanwhile, during the first phase, the two emplotting frames, national interest frames, and technology frames which experienced a sudden increase, serve as the alternative frames, but starting from the second phase to the third, phase the other two emplotting frames, power reliance, and public interest frames started to take on the alternative roles. An interpretation into the employment of the strategy is to maintain a certain level of politicization and the diversity of the salience to other issues by the WSJ.

8.2.6 Research Question 6: Interpretations and Reflections

Research Question 6 (Editorials vis-à-vis Information Pieces): Were news stories and editorials significantly different in the use of valence and generic frames of the Sino-U.S. trade war?

Hypothesis 6: There are significant differences regarding generic and valence frames between newspaper editorials and news reports.

Generally, no statistically significant differences in valence frames between information pieces and editorials have been observed. Therefore, the focus should be put on the generic and thematic frames. It has been observed that, in general, there were significant discrepancies in the presence of the most master frames including economic frames, power reliance frames, political and ideological frames, conflict frames, and consequence frames, along with the less dominant emplotting frames revealed in the diachronic process of the timeline such as human rights frames, morality frames, and editorials taking presence in their salience. In other words, more salience in these frames including most master frames and some emplotting frames was given to the editorials than to information pieces in general. Generally, it is worth mentioning that no statistically significant differences in the public interest frames between editorials and information pieces in the newspapers have been observed. In other words, the analysis on the only counter-frames in the national interest frames vis-à-vis the public interest frames demonstrated that the salience of the national interest was given more to editorials than information pieces, whereas the salience of the public interest was not the case, as there was a presence of public interest frames in a similar fashion between the more salient editorials and the less

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salient information pieces. The salience of these frames on both editorials and

information pieces revealed the fact that the newspapers, both U.S. and Chinese,

tended to be more outspoken in their coverage of the trade war on political,

economic, conflict, human rights, and morality issues, whereas it takes more

maneuvering for journalists to circumvent possible self-censorship and move the

institutional and societal boundaries to push for the predominant public interest in

relation to the trade war in a more nuanced way, while avoiding the forthright

assertions on public interest being advanced or compromised. A respective

examination of the U.S. and Chinese newspapers revealed a similar trend with few

exceptions.

Future research can examine the intra-national discrepancies in generic and

thematic frames between editorials and information pieces, namely, to study the

discrepancies of editorials vis-à-vis information pieces in generic and thematic frames

among the three U.S. newspapers and Chinese newspapers, respectively. Due to the

technical difficulties, this research solely focused on the discrepancies in generic and

thematic frames of editorials vis-à-vis information pieces in a more generic sense,

and cross-nationally. Another area pending future research is to make further

inquiries into the extent to which the number of sources and the two dimensions of

the sources, in this study the locality of the sources and the power reliance of the

sources, relates to the framing discrepancies of the editorials vis-à-vis the information

pieces, serving as points of departure for the sake of informing other literature on

news making and framing studies.

Chapter 9 Conclusion: Core Concepts, Dynamics, Implications, and Limitations

9.1 International Outlooks and Middle-Range Theorization

Based on the findings after an array of comprehensive intranational and cross-national analyses in this study and extant literature, this section aimed to make a generalization and have drawn to the conclusion as follows to inform the middle-range theories and provide grounds for further research in journalism, communication

studies, and international communication studies. Except for the national interest, in which case, more salience was given to the editorials than information news pieces, this study shows the news coverage in all the five newspapers, both Chinese and American gives equal or at least very similar salience to other major frames identified in Chapter 5. It includes technology frame, economic frames, political and ideological frames, consequence frames, public interest frames, conflict frames, and so forth, on their editorials and information pieces without substantiated differences. Therefore, a succession of analyses on the salience of issues represented in a major event, such as the trade war and their predictors at various hierarchical levels are very telling in elucidating the journalists' daily routines of pushing the boundaries of censorship at various levels while employing tactics to circumvent the imposed hindrances in their daily negotiations between the influences exerted on their practices and journalists' ethical standards and professionalism. The research findings regarding the considerable framing discrepancies and evident nuances among the three U.S. newspapers and two Chinese newspapers contested the findings reported by Curran et al. (2017) on a five-country reappraisal of the news report on the 2012 election in China, which had recorded global affinity and conformity, attributable to the existence of international news agencies, shared journalistic culture, Cold War legacy, shared views among journalists on allied nations, and hegemony of thoughts on market liberalism. Thus, this dissertation offers a new perspective into the nuances in journalists' practices under different microscopes.

9.2 Involution Tendency of U.S. Press

The three U.S newspapers demonstrated stronger predilections of involution in their news coverage regarding major events, as in the case of the Sino-US trade war on multi-levels. Based on the following criterion and sufficient commensurable empirical evidence, the more business-focused WSJ showed the least tendency of involution, while the WP demonstrated its positioning further on the opposite side of the continuum of the involution, stretching from the least to the most in terms of degree. However, it cannot be ruled out that the WSJ still displayed a considerably high level of involution proneness, as the multivariate regression analysis also showed the positive institutional effects of the WSJ on the presence and salience of national interest at stakes due to the occurrence of the trade war.

First and foremost, U.S. journalists, at individual levels, most evidently in the WP, tended to use the sources geographically closer to them, mostly in the U.S., in stark contrast to the two Chinese newspapers, an indication of the ever-increasing involution tendencies of U.S. newspapers. Second, the three U.S. newspapers, particularly the WP, tended to be less likely to present a less diversity of frames, particularly giving salience to the political and ideological frames, conflict frames, national and public interest frames, economic frames, technology frames, and consequence frames. As this strong evidence pinpoints the negative correlations between the geographical distances of the sources and diversification of frames, further confirming the trend of the involution trend of the U.S. elite press, particularly the more conservative the WP, on their output levels.

Furthermore, all three U.S. newspapers with the WP taking the lead, followed by the NYT and the WSJ, were disproportionately devoted with the national interest of the U.S. being compromised. They generally had a disproportionately lower presence regarding the national interest of China being compromised and advanced, in stark contrast to the high salience given to China's national interest being advanced and compromised in GT and CD. The study findings can be associated with the parochialism, pluralistic involution characterizing American in their reporting of others, further validating the involution of the tendencies in their journalistic practices. Last but not least, according to the panel study, conducted from 2002 through 2007 by Brownlee and Beam (2012), also tapped into the journalistic roles, highlighting to the journalists' growing interest in more localized coverage, as opposed to more national and international coverage, lending further support to the involution tendencies of the American press in general.

However, the findings of two studies conducted by Brownlee and Beam (2012) and Johnston (1976) revealed that on the journalists' growing endorsement of their adversarial roles of public officials and interpretive functions, along with populist-mobilizing roles and more analysis on complex problems was invalidated with their heavy reliance on citing government sources and sources from authorities. The myopic and over simplistic take on trade war as exhibited in the interviews also serve as a direct rebuttal to and contest the interpretive and adversarial roles journalists should take on and their growing interest in interpreting and analyzing complex issues. However, further validation of their involution tendencies cannot be

denied, as represented in their shunning of a more global and broader perspective of the trade war.

9.3 Deviations from Professionalism Characterizing U.S. and Chinese Press

On the one hand, the three U.S. newspapers, particularly the WP, demonstrated a higher level of journalistic professionalism in citing an overwhelming number of sources to back up their assertions, compared to the Chinese newspapers. However, its professionalism standards, in which the U.S. press have long been taking pride, were tremendously compromised for stronger preferences for more localized sources than antagonism sources. Therefore, stronger proneness for less diversity in the issues made salient. Second, the professional standards of the U.S. press were found to undergo further erosion as demonstrated in the stronger tendencies, particularly the WP, in their heavy reliance on government sources and sources from authorities, compared to the two Chinese newspapers, leading to a decline in the diversity of source retrieval from a more diverse pool of sources and confidants. At the institutional level, the two interviewees who have been working as correspondents for WSJ, a business focused and the least politicized U.S papers, both testified the institutional constraints on their daily routines and practices, tracing back to the very beginning of their career. Their professional autonomy and freedom were compromised due to the repeated editing services and institutional censorship that served to centralize more diverse voices from journalists with various backgrounds. Brownlee and Beam (2012) have attributed the compromised professionalism autonomy to the downward job markets for journalists under the circumstances of the

more recent economic predicaments and stress in the industry, outside pressure from advertisers and other commercial reasons, and, most importantly, the policies and conventions of the news agencies. A large-scale panel study (Beam et al., 2009) also recorded the decay in the ethical standards of U.S. journalists from 2002 to 2007, as represented in their attitudes and perception toward controversial practices in their reporting, even if during the same period, these journalists were reported to be considerably more cautious. Confronted with the declining professionalism autonomy, journalists tended to be more tactful in their maneuvering in circumventing the constraints imposed on their practices. The interviewed senior reporter who has been working for the WSJ and taking on a more supervisory role responded by devoting himself to commenting as opposed to mere news reporting, whereas a sense of dismay, if not disillusionment, permeated the interlocution when it came to the institutional censorship. The diachronic framing analysis also revealed the use of alternative and oppositional frames, as in the case of the WP and WSJ, as tactics for journalists to get around the constraints. Another instance having well illustrated the tactics of U.S. journalists is the discourse analysis on one editorial in Chapter 6, exhibiting in more nuanced and contextualized but less salient ways of disseminating power relations and identity construction while foregrounding many aspects of the trade war.

Also, regarding the three Chinese newspapers, an overview of the secondary counter frame in the form of national interest frames vis-à-vis public interest frames also revealed further deviations of journalistic professionalism toward both inward and outward propaganda and promotion of nationalism basing itself on the news

coverage on technology advances or China's superiority, as validated by the evidence

of the disproportionately greater salience of the national interest of the U.S. being

compromised and the public interest being compromised, particularly the former,

along with the greater proportion of news coverage on China's national and public

interest being advanced in the Chinese context, where "party-market corporatism and

clientelism" (Lee, 2007, p1) prevails under a dictatorial regime.

9.4 Outbound Propagandization: Antagonistic Politicization and Nationalism

The two Chinese newspapers, particularly GT, demonstrated the intent of

outbound propagandization, and a tendency of antagonistic politicization, and

nationalism. First and foremost, the intranational framing analysis revealed that GT

has also shown significantly stronger salience in harder frames such as political and

ideological frames, conflict frames, and consequence frames, but not in softer frames,

such as human rights frames, technology frames, or economic frames, compared to

CD. Second, it is noticeable that GT tended to cite a large number of sources

geographically further away from China than not only CD and the three U.S.

newspapers.

Moreover, compared to CD, GT tended to use antagonistic sources, namely,

the sources from the U.S. and other countries further beyond its geographical

boundaries, indicating its stronger likelihood and propensities for the use a more

variety of sources, particularly making political and ideological issues, conflict,

national interest, and public interest, and technology disputes, and, last but not least,

consequences as a result of the trade war more salient, empirically further confirming its propensity toward nationalism and politicization, given the inclinations toward the longer distance of sources feeding news coverage is an extremely determinant for the salient toward the stronger above-mentioned frames, most of which are politically and ideologically related, and stress China's national and public interest.

The Chinese newspaper's promotion of its media logic and propaganda, in recent years, and especially in the case of trade, were represented by their extensive news coverage of Huawei's rise and technological advances to promote its nationalism and outbound propagandization agenda to enhance the pull factors for foreign investment and China's soft powers. As a result, the cross-nationally analyses on valence frames revealed an overwhelming trend of using positive valenced frames on GT and China Daily, particularly the former, with news coverage foregrounding China's supremacy in political and economic systems.

The stronger presence of positively valenced frames on GT and China Daily highlighted a recent escalating rise in their concerted efforts to promote nationalism and populism on the Chinese press both more saliently and less saliently. Also, the more intranational politicization and nationalism proneness, characterizing GT's institutional efforts and journalistic practices, were further supported in the discovery regarding the significant effects of ownership and newspapers on the sole counter frames, national frames vis-à-vis public frames. More specifically, while GT was less likely to give salience to the public interest of the two countries, particularly China,

China Daily was more likely to give precedence to the two countries' public interest, with significantly more coverage on the influence exerted by the trade war on China.

Also, the three U.S. newspapers, particularly the WP, demonstrated strong tendencies toward more politicization not only on input but also output levels even though U.S. newspapers tended not to be as politicized as their Chinese counterparts, because the multivariate regression analyses demonstrated the superiority of the two Chinese papers, particularly, GT, over the three U.S. newspapers in terms of the salience given to the sole counter-frames in the form of national interest frames vis-à-vis public interest frames.

Among the three U.S. newspapers, the WSJ showed the most presence in the public frames, whereas the WP displayed the least. However, it is worth noting that the more business focused WSJ, showed no less tendency of politicization, as WSJ showed a greater salience of hard frames in the case of political and ideological frames and public interest frames, all of which highlighted the degree of politicization due to the sheer number and a significantly high percentage.

First and foremost, a strong presence of two-politically related frames, political and ideological frames and conflict frames, along with their stronger tendencies of the employment of citing more government sources and more sources from authorities, have been well observed.

Second, the stronger politicization inclinations characterizing U.S. press newsrooms were also well observed in its strong tendencies toward the heavy reliance on citing more sources from authorities, a determinant for the propensities for the precedence given to a wide range of political and ideological issues, consequences as a result of the trade war, national and public interest advanced or compromised as a consequence of the trade disputes on technology, more related to forced transfers of technologies, and technology thefts under U.S. contexts, in sharp contrast to the salience give to the technology in Chinese contexts, with greater emphasis placed on innovations of technology and scientific advances with the emergence of the trade war.

Third, the WP, among the three U.S. newspapers from an intranational perspective, was found to be more likely to present political and ideological frames. Besides, a disproportionately high presence of and attention to American national and public interest compromised on GT and China Daily further highlighted their antagonism and hostility toward the U.S.

9.5 Theoretical Contributions, Limitations, and Future Directives

In a nutshell, this dissertation and its abundance of analysis via a medley of research methods contribute both empirically and methodologically to the existing literature on a wide range of areas, including but not confined to framing theory, media images, and journalism theories. The dissertation also provided opportunities via a wide range of quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence, including those retrieved from the more conventional content analyses, framing analyses, interviews, and OLS regression analyses and logistic regression analyses, along with discourse

analysis, for testing the hypotheses on the press, media systems, and international communication which in this dissertation involves the comparison and contrast of journalism practice by Chinese and U.S. journalists for the purpose of accomplishing unity in diversity in theory building, as lots of aforementioned theories were put forth without being supported by sufficient empirical evidence or empirical testing. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study testing the intrinsic and extrinsic factors affecting the frames of major events of as much economical and national importance as the Sino-US trade war, as past studies were devoted to the ideological and political packages associated with the framing of major political events, or mere ad hoc analysis without relating to framing theories and international communication studies. More specifically, first and foremost, this is one of the few studies having tested multi-level factors, both intrinsic and extrinsic, in accordance with the multi-level models dictating news put forth by Shoemaker and Reese (1996) and Reese (2009) on valence, generic, episodic, and thematic frames on both Chinese and U.S. newspapers, to contribute to the theoretical knowledge in the process of framing-building and the journalists' framing practices on many levels, starting from the individual to the institutional and societal levels. Second, this is the first paper quantitatively studying the causal relationships between the two different dimensions of sources, viz. the locality of sources and the power reliance of sources, and several master frames, either thematic or episodic, for the sole purpose of providing more empirical evidence for and informing the extant research on the intrinsic factors at the individual levels on the framing of major or critical events. Third, as opposed to the past studies focusing solely on generalizing patterns of frames of certain issues of great significance, this study is among the few extant studies examining and

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generalizing both diachronic and synchronic or generic patterns of frames on major events. The diachronic framing analyses are conducive to revealing the strategies of employment or the provision of salience to alternative or oppositional frames over time to renew and reinforce dominant ideologies. Fourthly, this study is among the few using mixed methodologies: while the focus was on content analysis, framing analysis, and regression analysis, interviews and discourse analysis were also conducted under different conceptual frameworks for providing cross-referencing and triangulation until the saturation of theories with renewing, modification, and even the redefinition of some core constructs having been employed to account for the different media systems and the factors influencing the news-making and frame-building process. Finally, the model comprising the measurement of the ownership, power reliance of the sources, locality of the sources, and countries of the newspapers to predict a wide range of generic and thematic frames in question not only provided empirical data to corroborate not only the correlations but also the causalities between their factors and a myriad of generic and thematic major frames. It is discovered that there were no statistically significant differences in the valence among different newspapers, and therefore the focus is on the generic and thematic frames in efforts to explore the intrinsic and extrinsic factors in their roles in predicting the frames conceptualized based on extant theories and literature review. Even though, as demonstrated in the data analysis, there were no consistent statistically significant differences in certain master frames based on the models having been tested, there still exist significant results regarding the effects exerted by all these factors. This inconsistency lends support to giving transient salience to alternative and oppositional frames and offers glimpses into the nuances of how these factors affect different

frames for avoiding the over-generalization of the relationships between generic and thematic frames and the proposed factors based on subjective assumptions. This research also provides insights and takeaways for U.S. journalists who can be well aware of the involution and antagonistic politicization trends of current U.S. elite media, so that journalists and media professionals are able to make further improvements on their journalists practices during their daily routines by taking on strategies such as the use of alternative and oppositional frames to circumvent censorship and other institutional influences, and stick to professionalism as set out in journalistic ethical standards, by upholding the interest of the general public and having higher sense of social responsibility. As for news managers and editors, this research is equally informative in terms of being capable of perceiving the antagonistic politicization and involution trends of journalists and reporters, who have managed to give salience to certain frames and been engaged in impression management of reinforcing their political stances, and to avoid inwardness or involution trend as exemplified by a multitude of empirical evidence in this research. For instance, news managers and editors can demand a more diversity of outward-looking sources to feed their news stories, as opposed to citing a large majority of geographically close government and authoritative sources, a mere reflection of further deviation from news professionalism in U.S. press.

Nevertheless, this research also has some limitations. First and foremost, the abundance of data and the introduction of the superfluous intrinsic and extrinsic factors intended to predict the generic and thematic frames failed to achieve the purpose of idealistic parsimony and tended to separate the influencing constructs on

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multiple levels as opposed to stringing these constructs together in a more meaningful, dynamic, and interactive manner and in a more overarching or inclusive model with more explanatory power, considering the complexity of the news-making process, which involves interactions among factors, intrinsic and extrinsic, from the individual level all the way to the more recently formulated levels (Shoemaker et al., 2020) in a more dynamic and diachronic process. Indeed, the research is able to inform researchers in journalism studies in terms of the causalities between the two dimensions of sources, an individual level factors and the frames used by journalists and reporters to give salience to certain issues. More specifically, the research has examined the two most important dimensions of the sources, the locality of the sources and the political power reliance of the sources, both of which have been under-searched. However, due to the complicity in collecting the demographics of the journalists and correspondents who wrote the news pieces on the trade war other than their gender and locality, and the surfeit of the data set and difficulty of conducting a survey with random sampling, this research fails to include other intrinsic factors such as gender, religious affiliation, and political affiliation, along with a wide range of demographic factors, delineating individual-level effects. Another reason for the precedence given to the two dimensions of the sources is that the sources feeding the news coverage on the trade war are at the very core of exploring the individual-level factors influencing the news making process and framing practices, whereas other demographics such as the gender, nationality, ethnicity, and political and religious affiliation also relate to institutional-level factors and ownership, as newspapers tend to hire correspondents, journalists, and editors in line with their political stances. Therefore, it is very difficult in this study to

distinguish these more simplistic demographic factors between the constructs on the individual level and those on higher levels in the hierarchy of the news making process. Since this research was primarily focused on the diachronic process of the framing practices in a more comparative perspective to further inform the literature on international communication, the media system, and framing, along with the causalities between the two dimensions of the sources with the generic and thematic frames, it is not feasible to make further inquiries under different paradigms or conceptual frameworks into the complexity of other intrinsic and extrinsic factors influencing the framing of news coverage, particularly those that are seemingly simplistic but intertwined with other factors at different levels on the hierarchy of the news making process. Therefore, future research should be devoted to further inquiry into the effects of these intrinsic and extrinsic factors on the framing practice and news making, particularly the interactions of these factors, using a more nuanced model to study the subtler relationships and interplay among a multitude of factors at various levels in their roles in the framing and news-making process. The diachronic framing analyses on the newspapers from both China and the U.S., along with the generic framing analyses having identified the master and emplotting frames for further diachronic framing analyses, on the basis of 1,189 randomly selected articles on the topic of the trade war, reveals the necessities of the avoidance of the over-generalization of both the American and the Chinese press in their coverage of major events, as demonstrated by the emergence of oppositional and alternative frames emplotting the dominant frames. Another limitation of the study lies in the fact that even though journalists have been interviewed to provide an epistemological understanding of the framing practices and news making process, future research

might need ethnography to provide triangulation evidence for the research to reach

theoretical saturation. Furthermore, the demarcation of the timeline based on the

critical landmark events into four semesters lasting around 6 months, in efforts to

make inquiries into the shift of the frames in a more nuanced manner also came

across great difficulties, which possibly led to reliability issues. However, phase

four, demarcated by the phase one deal between the two parties, witnessed a marginal

number of news articles on the trade war, partly due to the attention shifted to the

COVID-19 pandemic, setting the agenda for the ensuing news coverage. Thus, future

research may also consider the agenda set by the media institutions and the interplay

between the agenda set by the press and framing practices by journalists and editors

for the modification of the models into more self-contained ones for future studies.

Also, future topics may extend into other issues of national importance, such as the

COVID-19 pandemic, to provide further empirical evidence conducive to furnish a

more nuanced understanding of the conceptualization of the relationships among

sources, framing and major events. Finally, future research could also concentrate on

exploring correlations between the valence frame and thematic frame to further

inform the framing studies.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Interview Guide

NOTE: Dear journalist friends: This is a research project on the news reporting and editorial writings on the Sino–US trade war conducted by the School of Communication, Hong Kong Baptist University, for the purpose of investigating the journalistic practices by the journalists and columnists working for major print news institutions, such as the NYT, Washington Post, and WSJ. All the data and records received will be kept confidential and exclusively for research purposes and will be

discarded within three months after the research is completed. We are very grateful if you can spend 10–15 minutes on answering the questions below.

Personal profile:

Name (either given name or sir name will be fine): Luke

_____

Set of questions on demographics.

1. Which newspaper do/did you work for? Which desk and section were/are you working at or working for?

2. Are you working as a journalist (reporter or editor) or columnist? What is your duration of tenure?

3. What are your ethnic background and political and religious affiliations?

4. Do you believe in that China poses threats to the American democratic of life, free society and its hegemony and Americanism? Do you describe yourself as a Conservatist, centrist, or liberal?

5. Do you believe in the best interest of the US and that the strategies/tactics during the trade war can be best characterized as counter-striking or containment utilizing trade disputes and punitive measures as leverage?

6. Alternatively, do you believe that the trade war constitutes part of the engagement strategies metaphorically comparable with carrots and sticks as endeavors to draw China in as opposed to shutting China out?

7. Do you believe that the trade war is indicative of the demise of globalization, decoupling the US from China and China's exceptionalism and intended to bring the peaceful evolution of China's extant political systems?

8. Have your attitudes toward China changed over the course of the past from the end of the Cold War, Tiananmen crackdown, China joining WTO, and recent trade war? How do your beliefs, attitudes, and values affect your reporting on the trade war?

9. What belief systems, social actors, establishments or institutions, or some other factors have the most influence on your reporting and editorials on the Sino–US trade war regarding the human rights infringements, technology theft, Americanism, democracy, and capitalism?

10. To what extent do you identify yourself with the rhetoric, logic, media logic, strategies, and discourse of media institutions and establishments, politicians, social groups, NGOs, bloggers, user-generated content, and the milieu of the media establishment? How do you strike a balance between the opinions, logic, and stance of the others and your own in your news reporting?

11 How do you convey to or impress your readers your own stance, logic, attitudes, and values in news reporting in terms of the various aspects of the trade war and China if there exist discrepancies and deviations of yours from the logic and rhetoric of the public opinion, government, politicians, and news routine of profession and professionalism?

Appendix 2: Codebook

Level 1 Coding

1. Descriptive variables

The first set of variables comprises descriptive ones; therefore, coders aim to identify the articles from the NYT, WSJ, Washington Post, Global Times, and China Daily. All the relevant information, including page number, date, section of the newspaper, and the type of the article, is very telling in terms of the significance of the article.

Level 2 coding: coding for primary and secondary frames

The variables analyze the primary and secondary media frames. L2 coding identifies both the primary and secondary frames with different characteristics.

Level 2 coding is also meant to identify the basic information regarding the sources to identify the locality of the sources.

The second set of variables analyzes the primary and secondary frames for every single article. According to Bennet (2002), a media frame is an overarching organizing theme packages for the purpose of choosing, underscoring, and connecting various elements of news stories, including but not confined to the characters, scenes, and actions. In the Excel file recording the database, the variables referring to the primary frame will be prefixed with F1. Likewise, the variables prefixed with F2 refer to the analysis of the secondary frame. When there are no secondary frames existing here, you can code NO under the category of F2_Presence, and the rest of the variable with relation to F2 should be coded as N/A or not applicable.

Level 3 coding intends to identify and quantify both the primary and secondary frames in more elaborate ways. Level 3 coding is more intensive and comprehensive than level 2 coding. The third level coding process intends to identify the narratives and discourses in the articles that are meant to represent main adversaries and advocates within the frames, the stances, and ideological positions toward the Sino–US trade war in each article, along with how these positions and beliefs are being qualified and evidenced.

The questions are listed as follows.

Variable 1: How many sources are there in each article?

1 = one, 2 = two, 3 = three, 4 = more than three

Variable 2: Where do the most sources come from?

1. Mostly from its own correspondents and reporters

2. Mostly from the sources in the US

3. Mostly from the sources in China

4. Mostly from the sources in Western countries

5. Mostly from other sources, please specify_____.

Variable 3: Are there political or ideological frames (thematic or generic frames)?

0 = not cited at all, 1 = cited once, 2 = cited twice, 3 = cited three or more times

Variable 4 (secondary political frames, power and authority reliance frames, level 3 coding): if variable 3 is not 0, then political authority frames are quantified by the frequency of quotes elicited from government officials and institutional authorities. Are there political authority frames?

0 = not cited at all, 1 = cited once, 2 = cited twice, and 3 = cited three or more times

Variable 5 (secondary political frames and level 3 coding): if variable 3 is not 0, then variable 5 is intended to measure which regions and governments the authorities mention regarding these political authority frames are from. Where are all these political authority frames from?

(1 = members of the Chinese Communist Party, 2 = Chinese government sources, 3 = Chinese government spokesperson, 4 = source close to the Chinese government and agency, 5 = members of political parties in the US, 6 = US government sources, 7 = US government spokesperson, and 8 = source close to the US government and agencies).

Variable 6 (Conflict frames and coding levels 2 and 3): to what extent are the references to conflicts represented in each article?

1 = many, 2 = several, 3 = few 4. No

Variable 7. (Human rights frame level 3 coding): To what extent are the human rights frames represented in each article? Hence, to measure the variable, how frequent are the mentions of human rights in each article on the Sino–US trade war?

1 = many, 2 = several, 3 = few, 4 = no presence

Variable 8: Are there economic frames or any mention of economic consequences in describing trade wars?

1 = many, 2 = several, 3 = few, 4 = no presence

Variable 9: Are there technological frames or any mention of forced technology transfer by China of US technologies or alleged technology theft by China?

1 = many, 2 = several, 3 = few, 4 = no presence

Variable 10 (Accountability or Responsibility Attribution): Are there discourses or mentions of economic and political problems arising from the Sino–US trade war in each article? (0 = no; 1 = US individuals; 2 = US government and Trump; 3 = US corporations and businesses; 4 = Chinese individuals; 5 = the Chinese government; 6 = Chinese corporations and businesses; and 8 = others, specify: ___)

Variable 11 (Racism Frames, Level 2 Coding): According to each article, to what extent has racism been mentioned to account for the root causes for the Sino–US trade war?

1 = many, 2 = several, 3 = few, 4 = no presence

Variable 12 (Responsible Capitalism Frames)

To what extent are responsible capitalism frames represented in each article? Thus, how many mentions of responsible capitalism or reference to responsible capitalism in the article?

1 = many, 2 = several, 3 = few, 4 = no presence

Variable 13 (Public Interest Frames)

How many times the wording of public interests or its equivalence are mentioned in each article?

1 = many, 2 = several, 3 = few, 4 = no presence

Variable 14 (Public Interest Frame, Third Level Coding)

If there is presence of public interest frames according to the article, then to what extent public interest are being influenced by the trade war?

1. The public interests of the US and China are both compromised.

2. Only the public interests of the US are compromised, whereas China's pubic interests have been advanced.

3. Only the public interests of China are compromised, whereas the public interests of the US are advanced.

4. The public interests of both China and the US have been advanced.

5. Others, please specify _____.

Variable 15 (National Interest Frames)

How many times the wording of national interests or its equivalence is mentioned in each article?

1 = many, 2 = several, 3 = few, 4 = no presence

Variable 16 (National Interest Frames, third level coding)

If there is presence of public interest frames according to the article, then to what extent public interest are being influenced by the trade war?

1. The national interests of the US and China are both compromised.

2. Only the national interests of the US are compromised, whereas China's national interests have been advanced.

3. Only the national interests of China are compromised, whereas the national

interests of the US are advanced.

4. The national interests of both China and the US have been advanced

5. Others, please specify _____.

Variable 17 (Morality Frames)
This frame puts the event, problem, or issue in the context of morals, social
prescriptions, and religious tenets. Neuman et al. (1992) found that the morality
frame was commonly used by journalists indirectly through quotations or inferences,
rather than directly because of the journalistic norm of objectivity.
Is there reference to, mention of, or quotes on the problems in the context of morals,
social prescriptions, social norms, and religious tenets in each article?
1 = many, 2 = several, 3 = few, 4 = no presence

Variable 18: Coder_ID. This variable is meant to identify each coder. The initials of

the coder name can be followed by a sequential number. For instance, if coder 1 is

Michael Jordan, then his Coder_ID is MJ1.

Variable 19: Coder_name. This variable is to enter the full name of the coder (e.g.,

Coder_name: Michael Jordan).

V20: Article_ID. There is an article identity code assigned to each article in the

database. The code for the article is to follow the certain format and

year/day/newspaper/news abbreviation/page number of the article/section where the

news article is located (such as politics, economy, and culture)/order on the page (if

there are two or more than two articles on the page)/above or below the fold (coded

as af/bf).

Newspaper. The newspapers must be coded into categorical variables on the basis of

the title of the newspaper.

1. New York Times: recoded into acronym NYT

2. Washington Post: recoded into acronym WP

3. Wall Street Journal: recoded into acronym WSJ

4. China Daily: recoded into acronym CD

5. Global Times: recoded into acronym GT

V21 Day: The day of the week where the article has been selected from Monday to Sunday (from 1 to 7).

V22 Page: the page number where the article is selected

V23 Section: The section where the article is located, such as business, politics, international, world, US, China, features, front page, and opinions. Thereafter, after the coding, all the options can be recoded and combined into categorical variables.

V24 Date: the date of the article can be coded as the following format DD-month abbreviation-YYYY. For instance, 21-Feb-2018.

V25 Words: the word counts of the article

V26 Type/Genre: the genre or type of the article can be coded as follows:

1 = news, 2 = feature/column, 3 = letter, 4 = editorial, 5 = news summary

V27 Author ： The name of the author of the article as it stands on the article can be

coded into variables.

V28 Headline: the headings and the subheadings of the articles can be copied and

pasted and coded into string variables.

Appendix 3

Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/26/opinion/trump-tariffs-trade-

war-farmers.html

Opinion

Donald Trump's Great Patriotic Wars

The American people are collateral damage in the president's trade conflicts.

By Michelle Cottle

Ms. Cottle is a member of the editorial board.

The Trump administration has been trying out a fresh line with the American public of late: Patriotism requires sacrifice.

As the president's trade wars drag on, putting the economic bite on a growing number of Americans, his team is scrambling to put a nationalist gloss on his protectionist gamble, spinning it as a noble crusade in which the individual interest must be subordinated to the greater good.

Sure Americans "pay a little bit," Mr. Trump acknowledged in a speech to real estate professionals in mid-May. "But it's worth it."

Concerned about losing support among rural voters caught in the tariff crossfire, he recently issued a Twitter proclamation that America's "Patriot Farmers" would eventually be "the biggest beneficiaries of what is happening now." Until then, he plans to subsidize impacted producers. Last Thursday, the Agriculture Department announced that it would provide up to $16 billion in farm aid, to be financed, the president has said, using the "massive Tariffs being paid to the United States for allowing China, and others, to do business with us."

Mr. Trump failed to mention who pays those "massive Tariffs." (Hint: Americans.) But he has never been one to let details get in the way of a good plotline.

The president's chief economic adviser, Larry Kudlow, has been more frank about the United States-China showdown. "Both sides will suffer," he said after trade talks with China broke down earlier this month. But the "possible improvement in trade and

exports and open markets" make the suffering "worthwhile," he added. "You've got to do what you got to do."

Republican lawmakers, usually a free-trade-loving bunch, have taken up the cause as well. Senator Pat Toomey of Pennsylvania allowed that tariffs are "absolutely painful and dislocating," but he reasoned that, someday, Americans might look back and say they were "worth the price."

And when it comes to wrapping tariffs in the flag, no one can touch Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas. Yes, the trade war will require "some sacrifices on the part of Americans," he said, but the costs "will be pretty minimal" compared with those paid by American troops serving overseas and our "fallen heroes."

Give Mr. Cotton debate points: Few would dispute that being killed in action is more of a hardship than paying a little extra for spark plugs or baseball mitts or live eels.

Fewer still would make such a tasteless comparison.

Previous presidents have appealed to Americans' patriotism in wartime. In peacetime, President Kennedy's 1961 inaugural entreaty — "Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country." — inspired an entire generation.

The Trumpian call to duty, however, is a particularly bold — even counterintuitive — choice for a president whose core message has always been that he can save anxious Americans from having to make tough choices, to adapt to economic changes or to face scary cultural shifts. His pledge to Make America Great Again has never been about helping move the nation into the future, but about easing it back into a more comforting past. In his capacity as Strong Leader, he has vowed to take care of everything, and it is all going to be "so easy."

There is, in fact, no problem so big or so complex that Mr. Trump has not boasted of his ability to fix it quickly and painlessly. Repealing and replacing Obamacare with a better, cheaper system? Easy. Returning domestic manufacturing to its heyday? Easy. Lowering gas prices? Ending the drug problem? Dealing with China? Easy, easy and easy. Restoring cultural and economic security by erecting a big, beautiful border wall that Mexico will pay for? Piece. Of. Cake.

Of all Mr. Trump's grandiose claims, his pledge to restore lost manufacturing jobs remains among the most heartbreaking. "Don't move. Don't sell your houses," he soothed voters in the Rust Belt town of Youngstown, Ohio, in 2017. "They're all coming back," he promised of the jobs and prosperity.

These dreams have not come to pass.

Mr. Trump's rosy reassurances that trade wars "are good, and easy to win" have proved equally hollow. Farmers are not the only one's suffering. Manufacturers are paying higher prices. The instability is disrupting markets. Small wonder the poll shows only 39 percent of Americans approve of the president's trade policies.

It's always possible that the president will confound the naysayers and emerge from what he has called his "little squabble with China" with some big-picture successes. Alternatively, this folly could wind up wreaking global havoc well beyond the economic sphere.

Either way, Team Trump recognizes the immediate political potential of its new messaging. The president's gift for waging culture war has served him well in keeping his fans riled up and his critics off-kilter. By turning trade into a matter of national pride — a clash of civilizations, if you will — he's reminding supporters that he is fighting for them against both foreign competitors and "globalists" here at

home. This can help distract from whatever economic pain they're experiencing. At least for now.

In the meantime, Mr. Trump has no intention of abandoning his penchant for making impossible promises. At a rally in Montoursville, Pa., last week, he went on and on about how he had saved American industry, saying, "Remember the old days, we actually made our own product." The president lamented the tens of thousands of factories that have been shuttered post-NAFTA, before proclaiming triumphantly, "They're all coming back!"

Are they, Mr. President?

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